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A b s t r a c t 
Political part ies who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced 
to enter some form of coalition. Par t ies can either form a pre-electoral 
coalition prior to an election or they can compete independent ly and 
enter a government coalition afterwards. Al though there is a vast coali-
t ion l i terature, there are no theoretical or empirical s tudies of coalitions 
t h a t form prior to an election. This dissertat ion seeks to redress this 
imbalance in our knowledge of coalitions by explaining the variation in 
electoral coalition formation. 
T h e existing l i terature implicitly suggests t h a t pre-electoral coalition 
formation is a s imple function of electoral rules: the more dispropor-
t ional the electoral system, the more likely a pre-electoral coalition is 
to form. I reframe the notions in the l i terature as testable hypothe-
ses, using an original da tase t comprising all legislative elections in 25 
countries between 1946 and 2002. I find considerable suppor t for the 
following hypothesis: pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in 
VI 
disproport ional electoral systems if there are many parties. However, 
this result does not explain tempora l variation in pre-electoral coalition 
formation, and it ignores t he obvious dis t r ibut ional consequences t h a t 
must be overcome when electoral coalitions are formed. 
I develop a more nuanced explanat ion of electoral coalition forma-
tion using a finite two-player complete-information bargaining game t h a t 
generates implications concerning the probabili ty of pre-electoral coali-
tion formation. T h e plausibility of the model is examined in the context 
of in-depth case studies of pre-electoral coalition formation in the French 
Fifth Republic and in South Korea. 
Finally, I test the model 's hypotheses using a random-effects probi t 
model wi th an original dataset containing information on potent ial coali-
tion dyads in 20 industrialized par l iamentary democracies from 1946 to 
1998. T h e results suppor t the hypotheses derived from the model. Ide-
ological compatibi l i ty increases the likelihood of forming an electoral 
coalition, as do disproportional electoral inst i tut ions. Par t ies are more 
likely to form an electdral coalition if the potent ia l coalition size is be 
large (but not too large) and if the coalition members are of similar elec-
tora l size. Finally, electoral coalitions are more likely if the par ty sys tem 
is polarized and the electoral inst i tut ions are disproportional. 
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C h a p t e r 1 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
In most democracies single part ies are unable to command a majority 
of suppor t in the legislature. T h u s political par t ies who wish t o exercise 
executive power are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. In 
effect, they can either form an electoral coalition wi th another par ty (or 
parties) prior to election or they can compete independent ly and enter a 
government coalition afterwards. I define pre-electoral coalitions fairly 
broadly to include cases in which par ty leaders ei ther announce to the 
electorate tha t they plan to form a government together if successful a t 
t he polls or agree to run under a single name (with joint lists or nomi-
nat ion agreements). T h e common link between these s i tuat ions is t ha t 
par t ies or par ty leaders never compete in elections as t ruly independent 
entities.1 T h e fact t h a t coalition government is the norm ra ther than the 
exception across the world has encouraged a vast l i tera ture to develop 
in political science. T h e overwhelming majori ty of these theoretical and 
empirical studies focus purely on government coalitions; electoral coali-
t ions are virtually ignored. This study- seeks to redress this imbalance 
in our knowledge of coalitions by focusing on pre-electoral coalitions. 
Specifically, it a ims to explain electoral coalition formation. 
Unders tanding the formation of electoral coalitions is impor tan t for 
a t least three reasons. Firs t , electoral coalitions can have a significant 
impact on election outcomes and the types of policy t h a t are ul t imately 
implemented. Consider t he following simple example. Imagine a legisla-
tive election wi th single-member districts in which there are two blocs 
of parties, one on t h e left and one on the right. T h e right-wing bloc 
has more electoral suppor t than the left. Suppose the part ies on the 
left form an electoral coalition and field a common candida te in each 
district, b u t t ha t t he part ies on the right compete independently. T h e 
J There are, of course, finer distinctions t h a t could be m a d e among 
the various types of electoral coalition. For example, one might argue 
t ha t coalitions composed of part ies with different geographical bases 
of suppor t are different from those composed of part ies t ha t normally 
compete in the same districts. Given the limited research on pre-electoral 
coalitions, I focus here on the defining characterist ic of a pre-electoral 
coalition - t h a t par t ies do not compete independent ly - ra ther t han on 
the various ways in which these coalitions can be disaggregated. 
right would most likely lose in this s i tuat ion. In this example the possi-
bility arises t ha t a majori ty of voters could vote for a group of politicians 
who suppor t similar policies and tha t these polit icians might still lose the 
election by failing to coordinate sufficiently.2 T h e result is tha t the left 
par ty is elected t o implement policies t h a t a major i ty of the voters do no t 
want . 3 In as much as one places a normat ive value on the basic principle 
t ha t the candida te wi th t he most suppor t among the electorate should 
be elected, it m a t t e r s whether political elites choose electoral strategies 
and coalitions t h a t make them less likely to win elections. 
Second, the coalition strategies employed by political part ies have 
impor tan t implications for the representat ive na tu re of governments. 
Powell (2000) distinguishes between major i tar ian and proport ional rep-
resentation versions of democrat ic government. In the majori tar ian ver-
sion, a par ty with a majori ty (or plurali ty) of the vote wins the election 
2In a country wi th more proport ional electoral rules, electoral coali-
tions can still play a role in determining the identi ty of the government. 
An electoral coalition may affect the choice of government formateur, or 
allow a small pa r ty t h a t is a potent ia l government member to surpass 
an electoral threshold. Control over the government policy may well go 
to the political part ies who are most effective a t coordinating electoral 
strategies to win a plurali ty of the votes : 
3Cox (1997, 138) argues t ha t this type of s i tuat ion "ought to end in 
fusion, nominat ion agreements, or s t rategic voting." Ei ther t he elites on 
the right should coordinate on electoral s t rategies (fusion or nominat ion 
agreements) , or voters should take the problem out of their hands by 
coordinat ing on the candidate most likely to defeat t he left candida te 
(strategic voting). 
and governs the country until t he next election. In this s i tuat ion t he 
electorate knows tha t their votes directly influence which par ty exerts 
executive power and implements policy. In the proport ional represen-
ta t ion version this is not necessarily true. Elections in these systems 
"serve primarily as devices for electing representat ive agents in postelec-
t ion bargaining processes, ra ther t h a n as devices for choosing a specific 
executive" (Huber 1996, 185). As a result , the lines of accountabil i ty 
are blurred and it is unclear how well voter preferences are reflected in 
t he government t h a t is ul t imately formed. 
To some extent , the formation of pre-electoral coalitions can over-
come this problem since it allows voters to know exactly what the gov-
ernment alternatives are. In fact, pa r ty leaders in the Netherlands, Ire-
land, and Germany have m a d e th is type of a rgument publicly in order 
to explain their par t ic ipat ion in electoral coalitions and in an a t t e m p t to 
appeal to voters (Saalfeld 2000, Mitchell 1999, Klingemann, Hofferbert 
& Budge 1994, De Jong & Pi jnenburg 1986). One might argue t ha t elec-
toral coalitions increase democrat ic t ransparency and provide coalition 
governments with as much of a m a n d a t e as single part ies in major i tar ian 
systems (Budge & Keman 1990). Given the impor tan t implications for 
t he representat ive na tu re of government, one might want to know the 
condit ions under which pre-electoral coalitions form. 
Thi rd , electoral coalitions, are not rare phenomena. Figure 1.1 illus-
t ra tes the number of electoral coalitions per year, the average number 
of part ies part ic ipat ing in these coalitions per election, and the number 
of electoral coalitions t h a t enter government per election for 19 West 
European democracies from 1946 to 2002. T h e specific countries and 
elections are listed in Table 1.1 in t he Appendix to Chap te r l . 4 
T h e sharp increase in t he number of pre-electoral coalitions in the 
la te 1970s is due in pa r t to the inclusion of Spain and Por tuga l in ranks 
of democrat ic countries in the mid-1970s. At any one t ime between 1946-
2002. one could expect t o see an average of over 11 electoral coalitions 
across these countries. T h e average number of part ies par t ic ipat ing in a 
pre-electoral coalition was 2.9. Al though most electoral coalitions com-
prised two parties, some have m a n y parties. For instance, the Union of 
the Democrat ic Center (UCD) comprised 14 part ies in the 1977 Spanish 
elections. Perhaps a more significant point is tha t of the 175 pre-electoral 
coalitions tha t formed in this period, 24% actually ended u p in govern-
ment . 
One recent s tudy on the types of formal government coalition agreements 
found in par l iamentary democracies in Western Europe concluded t h a t 
4See the main Appendix for a detailed description of t he electoral 
coalitions included in this analysis and of the d a t a collection process. 
I present only Western European countries in Figure 1.1, as the vast 
major i ty of work on coalitions uses these countries, or a subset thereof 
(see below for further discussion of these studies). In addit ion, regional 
electoral coalitions are not included, which means t h a t some of the small 
par t ies in pre-electoral coalitions are not counted here. 
Figure 1.1: Pre-Electoral Coalit ions (PEC) in Europe 1946-2002 
0 : 
* Number of PECs per year 
• Number of Governments based on PEC 
- Average Number of Parties in PEC 
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when all of the coalition cabinets in t he sample were considered, many 
had an "identifiable coalition agreement," and t h a t more t han a th i rd 
were wr i t ten prior to the election (Strom & Miiller 2000). Naturally, this 
s tudy did not pick u p all instances of electoral coalitions. However, it 
does serve to emphasize the point t ha t coalition bargaining often occurs 
prior to elections in a wide range of countries. 
Curren t research on coalitions has almost nothing to say abou t these 
pre-electoral coalitions. Those formal models of coalition behavior t ha t 
exist are typically used to predict which government coalition will form 
(Diermeier k Merlo 2001, Strom, Budge & Laver 1994, Baron 1991, 
Aus ten-Smith h Banks 1990, Laver & Shepsle 1990, Baron & Ferejohn 
1989), who gets which portfolio (Warwick & Druckman 2001), how 
long the formation process takes (Mart in & Vanberg 2003, Diermeier 
& van Roozendaal 1998), and how long the government coalition will 
last' (Diermeier, Eraslan & Merlo 2003, Warwick 1999, Diermeier & 
Stevenson 1999, Merlo 1997, Lupia & Strom 1995). Al though these 
models tend to focus on parties, they do occasionally incorporate voter 
choices and candidate entry (Shepsle 1991). For instance, Aus ten-Smith 
and Banks (1988) analyze the s t rategic behavior of voters in their model 
of government coalition formation, and some recent work combines voter 
behavior with post-election elite bargaining (Glasgow & Alvarez 2003, 
Quinn & Mar t in 2002). 
However, none of these formal models of government coalitions ever 
incorporate the possibility of pre-electoral coalitions. Al though -these 
coalitions are occasionally discussed in single-country case studies, es-
pecially in countries such as France, Germany, or Ireland (Hanley 1999, 
Saalfeld 2000, Mitchell 1999), they are rarely the focus of sys temat ic 
investigation. Many of the political scientists who do actual ly address 
electoral coalitions never seem to be primarily interested in s tudying 
t h e pre-election stage of electoral competi t ion as such (Strom, Budge 
& Laver 1994, Laver & Schofield 1998, Muller & St rom 2000, Strom 
& Muller 2000). Electoral coalitions are often t rea ted purely as an in-
terest ing aside. One notable exception is Powell (2000, 247). In the 
conclusion of his recent book, Powell notes t ha t "One area t h a t cries 
out for more serious theoretical and empirical work is t he appearance 
of announced preelectoral coalitions between political part ies. We know 
too little abou t the origins of such coalitions and abou t the great variety 
of forms (shared manifestos, withdrawal of coalition par tners , recom-
mendat ions to voters) t h a t they can take. B u t in a number of countries 
such coalitions unmistakably play a critical role a t b o t h electoral and 
legislative levels." Given the prevalence of electoral coalitions and their 
potent ia l impact on government composition and policies, I believe t h a t 
th is represents a serious omission in our knowledge relating t o coalitions. 
Th i s s tudy begins to address this oversight by examining the conditions 
under which electoral coalitions form. 
Th i s research objective presupposes the existence of a common un-
derlying logic to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. To some ex-
tent , this represents a new approach to analyzing these coalitions. As I 
mentioned earlier, the l imited research tha t already exists on electoral 
coalitions is often country or election specific. One consequence of this 
is the emphasis placed on factors t ha t are idiosyncratic to par t icular 
countries, elections or par ty leaders. For example, the inability of the 
modera te right in France to form electoral coalitions in cer tain elections 
is frequently explained in t e rms of the personal animosities or plain 's tu-
pidi ty ' of par ty leaders (Bell 2000, Goldey 1999, K n a p p 1999, Nay 1994). 
While the country-specific research is both interesting and highly infor-
mative, it does not offer us a general theory for explaining why electoral 
coalitions form. I seek to provide such a . theory in this dissertat ion. 
As with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral 
coalitions is the result of a bargaining process among par ty leaders. For 
example, par ty leaders who wish to form A pre-electoral coalition must 
reach agreement over a joint electoral s t ra tegy and the dis t r ibut ion of 
office benefits t h a t might accrue to them. This may involve outl ining a 
common coalition platform, deciding which par ty gets t o run the more 
powerful ministerial posts , choosing which par ty ' s candida tes should s tep 
down in favor of candidates from their coalition par tner (s ) in partic-
ular districts, or determining which leader is to become pr ime minis-
ter . Clearly, any pre-electoral coalition bargaining process will involve 
a thorny set* of dis t r ibut ional and ideological issues. Ultimately, pa r ty 
leaders must weigh the incentives to form electoral coalitions against t he 
incentives to run independently. 
Before elaborat ing on these incentives, it is wor th not ing t h a t the 
pre-electoral coalition formation process is not qui te t h e same as the 
government coalition formation process. First , electoral advantages t h a t 
come from competing together as a coalition, par t icular ly i n countries 
with dispropprt ional electoral rules, will create incentives to form an 
electoral coalition t h a t are no longer relevant in t he post-election con-
text . P u t differently, forming a government coalition cannot influence 
the probability of electoral victory; electoral coalitions can. Second, it 
is possible t h a t the ideological compatibil i ty constraint facing potent ial 
coalitions is likely to be stronger prior to the election than afterwards. 
This is because voters might be unwilling to vote for electoral coalitions 
comprising par t ies wi th incompatible policy preferences; after the elec-
tion, part ies have more leeway to enter into these types of government 
coalitions because voters are no longer such an immedia te constraint on 
politicians' actions.5 My point here is only t h a t it would be a mistake 
to immediately assume t h a t the same factors which have been found to 
be impor tan t in the government coalition bargaining process will be t he 
same factors t h a t shape pre-electoral coalition formation. 
T h e logic of electoral coalition formation t ha t I present is based on 
the belief t ha t pa r ty leaders care about winning office and policy (Muller 
5 Par t ies may feel constrained in their coalition choices even after the 
election. This is because voters would punish ideologically incompatible 
government coalitions a t subsequent elections. Rat ional par ty leaders 
would look ahead and adjust their coalition behavior accordingly. T h u s 
governments t ha t result from pre-electoral and government coalitions 
might be similar in t e rms of their ideological compatibili ty. (Thanks 
to Bruce Bueno de Mesqui ta for this point.) - However, if pa r ty leaders 
think tha t a par t icular ' incompatible ' coalition is likely to be successful 
in office, they may gamble tha t voters will not punish them in the next 
elections. 
10 
& Strom 1999). Each par ty leader must compare t he util i ty tha t they 
expect to receive if they competed independent ly to t he util i ty t h a t 
they expect to receive if they competed as pa r t of an electoral coalition. 
Consider first the case where par ty i decides to run independently. In 
this scenario, the par ty may be sufficiently successful at the polls t ha t it 
gets to enter government. If t h e pa r ty wins more t h a n 50% of the seats 
it could form a government on its own. In this s i tuat ion the par ty would 
obtain all of the office benefits associated with being in power and could 
set policy at its own ideal point . Clearly, this would be the first choice 
for par ty i. However, pa r ty i will recognize t ha t it is relatively rare for 
a single par ty to control a majori ty of the seats in most par l iamentary 
systems. If par ty i is to enter government, then it is much more likely 
to do so as par t of a government coalition. In this case, par ty i would 
receive some utility from its share of the office benefits and would suffer 
some utility loss from having government policy set at the ideal point of 
the coalition ra ther t han a t its own ideal point . Naturally, the utility loss 
suffered by each coalition par tner would be lower the more ideologically 
compatible the government coalition. Finally, pa r ty i will know tha t 
there is some probabil i ty t h a t it will not get t o enter government if 
it runs independently. If this s i tuat ion arises, then it will receive no 
office benefits and will suffer the utility loss associated with having the 
government set policy at the government ideal point and not at par ty i ' s 
ideal point . Clearly, the lowest possible uti l i ty for par ty i from running 
11 
independent ly would occur if it was in opposit ion and government policy 
was ideologically dis tant from its own ideal point . 
T h e second case is when par ty i decides to run as par t of an electoral 
coalition. Note t h a t in order to form a pre-electoral coalition it is likely 
t h a t pa r ty i will need to make some concessions in t e rms of policy and 
office to its potent ial coalition par tners . For example, it is highly unlikely 
t ha t par ty i would get to set t he coalition policy exactly at its own ideal 
point a n d / o r obta in all of the office benefits if t he electoral coalition 
entered government. These concessions are essentially the exact same 
concessions t ha t part ies which run independent ly would have to make 
when forming a government coalition after the election. Arguably, these 
concessions are more costly to make prior to an election than afterwards. 
This is because any concessions t h a t mus t be made to other part ies in 
te rms of ministerial posts or coalition policies after an election can more 
easily be presented to par ty members as a consequence of the votes 
cast by the electorate; if the concessions occur before an election then 
they can only be blamed on the par ty leadership. Given this, one might 
reasonably wonder why part ies do not simply wait until after the election 
to make these concessions. Indeed, in many elections this is precisely 
what happens . 
However, the key thing to recognize abou t pre-electoral coalitions is 
t h a t they can affect the probabil i ty t h a t a par ty gets to enter govern-
ment . Recognizing this, par ty leaders will form a pre-electoral coalition 
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if they think tha t this will increase their probabil i ty of entering govern-
ment to such an extent t h a t t h e expected util i ty from doing this is larger 
t han the expected utility from running independently. There are several 
reasons why pre-electoral coalitions might be electorally advantageous. 6 
Firs t , it may be the case t h a t an electoral coalition would a t t r ac t 
a higher number of votes t han any of the coalition part ies would win 
running independently. This s i tuat ion might occur if voters are risk 
averse in regard to the policy positions of potent ia l future governments. 
T h a t is, they prefer being able to identify a government al ternat ive to 
being faced with a lottery over possible government outcomes, even if 
t h e mean expected policy position in b o t h cases is identical. T h e lot-
tery over possible government outcomes is less desirable because the 
variance in possible policy positions is greater (Ashworth & Bueno de 
Mesqui ta 2004, Snyder & T ing 2002, Enelow & Hinich 1981). By de-
creasing voter uncertainty over which government coalition might form 
and thus which policy would get implemented, the part ies t h a t form a 
pre-electoral coalition can a t t r ac t more votes t h a n would otherwise be 
t he case. 
More impor tan t , probably, is the s t rong empirical evidence tha t dis-
propor t ional electoral inst i tut ions provide an electoral bonus to large 
6I do not claim tha t pre-electoral coalitions will always be electorally 
advantageous. After all, it may be the case t h a t a coalition is composed 
of part ies t ha t are so ideologically incompatible t h a t their respective 
electorates refuse to vote for the coalition. 
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par t ies or coalitions through their mechanical effect on the t ransla t ion 
of votes into seats (Golder & Clark 2003ft, Cox 1997, Lijphart 1994, 
Duverger 1959). Since all electoral systems are disproport ional to some 
extent , electoral coalitions may hold out significant advantages in terms 
of ex t ra legislative seats. Al though we do not yet have an entirely sat-
isfactory model of how par t icular distr ibutions of legislative seats get 
t rans la ted into government coalitions, it seems reasonable to th ink t h a t 
these ex t ra legislative seats will be positively correlated wi th an increased 
probabil i ty of being in government . 
T h e empirical s tudy of electoral coalitions poses a par t icular chal-
lenge for the researcher. Unlike with government coalitions, it is almost 
impossible from a practical point of view to accurately know the total 
number of electoral coalitions t h a t form. This is because these coali-
t ions are rarely listed as such in official election results or on electoral 
ballots. This leaves the interested researcher scouring th rough the vast 
case s tudy l i terature t h a t analyzes elections and par ty compet i t ion. T h e 
problem is magnified when one realizes t h a t pre-electoral coalitions have 
rarely been the focus of scholarly a t tent ion in these studies. These prac-
tical issues may explain why I have failed to locate a detailed da tabase 
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on these coalitions and why there have been no stat is t ical analyses ex-
amining pre-electoral coalition formation prior to this s tudy. 7 
Assuming tha t one overcomes these practical difficulties, t he issue of 
developing the correct research design for analyzing pre-electoral coali-
t ions remains a difficult one. An implication of my theoretical model 
is t ha t one should only actually observe an electoral coalition if par ty 
leaders (i) expect it t o be electorally advantageous and (ii) are able to 
overcome the distr ibut ional conflicts associated wi th coordinat ing their 
electoral strategies. This means tha t one may fail to observe an elec-
toral coalition in the real world for two very different reasons. On the 
one hand, a potent ial coalition may be expected to increase the vote 
share or seats of its members , but still fail to see the light of day be-
cause par ty leaders cannot agree on how to divide t he spoils of office. In 
chapter four, I argue t ha t this s i tuat ion accurately describes the s t ra te-
gic d i lemma faced by the modera te right part ies in France throughout 
7Powell (2000) has collected d a t a on government majorit ies t h a t were 
identifiable prior to elections. Although he includes pre-electoral coali-
tions in this analysis, they are not the main emphasis of his book. Like-
wise, Mar t in and Stevenson (2001) include pre-electoral coalitions, b u t 
only in so far as they affect the likelihood of par t icular governments 
forming. Their s tudy includes 30 potent ial governments t h a t had pre-
electoral agreements. Around half of these refer t o governments forming 
without an election, a phenomenon I do not consider here. They identify 
only 14 elections out of the 170 in their sample (about 8%) as having 
a pre-electoral coalition. In fact, I have identified t h a t there were actu-
ally 69 elections t h a t had pre-electoral coalitions in thei r sample (about 
41%). 
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much of the past few decades. On the other hand , a potent ial coalition 
may be stil lborn due to the simple fact t h a t it would not help any par-
ties electorally. I take account of these theoretical issues when I test the 
hypotheses generated by my model. 
To sum up, I hope to generate a wider scholarly debate about the 
role played by electoral coalitions a t election t ime. Pre-electoral coali-
tions are impor tan t . Not only are they commonplace, bu t they also 
have the ability to de termine electoral and policy outcomes. They may 
even be preferable on normat ive grounds to government coalitions whose 
members begin bargaining after the election. As a result, they deserve 
more a t tent ion from researchers. In t he chapters t h a t follow I develop a 
theoretical model of coalition formation and expose the hypotheses t h a t 
it generates to s ta t is t ical analysis. This research represents the first at-
t empt to formally analyze those factors t ha t systematical ly influence t he 
emergence of pre-electoral coalitions across elections and countries. T h e 
empirical analysis also represents the first t ime t h a t d a t a has been col-
lected and analyzed on electoral coalitions across such a large number 
of countries. 
T h e s tudy proceeds in the following way: in Chap te r 2 1 examine the 
effect of electoral inst i tut ions on pre-electoral coalition formation in 25 
countries between 1946 and 2002. While t he l i tera ture on coalitions does 
not focus specifically on electoral coalitions, an implicit assumption is 
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often made tha t these types of coalitions are more likely to form in plural-
ity, ra ther t han proport ional representat ion, electoral systems (Shepsle 
& Bonchek 1997). A testable hypothesis d rawn from this assumption is 
t h a t pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in disproportional 
electoral systems if there are many parties. A second hypothesis occa-
sionally found in t h e case s tudy l i terature is t h a t pre-electoral coalitions 
are more likely to form when the identifiability of t he future government 
is low. T h e results of my analysis suppor t the former hypothesis but not 
the lat ter . I argue t ha t the incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions 
are highest when there are 'surplus ' parties, t h a t is, more t han we would 
expect given the electoral rules. However, electoral incentives do not 
tell us the whole story. How par ty leaders act in the presence of these 
incentives is explored in the following chapter . 
In chapter 3, I develop a model of electoral coalition formation. T h e 
model is a two-stage complete information bargaining game between two 
par ty leaders who must decide whether to form an electoral alliance. I 
am able to derive several implications t ha t relate the likelihood of see-
ing pre-electoral coalitions to variables employed in the game-theoret ic 
model. Of the hypotheses t h a t are generated, the most impor tan t are 
t ha t electoral coalitions are more likely when (i) the potent ia l coalition 
pa r tne r s share similar ideological preferences, (ii) t he electoral insti tu-
tions generate an electoral bonus for compet ing as a coalition, (iii) the 
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coalition size is large, bu t not too large, and (iv) the par ty sys tem is 
polarized and there is an electoral bonus from forming a coalition. 
In the fourth chapter, I demons t ra te the plausibility of the model by 
examining in dep th the history of pre-electoral coalitions in the French 
5th Republic and South Korea. Given the unusual na tu re of the French 
semi-presidential regime, the French case offers an almost unique oppor-
tuni ty to examine the impact of different electoral inst i tut ions, namely 
legislative and presidential elections, on pre-electoral strategies while 
holding o ther country characteristics constant . Moreover, the French 
case provides possibly the most d ramat ic evidence of the impact t h a t 
pre-electoral strategies can have on election outcomes. The South Ko-
rean case is interesting in t ha t it suggests t h a t there truly isi an un-
derlying general logic of electoral coalition formation. Factors such as 
dis t r ibut ional concerns seem to play jus t as influential a role in deter-
mining pre-electoral strategies in South Korea as they do in the more 
established French democracy. These cases i l lustrate the underlying fac-
tors influencing pre-electoral coalition formation presented in the model. 
In Chap te r 5, I conduct a more rigorous test of t he hypotheses gen-
era ted by the model. In part icular , I use a random-effects probit model 
wi th a new d a t a set containing information on potent ial coalition dyads 
in 20 par l iamentary democracies between 1946 and 1998.8 T h e d a t a are 
8 T h o u g h I was able to test t he effects of electoral inst i tut ions on 25 
democracies in Chapter 2, the lack of d a t a on ideological positions of 
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organized in dyadic format in order to resemble the formal model as 
closely as possible. T h e dyadic s t ruc tu re also reflects the fact t h a t 73% 
of the pre-electoral coalitions in the da tase t used in Chap te r 5 involve 
only two parties. T h e results provide s t rong suppor t for all of the hy-
potheses generated by the bargaining model in Chap te r 3. Ideological 
compatibi l i ty increases the likelihood of forming an electoral coalition, as 
do disproport ional electoral inst i tut ions. Par t ies are more likely to form 
an electoral coalition if the potent ia l coalition size is be large (but not 
too large) and if t he coalition members are of similar electoral size. Fi-
nally, electoral coalitions are more likely if the par ty system is polarized 
and the electoral inst i tut ions are disproport ional . 
In t he conclusion, I discuss the theoretical, empirical and method-
ological contr ibut ions t ha t my s tudy makes to our unders tanding of elec-
tora l coalitions. I will also address the shortcomings, bo th theoretical 
and empirical, of this analysis, before going on to discuss areas of future 
research. 
par t ies in Israel, Greece, and Mal t a led me to d rop them from the more 
extensive test of the model. T h e United Sta tes and Switzer land were 
d ropped because they do not have par l iamentary regimes. 
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A p p e n d i x t o C h a p t e r 1 
Table 1.1: Countr ies and Elections in Figure 1.1 
Election years Number of 
Count ry considered elections 
Austr ia 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Mal ta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
U.K. 
Total 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1949-2002 
1946-67, 1974-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1954-2002 
1966-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1976-2002 
1977-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
1946-2002 
16 
18 
22 
15 
15 
15 
19 
17 
17 
14 
10 
8 
17 
14 
10 
8 
18 
14 
14 
281 
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C h a p t e r 2 
E l e c t o r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s 
2 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Prior to the 2002 German legislative election, the Social Democra t s and 
the Greens announced t h a t they intended to form a government together 
if they received sufficient votes to do so and they encouraged voters to 
suppor t this coalition. In many cases this meant t ha t left-wing voters 
would cast their first vote for the Social Democrat ic candida te in their 
district and their second vote for the Green par ty list. In the French 
legislative elections a few months earlier, the major par t ies on the main-
s t r eam right were largely successful in fielding a single right-wing can-
d ida te for the first round in most electoral districts. While pre-electoral 
coalitions were successfully formed in these countries, this was not the 
case in the recent elections in the Netherlands. In fact, there was a great 
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deal of uncertainty as to the identity of the future coalition government 
immediately following the .Dutch elections. These empirical observations 
raise the question as to why pre-electoral coalitions formed in Germany 
and France bu t not in the Netherlands? The coalition l i terature implic-
itly suggests t h a t pre-electoral coalition formation is a simple function of 
electoral rules: the more disproportional the electoral system, the more 
likely a pre-electoral coalition is to form. Thus , pre-electoral agreements 
were reached in France because of the major i tar ian na tu re of French 
electoral inst i tut ions and they were not reached in the Netherlands due 
to the highly proport ional na tu re of Dutch electoral inst i tut ions. 
The empirical analyses of, coalitions tha t exist in the l i terature have 
focused almost exclusively on those government coalitions t h a t form after 
an election (Mart in & Vanberg 2003, Diermeier, Merlo & Eraslan 2002, 
Diermeier & Merlo 2001, Mar t in & Stevenson 2001, Warwick 1999, Lupia 
& Strom 1995); very little is known about the factors tha t influence pre-
electoral coalition formation. I a t t e m p t to remedy this to some extent by 
carefully analyzing the existing claims linking the incentives created by 
electoral inst i tut ions wi th the emergence of electoral coalitions.1 I focus 
on two part icular hypotheses. T h e disproport ionali ty hypothesis s ta tes 
t h a t pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in disproportional 
aIn the concluding chapter to their volume on Multiparty Government: 
The Politics of Coalition Government in Europe, Laver and Schofield 
(1998, 204) note tha t : "One of the most obvious effectsof the electoral 
law is to create incentives for politicians to form electoral coalitions." 
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electoral systems if there are many parties. T h e signalling hypothesis 
s ta tes t h a t pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when voters 
face high uncer ta in ty abou t the identity of future governments. While 
the disproportionali ty hypothesis is predominant in the l i terature, the 
signalling hypothesis is often called upon t o explain why pre-electoral 
coalitions form in highly proport ional electoral systems. 
In the next section, I outl ine t.he theoretical a rguments t ha t gen-
erate the disproportionali ty and signalling hypotheses. T h e stat ist ical 
model used to test these hypotheses is presented in the third section and 
draws on a new da tase t comprising all legislative elections in 25 coun-
tries between 1946 and 2002. In section four, I present and discuss t he 
results. While there is considerable suppor t for the disproportionali ty 
hypothesis, this is not t he case for the signalling hypothesis. 
At this point I should more clearly define what I mean by a pre-
electoral coalition. A pre-electoral coalition comprises multiple part ies 
t ha t do not compete independent ly in an election either because they 
have publicly agreed to coordinate their campaigns, run joint candidates 
or joint lists, or govern together following the election. Depending on the 
electoral system, different s teps might be required for part ies to form an 
electoral coalition. However, the key features are (i) t h a t the coalition 
mus t be publicly s t a ted (since t he goal is t o win voter suppor t for t he 
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coalition) and (ii) t ha t member part ies do not compete in elections as 
truly independent entities.2 
2 . 2 T h e o r i e s o f P r e - e l e c t o r a l C o a l i t i o n F o r m a t i o n 
While there has been little systematic investigation of pre-electoral coali-
tions, it would be misleading to imply t ha t they are never mentioned 
in the coalition l i terature. In fact, if one looks carefully enough one 
can see t h a t two hypotheses are implicitly made regarding pre-electoral 
coalitions. T h e first s ta tes t h a t pre-electoral coalitions should be more 
common in disproportional electoral systems. In this case, electoral 
coalitions are formed as a means of overcoming some barrier of rep-
resentat ion. The second hypothesis focuses on the electorate 's desire 
to be able to identify the na tu r e of future governments. In this case, 
electoral coalitions act as a signalling device, indicating the likely shape 
of t he post-election government coalition. To date , neither hypothesis 
has been carefully analyzed or tested. In this section, I examine the 
2 T h e requirement t ha t pre-electoral coalitions be publicly s t a ted rules 
out wha t might be considered ' implicit ' coalitions. For example, an 
outgoing coalition government t h a t is expected to reconst i tute itself if 
given the oppor tuni ty might be considered an implicit electoral coalition. 
T h e principal problem with including implicit coalitions such as this in 
a sys temat ic analysis is t h a t it relies on the subjective evaluation of the 
analyst as to whether the relevant part ies really were coordinat ing their 
campaign strategies or not . By ruling out these ' implicit ' coalitions, 
I am minimizing the probabil i ty of commit t ing a Type II error when 
classifying pre-electoral coalitions. 
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theoretical underpinning of each argument in t u rn and generate testable 
hypotheses. 
2 . 2 . 1 D i s p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y a n d E l e c t o r a l C o a l i t i o n s 
By far the predominant argument in the l i terature is tha t disproport ional 
electoral systems encourage pre-electoral coalition formation (Shepsle & 
Bonchek 1997, 190-1). St rom, Budge and Laver s t a te t ha t , 'Systems not 
based on P R lists tend to force par t ies to coalesce before elections in 
order to exploit electoral economies of scale. T h e more disproport ional 
t he electoral system, the greater the incentives for preelectoral alliances 
(1994, 316). ' The argument is fairly straightforward. Electoral rules 
t h a t consistently benefit larger part ies should encourage pa r ty leaders 
to forge pre-electoral alliances. While the implicit goal of pre-electoral 
coalition formation in this a rgument appears to be to gain more seats, 
this need not be the main objective of par ty leaders. If the size of a 
pa r ty in terms of legislative seats is highly correlated wi th being p a r t 
of a government coalition (or being chosen as formateur), then par ty 
leaders in par l iamentary systems could incfease their chances of being 
in government by joining an electoral coalition (Laver & Schofield 1998). 
While this argument has a great deal of intuit ive appeal, it needs to 
be qualified. Imagine a country with a highly disproport ional electoral 
sys tem in which there is only one seat being contested (or one seat per 
distr ict , t he extreme case being a presidential election). T h e a rgument 
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as s t a t ed above, and in t he l i terature, suggests t h a t pre-electoral coali-
t ions should be quite common in this country. However, if there are only 
two parties, then there is clearly no reason to form an electoral coalition. 
Except for periods of war or political crisis when political elites may want 
to form a government of nat ional unity, one would not expect t o see elec-
toral alliances in a two-party system. In other words, t he incentives to 
form a pre-electoral coalition only really exist when the re are more t han 
two parties. The intuit ion from this example can be s t a t ed more gener-
ally: disproportionali ty encourages pre-electoral coalition formation, bu t 
only when the number of part ies is sufficiently large. In fact, Duverger 
m a d e this exact same point when he first discussed electoral coalitions 
in the 1950s (Duverger 1959). I t is unclear why the condit ional pa r t of 
this hypothesis was dropped or forgotten in the l i terature. 
A vast l i terature exists investigating the factors t h a t de termine the 
number of parties in a par t icular country (Duverger 1959, Li jphart 1994, 
Amor im Neto & Cox 1997, Golder & Clark 20036). T he r e is s t rong 
theoret ical and empirical evidence tha t more disproport ional electoral 
sys tems are associated wi th fewer political parties. Disproport ional sys-
t ems clearly advantage larger part ies. It is the existence of a 'mechanical 
effect' in favor of large par t ies t h a t creates incentives for s t rategic voting 
on the par t of voters and for s trategic withdrawal on t h e pa r t of polit-
ical entrepreneurs. T h e end result is t ha t part ies typically merge and 
coalesce so as to 'exploit electoral economies of scale' in disproport ional 
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systems (Cox 1997). This is precisely the same a rgument presented in 
t h e coalition l i terature for why pre-electoral coalitions form in dispro-
por t ional systems. Note t h a t this raises an interesting puzzle. If the 
incentives to coalesce are so great in disproport ional systems, then one 
should not actually observe pre-electoral coalitions in these countries; 
the re simply will not be a sufficiently large number of independent par-
ties. I t is only when there are 'surplus ' or 'excess' par t ies t h a t choose to 
re ta in their pa r ty identi ty in spite of the incentives created by dispro-
port ional systems t h a t one would expect to observe electoral coalitions. 
Determining when and why some political par t ies will re ta in their 
separa te identities ra ther t han merge or coalesce into a larger par ty is a 
complex question and beyond the scope of this article. However, several 
inst i tut ions are already known to influence how likely par t ies are to re-
ta in their identities. One such inst i tut ion is the use of fusion candidacies 
where multiple part ies can nominate the same candidate . Fusion candi-
dacies were employed in many US s ta tes in the n ineteenth century and it 
is interesting to note t h a t electoral alliances were qui te common between 
the Democrat ic Pa r ty and various other part ies (depending on the s ta te) 
a t this time. Al though this practice continues in New York s ta te , it was 
s topped in most other s ta tes more than a century ago. It is thought t h a t 
t he end of fusion candidacies contr ibuted quite markedly to the evolu-
tion of a par ty system in which the Democrat ic and Republ ican parties 
were the only viable par t ies (outside New York s ta te ) (Argersinger 1980) 
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Majority requirements are also thought to encourage part ies to retain 
their separa te identi t ies (Duverger 1959). Moreover, characterist ics of 
presidential elections (whether they employ runoff procedures, their tem-
poral proximity t o legislative elections, and the number of presidential 
candidates) have also been found to influence the number of part ies in 
legislative elections (Golder & Clark 2003 a). Al though various insti tu-
tions obviously influence whether there will be a ' surplus ' or 'excess' 
number of parties, these inst i tut ions are n o t ' themselves directly rele-
vant to the analysis here. T h e principal point t h a t I am trying to make 
is simply t ha t the disproport ionali ty hypothesis regarding pre-electoral 
coalitions mus t be conditional in nature : 
Disproportionali ty Hypothesis: Disproport ionali ty only in-
creases the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation when 
there is a sufficiently large number of part ies .3 
2 . 2 . 2 P r e - E l e c t o r a l C o a l i t i o n s a s S i g n a l l i n g D e v i c e s 
While the disproport ionali ty hypothesis is p redominant , a second expla-
nat ion for pre-electoral coalition formation can be discerned in the liter-
ature. In this a l ternat ive argument , pre-electoral coalitions are t reated 
as signalling devices wi th respect to voters.. There appear to be a t least 
3Note t h a t this is equivalent to saying tha t an increase in the number 
of part ies will only increase the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions when 
the electoral system is sufficiently disproport ional . 
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three separate motives behind forming an electoral coalition as a sig-
nalling device: (i) t o signal t h a t member part ies can form an effective 
government coalition, (ii) to signal the identi ty of a potent ia l future gov-
ernment as clearly as possible, and (iii) to signal the desire of political 
part ies to give voters a more direct role in choosing government coali-
tions. These variants of the signalling a rgument are typically found in 
the case s tudy l i terature dealing with coalitions. They are often used to 
explain what appear to be anomalous cases of electoral coalition forma-
tion in highly proport ional electoral systems. As such, they tend to be 
case-specific and ra ther ad hoc. 
T h e argument t ha t electoral coalitions send a signal to voters tha t 
member part ies can form an effective government coalition has been 
made, in the case of Ireland, Sweden and India. Each of these countries 
have experienced long periods in which a single pa r ty has dominated the 
executive (F ianna Fail in Ireland, the Social Democra t s in Sweden, the 
Congress Pa r ty in India). Those voters who preferred one of the smaller 
opposition part ies in these countries risked 'wast ing ' their vote if they 
voted for this party. Opposi t ion part ies formed electoral coalitions in 
these countries to signal their ability to compete effectively with the 
ruling par ty and encourage the electorate to vote for them. In Sweden, 
the Social Democra ts were dominant for decades because the various 
opposit ion part ies were so ideologically d is tant from one another t ha t 
they were not seen as a credible government al ternat ive. Eventually, t he 
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three "bourgeois" part ies formed electoral coalitions in the 1970s as a 
signal to voters t ha t their policy positions had sufficiently converged tha t 
they could offer a viable governing al ternat ive (Hancock 1998). Likewise, 
the opposit ion part ies in India managed to form an electoral coalition 
based on a common anti-corruption platform to br ing down the long-
dominant Congress Pa r ty (Andersen 1990). 
T h e a rgument t h a t electoral coalitions are a device to signal t he iden-
tity of potent ia l future government coalitions is perhaps more common. 
These coalitions can be used to signal b o t h wi th whom member part ies 
will try to form a government if elected and with whom they will not . 4 
As a result , pre-electoral coalitions can be expected to offer benefits to 
risk averse voters who would ra ther know the identi ty of the post-election 
coalition for sure ra ther t han wait for the lot tery t h a t occurs dur ing a 
government coalition bargaining process. These benefits are likely to be 
quite significant in those countries where t he post-election bargaining 
process is very uncertain. Some of the par t ies in Germany are qui te 
explicit in their campaign messages abou t t he coalition government t h a t 
4For example, par ty leaders in Germany, Austr ia , Norway, and the 
Nether lands sometimes announce the par t ies they will refuse to govern 
alongside under any circumstances, effectively ruling out certain govern-
ment cabinet configurations. A recent empirical s tudy shows t h a t 'anti-
coalition pac ts ' make it more unlikely t h a t a potent ia l government in-
cluding those part ies would form (Mart in & Stevenson 2001). For specific 
country examples, see Muller (2000), Muller and St rom (2000), Narud 
and S t rom (2000); Hillebrand and Irwin (1999), and Strom, Budge a n d 
Laver (1994). 
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they will form if elected. They often tell voters t o suppor t a par t icular 
coalition by spli t t ing their votes in the const i tuency and party-l ist por-
t ions of the ballot precisely because this can affect the identi ty of the 
post-election government coalition (Rober ts 1988, 317-37). Papp i and 
Thurne r note tha t in ' the German system, voters recognize the realistic 
options for a new coalition government and the German two-vote system 
offers voters an oppor tuni ty to suppor t not only their party, b u t also the 
specific coalition advocated by their pa r ty (Pappi & Thurner 2002). ' 
T h e final variant of the signalling argument is t h a t par ty leaders form 
electoral coalitions to signal their desire to have voters play a larger role 
in determining government coalitions. At least, this was the public jus-
tification behind the electoral coalitions t h a t formed in t he Nether lands 
in the early 1970s (De Jong & Pijnenburg 1986, Andeweg 1989, Hille-
b rand & Irwin 1999, Rochan 1999). Coalit ion parties claimed t h a t voters 
would feel tha t the future government coalition was more legit imate if 
they knew ahead of t ime what they were voting for.5 Some analysts 
have argued tha t this motivat ion has been impor tan t in Germany as 
5Some commenta tors analyzing Dutch politics have suggested t h a t 
electoral coalitions have not been very effective in giving Dutch voters 
more say over the composit ion of their governments. For example, De 
Jong and Pi jnenburg s ta te tha t , " the making of a [government] coalition 
remains the crucial moment despite the efforts . . . towards more 'political 
clari ty ' and pre-electoral agreements . . . Du tch voters will never decide 
on the composition of their government." See De Jong and Pi jnenburg 
(1986, 148). 
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well. For example, Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge s t a t e t h a t the 
F D P and whichever of the major part ies was its par tner a t the t ime 
benefited from forming an electoral alliance since they could claim to 
have a direct popular m a n d a t e once in office (Klingemann, Hofferbert & 
Budge 1994). 
If pre-electoral coalitions are to be useful as signalling devices, it must 
be the case tha t they t rans la te fairly accurately into the government 
coalitions t ha t eventually form after elections. If this is not the case, 
then the electorate is unlikely to continue voting for t h e m in the future. 
In other words, one would expect t h a t public commitments to form a 
government coalition with another par ty if successful will actually be 
implemented. The empirical evidence seems to suppor t th is (Laver & 
Schofield 1998, Strom, Budge & Laver 1994, Mar t in & Stevenson 2001). 
These variants of the signalling hypothesis have often been developed 
in a case-specific and ad hoc manner . As a result, it is difficult to delin-
eate shared features and generate testable claims t h a t can easily be eval-
ua ted across different cases. T h e variant of the signalling hypothesis t h a t 
can most easily be generalized is the one tha t focuses on the identifiabil-
ity of potent ia l future governments. T h e basic claim is t h a t pre-electoral 
coalitions are more likely to form when the identifiability of future gov-
ernments is uncertain. One only needs a measure of identifiability to be 
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able to test this. Al though measures of 'identifiability' do exist in the lit-
erature, the creators themselves acknowledge tha t t he measurement cri-
ter ia are very ' impressionistic ' (Strom 1990, Powell 2000, Shugar t 2001). 
One al ternative to these impressionistic measures is to assume tha t un-
certainty about the identi ty of future governments is correlated with the ' 
number of potent ial governments t ha t could form. As a result, those 
countries with a large number of part ies should also have a high level 
of uncertainty as to who will be in the next government. This line of 
reasoning generates the following testable hypothesis: 
Signalling Hypothesis: Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely 
to form when there is a large number of parties. 
2 . 3 D a t a a n d M o d e l 
T h e datase t t ha t is used to test these hypotheses is new and covers all 
legislative elections in 25 advanced industrialized democracies between 
1946 and 2002.6 
6 T h e 25 advanced industrialized democracies are listed in the ap-
pendix to the Dissertat ion. I include the smaller European countries 
(such as Luxembourg) t h a t are sometimes excluded from empirical anal-
yses so t ha t my da tase t corresponds to the 25 countries most commonly 
included in coalition da tase t s (Mershon 2002). This gives a to ta l of 405 
elections. 
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Before describing the statist ical model used to test the disproportion-
ality and signalling hypotheses, it is useful to first examine the uncondi-
tional disproport ionali ty hypothesis t ha t is p redominant in the contem-
porary coalition l i terature. Remember t ha t this hypothesis s ta tes t ha t 
electoral coalitions will be common and successful in disproportional sys-
tems such as those t h a t employ a major i tar ian electoral formula; they 
should be absent or infrequent in systems tha t employ a proport ional 
formula (Laver k Schofield 1998, Strom, Budge k Laver 1994). In Table 
2 .1,1 present information on the number of electoral coalitions t h a t have 
formed in elections using majori tar ian formulas as opposed to those t ha t 
have formed in elections using some form of proport ional representat ion.7 
I also provide information on the average number of pre-electoral coali-
tions, the average percentage of the vote received by these coalitions, and 
the average effective number of electoral part ies by electoral formula.8 
T o r the classification of each election by electoral formula see Golder 
(2004). Majori tar ian systems include plurality rule, absolute majori ty 
rule, t he a l ternat ive vote, and the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). 
Al though it is possible to distinguish between proport ional , multi-tier, 
and mixed electoral"systems, I do not do so here. They are all classified 
as proport ional sys tems because they employ a propor t ional formula in 
at least one electoral tier. Results do not change noticeably if systems 
using S N T V are classified as proport ional . 
8 T h e effective number of electoral part ies is calculated as 1 /St ; 2 , where 
Vi is the percentage of votes won by the iih party. See Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979). 
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Table 2.1: Pre-Electoral Coalitions (PECs) by Electoral Formula 
Electoral Formula Number of Elections Percentage Percentage Effective 
with P E C s without P E C s of Elections of Vote Number of 
with P E C s for P E C s Part ies 
Majoritarian 36 93 28% 14.9 3.0 
Proport ional 132 144 48% 19.4 4.3 
If the uncondit ional hypothesis is correct, pre-electoral coalitions should 
be bo th significantly more frequent and more successful in countries t h a t 
employ major i tar ian systems than in those using proport ional systems. 
T h e evidence in Table 2.1 is qui te clear. Pre-electoral coalitions are 
jus t as likely to form in proport ional systems as in major i tar ian ones. 
Indeed, t he percentage of elections wi th pre-electoral coalitions is higher 
in proport ional systems than tha t in major i tar ian systems. Moreover, 
the average percentage of the vote won by pre-electoral coalitions is 
also higher in proport ional systems t h a n t h a t in major i tar ian systems. 
In sum, there is very little evidence in favor of the uncondit ional dis-
proport ional i ty hypothesis found in t he l i terature. This is exactly as I 
predicted earlier. Note t ha t the average number of effective electoral par-
ties is significantly lower in major i tar ian systems t h a n in proport ional 
ones. By encouraging political par t ies to coalesce and merge, dispro-
port ional systems have fewer part ies and, hence, fewer opportuni t ies for 
electoral coalitions to form. Making the disproportionali ty hypothesis 
conditional on the number of.parties was motivated precisely by the need 
to take account of the oppor tuni ty s t ruc tu re facing individual parties. 
T h e quest ion now is whether there is evidence in favor of the condit ional 
disproport ionali ty hypothesis. 
T h e disproport ionali ty and signalling hypotheses as s ta ted in the 
l i terature are slightly ambiguous since they often refer to the likelihood 
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t h a t pre-electoral coalitions will form, the electoral success of these coali-
tions, or the number of these coalitions. One would expect political elites 
to form pre-electoral coalitions precisely in those si tuat ions in which they 
are expected to be electorally successful. Given this, it is possible to eval-
u a t e the two hypotheses using either (i) the percentage of vote received 
by pre-electoral coalitions or (ii) the percentage of part ies involved in 
a pre-electoral coalition as dependent variables. In t he analysis t h a t 
follows, I use bo th of these as dependent variables to test t he dispropor-
t ionali ty and signalling hypothesis .9 
T h e disproportionali ty and signalling hypotheses can be tested using 
t h e following multiplicative interaction model: 
P E C = 0o + A E f f e c t i v e T h r e s h o l d + /? 2 Elec tora lPart i e s 
+ ftjEffectiveThreshold * E l e c t o r a l P a r t i e s + e 
where P E C is one of the two dependent variables already mentioned. 
EffectiveThreshold captures electoral system disproport ionali ty and is 
measured using Lijphart 's effective threshold.1 0 T h e higher the effective 
threshold, the more disproport ional t he electoral system. An al ternat ive 
9I only include parties t ha t won more than 1% of the nat ional vote. 
Th i s criterion is forced on me by the fact t h a t official electoral s tat ist ics 
do not often report vote tota ls for par t ies who win fewer votes t han this. 
1 0 The effective threshold is the mean of the threshold of representat ion 
a n d exclusion. It is calculated as ~f~ + f ^ , where M is the district 
magni tude . If there are legal thresholds a n d / o r upper tier seats, t he 
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measure of electoral system disproport ionali ty is the district magni tude . 
While district magni tude has long been considered the decisive factor in 
determining the proport ional i ty of an electoral system,1 1 it only captures 
one element of it. In contrast , the effective threshold takes account of 
several aspects of the electoral system - the district magni tude , legal 
thresholds, and upper tier seats. It is for this reason t h a t I prefer to 
use t he effective threshold.1 2 ElectoralParties is t h e effective number of 
electoral parties. The interact ion te rm is required t o test t he condit ional 
na tu r e of t he disproport ionali ty hypothesis. 
T h e signalling hypothesis predicts t ha t the marginal effect of a one 
uni t increase in the effective number of electoral par t ies (02 +03 Effective 
Threshold) will always be positive irrespective of the effective threshold. 
Th i s means tha t 02 should b e positive. Although it is not possible to 
make a precise prediction a b o u t /?3 given tha t the signalling hypothesis 
says nothing about the modifying effect of electoral system dispropor-
tionality, 02 + 0zEffectiveThreshold should always be non-negative. 
T h e disproportionali ty hypothesis predicts t ha t t he marginal effect 
of Effective Threshold (0i + 0SElectoralParties) should only be positive 
calculation is slightly more complicated. See Lijphart (1994), pp. 25-
30. For more information on electoral thresholds, see Taagepera (1998a, 
19986). 
n S e e Horwill (1925, 53), Rae (1967, 114-25), Taagepera and Shugar t 
(1989, 112), and Cox (1997). 
12It t u rns out t ha t quali tatively similar results to those presented here 
are found if the log of average district magni tude is used instead of effec-
tive thresholds. These results are available from the au thor on request. 
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when the effective number of part ies is sufficiently large. Al though the-
ory does not provide us wi th a clear expectat ion as to when this will 
be the case, the disproportionali ty hypothesis will have found little sup-
por t if the marginal effect of EffectiveThreshold is never positive and 
significantly different from zero. Given tha t the marginal effect of ef-
fective thresholds should be increasing as the number of par t ies grows, 
one would expect 03 to be positive, 'fli indicates the marginal effect of 
effective thresholds when the number of electoral part ies is zero. Since 
there are no real-world observations where this is the case, the dispro-
portionali ty hypothesis does not generate a prediction as to i ts sign. T h e 
disproportionali ty hypothesis also predicts t ha t the marginal effect of a 
one unit increase in t he number of part ies {02 + 0-sEffectiveThreshold) 
will only be positive when the electoral system is sufficiently dispropor-
tional (high effective threshold) . Since 02 indicates the marginal effect of 
electoral part ies in highly proport ional systems (EffectiveThreshold=0), 
it should be zero (or negative). 
Descriptive stat ist ics are shown in Table 4.3. T h e percentage of vote 
for pre-electoral coalitions ranges from zero in elections where there were 
no coalitions to 99.12% in the 1976 German elections. T h e 1976 German 
elections also had the highest percentage of part ies in a pre-electoral 
coalition (100%). Effective thresholds range from a low of 0.6% in Israel 
(1949) to a high of 35% in countries with single-member distr icts such 
as the United Kingdom. T h e lowest effective number of electoral par t ies 
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27.55 
27.23 
1.48 
13.40 
0 
0 
1.97 
0.6 
99.12 
100 
10.29 
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was 1.97 in the 1964 US elections, while the highest was 10.29 in the 
1999 Belgian elections. 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statist ics for Pre-Electoral Coali-
tions (PECs) in 25 Countries, 1946-2002 
Variable N Mean S tanda rd Min Max 
Deviat ion 
Percentage Vote for P E C s 405 17.98 
Percentage of Par t ies in P E C s 405 20.20 
Electoral Par t ies 405 3.84 
Electoral Threshold* 391 14.84 
t Da ta on effective thresholds are missing for Aus t r ia (1994-2002), 
Belgium (1995-2002), and Greece (1946-1964). 
2 . 4 R e s u l t s a n d I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
I tested the disproport ionali ty and signalling hypotheses using a pooled 
analysis. To take account of panel heteroscedasticity and contempora-
neously correlated errors, I employed the Beck and Ka tz procedure for 
panel-corrected s t anda rd errors (Beck k Ka tz 1995). T h e results are 
shown in Table 2.3. Models 1 and 2 refer to the two dependent variables 
tha t I use ( the percentage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions and the 
percentage of part ies in a pre-electoral coalition respectively). The first 
two columns provide a direct test of the signalling hypothesis because 
the effective number of electoral parties is the only variable included. 
Since it is arguable t ha t the signalling hypothesis only really applies to 
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par l iamentary regimes, the second column presents results when presi-
dential systems are excluded.1 3 By including ElectoralThreshold wi thout 
an interaction te rm, t he th i rd cqlumn provides another test of the un-
conditional disproportionali ty hypothesis. Finally, the last two columns 
provide a test of the conditional disproport ionali ty hypothesis by pre-
senting results from the full model outl ined in (2.1). 
The first two columns provide no suppor t for the signalling hypoth-
esis. T h e number of part ies in a country seems to have no significant 
impact on pre-electoral coalitions. This is t rue whether one analyzes the 
full sample or t he sample restricted to par l iamentary regimes. Nor is 
there any evidence t ha t an increase in the number of part ies will have 
any effect on the vote for pre-electoral coalitions when we control for 
electoral system disproport ionali ty (columns 3). 
" T h i s means dropping the United Sta tes and Switzerland from the 
analysis. I do not show the equivalent results for the case where the 
dependent variable is t he percentage of par t ies in a pre-electoral coalition 
because they are qualitatively similar to those already shown. 
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Table 2.3: Pre-Electoral Coalitions, 1946-2002 
Regressor 
Signalling Unconditional Disproportionality Conditional Disproportionality 
Full Sample Parliamentary 
(Model 1) (Model 1) (Model 1) (Model 1) (Model 2) 
>*> 
to 
ElectoralParties 
ElectoralThreshold 
ElectoralThreshold x 
ElectoralParties 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 
0.54 
(0.94) 
15.91** 
(3.50) 
400 
0.001 
0.02 
(1.04) 
20.05** 
(4.07) 
358 
0 
0.82 
(1.33) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
14.28* 
(6.46) 
386 
0.002 
-3.82* 
(1.67) 
-1.37** 
(0.37) 
0.42** 
(0.12) 
32.40** 
(7.51) 
386 
0.06 
-3.26* 
(1.35) 
-1.26** 
(0.33) 
0.40** 
(0.10) 
31.57** 
(6.11) 
386 
0.06 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed); panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
In Model 1 the dependent variable is the percentage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions. 
In Model 2 the dependent variable is the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition. 
T h e results from the full model outlined in (2.1) also provide no 
suppor t for the signalling hypothesis (columns 4 and 5). T h e marginal 
effect of electoral parties on b o t h the percentage of votes for pre-electoral 
coalitions and the percentage of par t ies in a pre-electoral coalition is 
negative in highly proport ional systems (when EffectiveThreshold=0). 
This is in direct contrast to the signalling hypothesis which predicts 
t ha t this .effect should always be positive.14 
As expected, there is no evidence in suppor t of the uncondit ional 
disproportionali ty hypothesis (column 3). An increase in the effective 
threshold appears to have no effect on pre-electoral coalitions. How-
ever, there is considerable suppor t for the conditional disproport ionali ty 
hypothesis (columns 4 and 5). As predicted, t he interaction t e r m Effec-
tiveThreshold*ElectoralParties is positive and significant in b o t h Model 
1 and Model 2. While this is support ive of t he disproport ionali ty hy-
pothesis, it should also be the case t ha t the marginal effect of effective 
l 4 T h e positive sign on the interaction coefficient does indicate t ha t 
th is reductive effect declines as the effective threshold increases. In fact, 
t he marginal effect of electoral part ies on the percentage of votes for 
pre-electoral coalitions and the percentage of part ies in a pre-electoral 
coalition eventually becomes posit ive and significant when the effective 
threshold is greater t h a n 15.8% and 14% respectively. Roughly 40% of 
the sample falls in these ranges. Al though these results do not sup-
por t t he signalling hypothesis, they do suppor t the prediction made by 
the disproport ionali ty hypothesis t ha t electoral part ies will only have a 
positive effect on the dependent variables when the electoral sys tem is 
sufficiently disproportional. 
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thresholds is positive when the number of parties is sufficiently high. Al-
though the coefficient on EffectiveThresholds is negative in b o t h models, 
it is impor tan t to remember t h a t this only captures the marginal effect 
of effective thresholds when there are no electoral parties. As should be 
obvious, this coefficient is substantively meaningless and it is necessary 
to evaluate the marginal effect of effective thresholds a t more realistic 
values for the number of electoral parties. This is exactly wha t I do in 
Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: T h e Marginal Effect of Electoral Thresholds 
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Figure 2.1 graphically il lustrates the marginal effect of effective thresh-
olds on the percentage vote for pre-electoral coalitions ( the top figure) 
and the percentage of part ies in a pre-electoral coalition ( the bo t t om fig-
ure) as the effective number of electoral part ies changes. T h e solid slop-
ing lines indicate how the marginal effect of effective electoral threshold 
(0i + 0-iElectoralParties) changes with the number of electoral parties. 
The two-tailed 95% confidence intervals a round t h e lines allow us to 
determine the conditions' under which effective thresholds have a signifi-
cant effect they exert a significant effect whenever the upper and lower 
bounds of the confidence intervals are bo th above (or below) the zero 
line. 
As predicted, effective thresholds only have a posit ive effect on pre-
electoral coalitions when the number of par t ies is sufficiently large. Specif-
ically, the marginal effect of effective thresholds will increase the per-
centage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions when the effective number of 
electoral part ies is greater t h a n 3.8. I t will increase the percentage of 
parties in a pre-electoral coalition when the number of part ies is greater 
than 3.7. This is substantively meaningful since roughly 43% of the 
sample fall within these ranges. Thus, the evidence clearly suppor t s 
the disproportionali ty hypothesis t h a t par t ies are more likely to be in 
a pre-electoral coalition and tha t these coalitions are more likely to be 
electorally-successful in disproportional electoral systems when there is 
a large number of part ies. 
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2 . 5 C o n c l u s i o n 
To this point, there has been little theoretical or empirical research 
addressing pre-electoral coalitions. Th i s is despite the fact t ha t pre-
electoral coalitions are quite common, have impor tan t normative im-
plications, and can significantly influence bo th election and policy out-
comes. This brief analysis represents the first a t t e m p t to formulate and 
test hypotheses relating to pre-electoral coalitions. Specifically, it tests 
the two hypotheses most commonly made (often implicitly) about pre-
electoral coalitions in the l i terature the disproportionali ty and sig-
nalling hypotheses. T h e results from a pooled analysis of pre-electoral 
coalitions in 25 countries from 1946-2002 clearly suppor t the dispropor-
tionality hypothesis pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form and 
be successful in countries t h a t have a disproportional electoral sys tem 
and a large number of parties. Al though the number of part ies in a coun-
try was taken as given in this analysis, I did indicate several inst i tut ions 
tha t might encourage political par t ies to re ta in their separate identities 
in disproport ional electoral systems despite electoral incentives to merge 
or coalesce. 
In contrast , there was little evidence t h a t electoral coalitions are more 
likely to form when there are many par t ies so as to signal the identity of 
future governments to voters (signalling hypothesis) . While the evidence 
in suppor t of the disproportionali ty hypothesis seems clear, I believe 
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t ha t one should be cautious in rejecting the signalling hypothesis on the 
basis of this analysis alone. As my earlier discussion indicated, there 
are several versions of the signalling hypothesis and only one variant 
was tested here. Moreover, the proxy for the identifiability of future 
governments used in this analysis was the effective number of electoral 
parties. I t may simply be the case t ha t this is not a part icularly good 
proxy. T h e fact tha t countries such as the Netherlands and Israel do 
have a number of successful pre-electoral coalitions despite their highly 
proport ional electoral inst i tut ions should make one wary of rejecting t he 
signalling hypothesis too hastily. 
T h e evidence presented here shows t h a t electoral inst i tut ions play an 
impor tan t role in explaining pre-electoral coalition formation. Though 
the link between electoral rules and pre-electoral coalitions has long been 
suspected, this article is the first t o systematical ly analyze and find ev-
idence for such a relationship. Al though this is an impor tan t step, the 
implication common in the coalition l i terature t h a t pre-electoral coali-
t ions are simply a function of electoral rules is probably too reductionist . 
After all, there are costs to forming pre-electoral coalitions. Jus t as gov-
ernment coalitions emerge out of a bargaining process between pa r ty 
leaders, so do pre-electoral coalitions. Political part ies who are think-
ing abou t forming a coalition must reach an agreement as to how they 
would dis t r ibute office benefits if they come to power. For example, 
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par ty leaders have to decide which par ty will get to run the more pow-
erful ministries and who is to become pr ime minister or president. They 
may also have to decide which par ty should s tep down in favor of the 
other a t the district level. It is likely t ha t these dis tr ibut ional issues 
will be hard to resolve in some circumstances. Political par t ies also have 
to reach agreement on a coalition policy t ha t they would implement if 
successful a t the polls. T h e fact t h a t part ies must make concessions on 
office and policy may explain why pre-electoral coalitions often fail to 
form when there are clear electoral incentives to do so. A more nuanced 
unders tanding of pre-electoral coalition formation must take account of 
t h e distr ibutional costs t ha t arise during coalition bargaining as well as 
the potent ial electoral benefits. T h e following chapter provides a formal 
model in which the electoral benefits of coalition formation are clearly 
weighed against the associated distr ibut ional costs.- I t is only under 
part icular conditions t ha t pre-electoral coalitions will actually form. 
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C h a p t e r 3 
A T h e o r e t i c a l M o d e l 
3 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
In this chapter , I propose a theoretical model for the s tudy of pre-
electoral coalition formation. T h e formal analysis emphasizes t h a t par ty 
leaders must carefully weigh the costs and benefits associated wi th coor-
dinat ing their pre-electoral s trategies when deciding whether to form an 
electoral coalition. T h e model provides clear predictions a b o u t t he con-
ditions under which electoral coalitions are more likely to form. There 
are two sections. In the first, I outl ine the basic intuit ion behind the as-
sumpt ions and s t ruc ture of the formal model. Next, I formalize this in-
tui t ive argument . I outl ine the basic s t ructure of a pre-electoral coalition 
formation game, before deriving equilibrium outcomes and analyzing the 
variables t h a t affect the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. 
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3 . 1 . 1 T h e I n t u i t i o n 
Given tha t it is often infeasible for a single par ty to govern alone in most 
democracies, pa r ty leaders are faced with a strategic choice. They can 
either form an electoral coalition prior to the election, or par t ic ipate in 
government coalition bargaining afterwards. As I have already s ta ted , 
the vast majori ty of the coalition l i terature in political science ignores the 
first possibility. However, t he fact t h a t one regularly observes electoral 
coalitions across a broad range of countries suggests t ha t they must offer 
some form of political advantage a t least some of the time. Since elec-
toral coalitions do not always emerge, it mus t equally be t rue t h a t there 
are costs associated wi th par ty leaders coordinating their pre-electoral 
strategies. It seems na tu ra l then to seek an explanat ion of electoral coali-
tion formation in t e rms of i ts associated costs and benefits. I argue t h a t 
pa r ty leaders can be expected to care about policy, office and votes when 
they make decisions abou t whether to par t ic ipate in electoral coalitions 
(Muller k S t rom 1999). 
3 . 1 . 2 O f f i c e 
Jus t as with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-
electoral coalitions is the result of a bargaining process among par ty 
leaders. As a result , I use a bargaining model to analyze the forma-
tion of electoral coalitions (Morrow 1994, Osborne k Rubinste in 1990). 
T h e issues t h a t concern par ty leaders prior to an election are likely to 
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be very similar to those involved in any post-election bargaining pro-
cess. In part icular , pa r ty elites must decide how office benefits are to be 
dis t r ibuted if they win t h e election. I t seems an obvious assumption to 
make t h a t politicians care about winning office bo th for its own sake and 
for the ability to affect policy. Winning office allows them to enjoy the 
perquisites of power and to influence policy (Downs 1957, Mayhew 1974). 
It follows from this, though, t ha t they also care abou t their place in 
the par ty or coalition hierarchy. After all, only a limited number of 
par ty members can hope to win ministerial posts. Any electoral coali-
tion agreement mus t be able to overcome what can be a thorny set of 
distr ibutional issues b o t h among elites from the same par ty and across 
elites from different part ies. 
These dis t r ibut ional issues are part icularly s ta rk if there are few of-
fices available to satisfy the par ty elites. For example, only one par ty 
leader can be the official presidential candida te of an electoral coali-
tion. Legislative elections might offer par ty elites an easier oppor tuni ty 
to reach an agreement on distr ibutional issues since there are multiple 
legislative seats and even ministerial portfolios to hand out . In other 
words, one might expect t h a t the divisibility of office benefits would af-
fect the ease with which pre-electoral coalition benefits are reached. As 
will be shown in the following chapter, it seems to be the case in French 
elections t ha t par t ies on bo th the right and left find it easier to organize 
nominat ion agreements prior t o the first round of voting for legislative 
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elections t h a n presidential ones. However, even pre-electoral agreements 
in legislative elections can be problematic since they raise the possibility 
t h a t some candidates will be forced to s tep down in favor of candidates 
from another party.1 Evidence from South Korea also suggests t ha t the 
divisibility of office benefits may be a crucial de terminant of how easy 
presidential electoral coalition agreements are to reach. For example, the 
presence of t e rm limits in South Korea m a d e electoral coalitions more 
a t t rac t ive t han they would otherwise have been. This is because the 
leader of one par ty could throw his suppor t behind a candida te of an-
other par ty in presidential elections in exchange for a promise of similar 
suppor t in future elections. This promise was deemed more credible due 
to the presence of te rm limits. 
If nominat ion agreements are not used, then the issue of credibility 
is a relevant one in pre-electoral coalition bargaining as compared to 
government coalition bargaining. In a P R system, par ty elites might be 
able to reach an agreement on how to divide t he spoils of office before an 
election occurs. However, there is no concrete guarantee tha t one of the 
part ies will not renege on this agreement afterwards. A strong electoral 
performance by one of the coalition par t ies might cause it to want to 
*In the French case, some candidates simply refuse to obey par ty 
orders to s tep down. If this happened on a wide scale, it might damage 
the bargaining position of par ty leaders in any future electoral coalition 
negotiat ions since they would not be able to credibly commit to enforcing 
pre-electoral agreements among their rank and file. 
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renegotiate, or even cancel, the deal. The re are no th i rd-par ty enforcers 
for these types of agreements, unless one considers the threa t of voter 
sanct ions to be great enough to deter part ies from reneging. Despite 
this, it seems tha t the commitment issue is only a problem in theory. 
In practice, it rarely seems to be a cause of significant concern (Strom, 
Budge k Laver 1994). Laver and Schofield (1998, 28) note t ha t when 
"the coalition formation strategies of electoral coalitions are 
publicly announced - as they must be, since a more pow-
erful legislative bargaining bloc is precisely what electoral 
alliances set out to offer the electorate - then the extent to 
which the alliance can subsequently be abandoned is a signif-
icant empirical mat te r . Certainly, when two or more par t ies 
promise to go into government together if they are able, such 
promises tend only rarely to be broken." 
It is also impor tan t to realize t h a t political part ies are engaged in 
repeated interactions. If a coalition pa r tne r refuses to honor the terms 
of an electoral agreement, then' t h a t pa r ty may find itself unable to gain 
electoral coalition par tners in the future. Mitchell (1999) argues t h a t , 
though par t ies could change par tners between the pre-electoral and post-
electoral stages, "they may risk credibility costs if they do so. In pract ice 
part ies t h a t have formed electoral coalitions and offered themselves as a 
government-in-waiting do tend to govern together if the numbers allow 
i t ."2 
2I t is impor tan t to recognize, however, t ha t actual election results 
may rule out certain combinations, so t ha t a par ty may reconsider its 
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3 . 1 . 3 P o l i c y 
While par ty leaders care abou t office benefits, it seems clear t ha t they 
also bring policy concerns to the table during any electoral coalition 
bargaining process. T h e inclusion of policy in the util i ty function of 
p a r t y leaders distinguishes t he bargaining model presented here from 
the more tradit ional models in which players only bargain over 'office' 
benefits. While policy concerns complicate the model, it seems a com-
plication t ha t is worth making given the compelling empirical evidence 
t h a t politicians do sometimes care abou t policy outcomes. In the models 
of government coalition formation t h a t include policy as a component of 
t he players' utility function (Austen-Smith k Banks 1988), pa r ty lead-
ers bargain over the policy t ha t they will introduce as the government 
coalition.3 Typically the bargaining process results in a 'coalition policy' 
t h a t is some weighted average of the policy ideal points of the part ies 
alliance s t ra tegy afterwards. It may also be the case t h a t voters do not 
clearly show their suppor t for a par t icular electoral coalition. In these 
circumstances, par ty leaders can more easily justify not honoring the 
t e rms of the electoral coalition. After all, agreements over t he division of 
government spoils do not necessarily specify appropr ia te behavior if the 
coalition loses. It is, perhaps, interesting to note t h a t some agreements 
are sufficiently detailed t h a t they take these possibilities into account and 
prescribe part icular actions. Th i s indicates t ha t pa r ty leaders are clearly 
aware of the commitment problems associated with electoral coalitions. 
3Given tha t one might eventually want to provide a model of coali-
t ion formation tha t encapsulates b o t h pre- and post-electoral coalitions, 
this provides another reason for including policy in models addressing 
electoral coalitions. 
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in the government coalition. Such a bargaining process must obviously 
occur when pre-electoral agreements are made as well. 
However, policy concerns take on even more significance dur ing elec-
toral coalition bargaining since t he par ty leaders do not know if they will 
actually get to form the government. They face the possibility t ha t an 
opposition par ty (or coalition) wins the election and implements their 
ideal policy. This 'opposit ion government ' might implement modera te or 
ext reme policies. I believe t h a t t he ideological position of the opposition 
may be taken into account during pre-electoral coalition bargaining. In 
part icular , I expect t ha t pa r ty leaders are more willing to compromise 
on distr ibutional issues if they face an ideologically ex t reme opposit ion 
party. Recall the example in the in t roductory chapter of two countries in 
which modera te right-wing par t ies arc considering forming a n electoral 
coalition. In one country, the principal opposition par ty is on the ex-
t reme left, while in the o ther it is on the center left. Holding everything 
else constant , the par t ies on the right are likely to feel a greater urgency 
to overcome distr ibutional conflicts in the first country compared to the 
second. This is because they risk increasing the possibility t h a t policy 
far from their ideal point would be implemented. Right-wing part ies 
faced by the center-left pa r ty may feel less obliged to compromise on 
distr ibutional issues since policy will be fairly modera te regardless of 
the outcome of the election. 
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3 . 1 . 4 V o t e s 
Of course, these dis t r ibut ional and ideological issues are moot if the pre-
electoral coalition is expected to be disadvantageous from an electoral 
s tandpoin t . Pa r ty leaders are unlikely to engage in electoral coalition 
bargaining if they can expect to do as well or be t t e r by running sep-
arately at election t ime. There is ho guarantee t h a t par t ic ipat ion in 
an electoral alliance is going to increase the likelihood of par t ic ipat ing 
parties entering government or increasing their seat or vote shares. Po-
tential coalitions can either be superadditive, addit ive or subaddit ive.4 
Coalitions between par t ies with extremely d ispara te policy platforms 
may well be subaddit ive. Even if the par ty leaders were willing to form 
a coalition, voters might reject it because one of the members suppor ted 
objectionable policies. For instance a coalition t h a t consisted of a small 
par ty on the far right and a small par ty on the far left would have dif-
ficulty in winning the suppor t of either electorate if the main policy 
issues of the election fell along a s t anda rd left-right issue dimension.5 I 
would argue t ha t it is a fairly safe assumption tha t par ty leaders will 
4 A superaddit ive coalition is one in which the coalition wins more 
votes (or seats) t h a n the coalition members can expect to win running 
separately. A coalition t h a t wins t he same amoun t of seats is additive, 
while a coalition t h a t wins fewer seats is subaddit ive. (Kaminski 2001). 
5If the main issue for voters in a part icular election was incumbent 
corruption, then par t ies at opposing extremes could potential ly form an 
ant i- incumbent , ant i-corruption electoral coalition which could generate 
a significant amoun t of voter suppor t . In fact, th is is t h e story often told 
of the defeat of t he Congress P a r t y in India in 1989 (Andersen 1990). 
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not wish to par t ic ipa te in electoral coalitions if they think tha t it offers 
no significant electoral gains.6 
T h e extent to which a pre-electoral coalition offers gains is likely 
to be a function of the electoral inst i tut ions in a given country. As 
the discussion in Chap te r 2 suggested, disproport ional electoral systems 
should provide larger incentives for par ty leaders to reach pre-electoral 
agreements t h a n proport ional ones. Thus, one would expect the elec-
toral bonus associated wi th electoral coalition formation to be higher 
the more disproport ional the system. This line of reasoning also holds 
for presidential and legislative elections. Since only one par ty can win 
the presidency, size mat te r s . As a result, the electoral bonus associated 
with forming a pre-electoral coalition in presidential systems is likely to 
be larger than for forming a similar coalition in legislative elections. It is 
interesting to note a t this point tha t it is precisely where the electoral in-
centives to form a coalition are highest (presidential elections), tha t the 
distr ibutional issues t h a t need to be overcome are the most problematic. 
Par ty elites often invest considerable resources in various methods 
to measure the extent of the electoral benefits associated with possible 
6 Note t ha t the fact t h a t a coalition may be subaddi t ive does not nec-
essarily mean t h a t it offers no significant electoral gains. It is possible 
for a coalition to be subaddit ive, bu t still be sufficiently large to rep-
resent the largest ' pa r ty ' , thereby winning itself the role of government 
formateur. 
58 
coalitions (Kaminski 2002). For example, par ty leaders sometimes em-
ploy private polling companies to carry out surveys asking voters whether 
they would suppor t par t icular coalition ar rangements (Kaminski 2001).7 
Other pa r ty leaders engage in coalition experiments a t the regional 
level t o evaluate the performance of par t icular combinat ions of part ies 
(Downs 1998). Based on these local experiences, pa r ty leaders then 
decide whether these coalitions should be implemented a t the nat ional 
level. In many cases, politicians often go to great lengths to determine 
whether an electoral coalition is likely to offer significant electoral ben-
efits.8 
It is clear t h a t the concerns of pa r ty leaders with office, policy and 
votes should be ' incorpora ted into models of pre-electoral coalition for-
mat ion. T h e first th ing to note is t h a t pa r ty leaders will be unwilling 
to form a coalition if it offers no electoral advantage or if the coalition's 
policy would be incompatible wi th their pa r ty ' s preferences. T h e second 
is t h a t a coalition may not see the light of day even if it offers electoral 
benefits. Pa r ty elites still have to overcome a whole host of dis t r ibut ional 
7 One problem for the empirical researcher is t h a t these private polls 
are rarely made available to the public. 
8 This does not rule out the possibility t ha t politicians still overesti-
m a t e the suppor t they would receive from running separately or forming 
an electoral coalition. Es t imates of pa r ty or coalition suppor t are likely 
to be uncer ta in in volatile of new par ty systems. Although the extent 
to which these es t imates are inaccurate can obviously affect the range 
in which coalition bargains are feasible, I have not modelled this source 
of uncer ta in ty explicitly. 
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and policy differences. Finally, the extent to which these elites are faced 
with a modera te or extreme opposit ion par ty may influence how willing 
they are to compromise on these differences. To give this intuit ive ar-
gument precise meaning, I now tu rn to a more formal description of its 
s t ruc ture and underlying assumptions. 
3 . 2 T h e M o d e l 
T h e model is based on a s t andard two-person sequential bargaining 
game. 
3 . 2 . 1 S t r u c t u r e a n d P a y o f f s 
Figure 3.1 depicts the model in the form of a game tree where actors take 
a sequence of actions. The sequence of actions is listed more clearly in 
Table 3.1. The game takes place in two periods t = {1,2}. T h e substan-
tive question t h a t motivates this analysis suggests t h a t the bargaining 
process is most accurately modelled as a finite period game. This is be-
cause once elections have been called, the election da te is fixed and any 
bargaining process must necessarily come to an end at this da te . T h e 
choice of two periods is arbitrary, bu t as the game has finite dura t ion , 
the addit ion of more periods would not change the conclusions with re-
gards to whether or not a pre-electoral coalition forms. In the figure, 
the beginning of the second period is indicated by a horizontal dashed 
line. T h e let ter beside each node indicates t he player whose t u r n it is to 
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move there. Thus , the game begins at the topmost decision node where 
Player A must decide whether to make an electoral coalition offer or not. 
A t this point the game takes two diverging pa ths depending on Player 
A's initial choice. 
F igure 3.1: Pre-Electoral Coalit ion Format ion Game in Extensive Form 
no offer offers Xi.l-Xi 
rejects offei no PEC 
no PEC A 
reiects offep/ \ accepts offer no PEC 
no PEC PEC 
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1. If an offer is made, then Player B must decide whether to accept 
or reject it. If the offer is accepted, the bargaining ends and an 
electoral coalition forms. If the proposal is rejected, the game con-
tinues into a second period in which Player B can make a counter 
offer. If no counter offer is made, the game ends wi thout the for-
mat ion of an electoral coalition. On the other hand , if a counter 
offer is made, Player A must decide whether to accept or reject 
it. If the counter offer is accepted, a coalition forms and the game 
ends. If it is rejected, no coalition forms and the game ends. 
2. If no offer is made by Player A, the game immediately moves to 
a second period. Player B now has the oppor tuni ty of making an 
•electoral coalition offer to Player A. If he chooses not to propose a 
coalition, the game ends wi thout a pre-electoral coalition forming. 
If, however, he chooses to make an offer, Player A mus t decide 
whether to accept it or not . If the offer is accepted, a coalition 
forms and the game ends. If the offer is rejected, no coalition 
forms and the game ends. 
Each t ime a player has the oppor tuni ty to make an offer he has a con-
t inuum of choices t h a t corresponds to the electoral coalition agreements 
t ha t each player can propose. T h e cont inuum arises since each electoral 
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coalition offer is a par t icular division of an overall 'pie ' .9 T h e general 
s t ruc ture of the game has now been described. 
Table 3.1: Actors, Actions and Payoffs in Bargaining 
Game 
Period Actors Actions Expec ted Payoffs 
1 A offer electoral coalition 
no offer 
B (if A makes offer) 
accept offer P^ (o\ — A^pec) 
reject offer 
^ ( ( l - ^ ) - A B p e c ) 
-Az?opp(l - Pi) 
B (if A made initial offer) 
offer electoral coalition 
n o offer PAASA - ^A9OV} 
~ A/lopp(l — PAJ&)'I 
PDA(SB — ^Dgov) 
~ Aj3opp(l — PlJjA) 
(if B makes offer) 
accept offer Pu(°% ~ ^Apec) 
— A>iopp(l — Puh 
Pl((l - ol)-XDpec) 
—Az?opp(l — Pu) 
9 T h e core of any bargaining game is t ha t two players are bargain-
ing over a 'pie' . T h e size of this pie is typically normalized to 1. 
An agreement is a pair (xx,x2), in which X\ is Player A's share of 
the pie and x2 Player B ' s share. T h e set of possible agreements is: 
X = {(xi,x2) G sift2 : x\ + x2 = 1 and xt > 0 for i = 1,2}. It should be 
fairly obvious t ha t there is always a cont inuum of possible offers. For 
further information, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). 
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Table 3.1: Actors, Actions and Payoffs in Bargaining 
Game 
Period Actors Actions Expected Payoffs 
reject offer PAASA - ^Agm,) 
~A/i0pp(l — PA.d)\ 
PBASH ~ ^Bgov) 
~Az?opp(l — PBJL) 
2 B (if A made no offer) 
offer electoral coalition 
no offer PAASA - ^Agov) 
~A^opp( l — PAJLII 
PBASB — ^Bgov) 
— ^ Bopp(l — PB.d) 
A (if B makes offer) 
accept offer Pu(°'n ~ ' W . c ) 
~A /4opp(l — Pu)\ 
^ ( ( 1 " °B) -^Bpec) 
—Acopp(l - Pu) 
r e j ec t offer PAASA - >>A9OV) 
~A^ o p p ( l — PAA)\ 
PBASB — ^Bgmi) 
—A.p0pp(l — PBA) 
T h e impor tan t remaining elements of t he game relate to the payoffs 
associated with the different outcomes. I derive these payoffs analytically 
by discussing the consequences of each outcome. T h e payoffs to Player A 
are listed first in Table 3.1, while the payoffs to Player B come second. 
The payoffs to the two part ies can easily be related to their concerns 
about policy, office and votes. 
64 
First , bo th part ies care whether forming an electoral coalition is likely 
to offer any electoral advantages. Th i s is captured in the probabili t ies 
of "winning" the election, P„ , P 2 and Pi_d, where i refers to the spe-
cific party. I t is impor tan t to remember t h a t "winning" the election 
may mean different things in parl iamentary, presidential, and mixed 
regimes.10 Electoral coalitions could form with the goal of controlling 
the presidency or the government, depending on the type of election. In 
the' context of a par l iamentary regime, P„ captures the probabili ty t h a t 
a 'unified' electoral coalition t h a t forms in the .first round will win the 
election and form the government. Thus , 1 — P£ necessarily indicates the 
probabili ty tha t the coalition will lose the election and not enter govern-
ment . Similarly, P 2 is the probabili ty t h a t a 'unified' electoral coalition 
tha t forms in the second round of bargaining will win the election and 
form the government, and 1 — P 2 is t he probabil i ty t h a t the coalition will 
lose the election and not enter government. In a presidential context , 
"winning" means controlling the presidency or the legislature; in a mixed 
regime, it means controlling either the presidency or the government. 
10In a presidential regime, the chief executive is directly elected for a 
fixed term. In a par l iamentary regime, the executive is controlled by the 
legislature. Under this arrangement , the par l iament is directly elected 
and i ts members choose the government (cabinet) . T h e government 
serves as long as it has the confidence of the legislature. A mixed regime 
combines elements of both . It has a directly elected president as well as 
a government controlled by the legislature. 
65 
I assume tha t P„ > P 2 . This allows me to incorporate a cost of delay 
into the game. T h e notion underlying this cost of delay is t h a t forming 
a coalition three months before an election is preferable t o forming one 
a few days before it (Smith 2003, Smi th 2004). More t ime to plan and 
execute a coherent and coordinated campaign s t ra tegy is presumably 
an asset in electoral competi t ion. In the first period of the game the 
electoral benefits to be gained from forming a coalition are higher t han 
the benefits gained from forming in t he second round. 
Finally, PiA is the probabili ty of being in government if the two 
part ies do not form an electoral coalition. It follows tha t the opposit ion 
wins wi th probabili ty 1 — Pi_d if t he two par t ies fail t o form an electoral 
coalition. If the pre-electoral coalition offers an electoral advantage, then 
P,1 > Pijd or P 2 > PiA. 
P a r t y leaders also care about office benefits. Let the to ta l amount of 
office benefits available be large S. This is normalized to 1 to ease the 
analysis.1 1 One can think of these office benefits as ministerial portfolios 
in a par l iamentary regime, perhaps ranked hierarchically in t e rms of the 
benefits t h a t they provide. For example, t he positions of pr ime minister 
or finance minister are much more likely to be fought over by par ty elites 
t h a n the ministerial post overseeing tour ism. In a presidential regime, S 
refers to the office benefits associated with the presidency in presidential 
a This does not affect the implications of the model. 
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elections and to the office benefits associated with being in the legislative 
majori ty (perhaps as a coalition member) in legislative elections. 
Each t ime a par ty makes a coalition offer, it is in fact offering a 
part icular division of these office benefits. These shares are indexed in 
Figure 3.1 by the part icular period in which the offer is made. Thus , 
o\, 1 — o\ represents the division of the office benefits (large S) being 
offered in period 1 by Player A, whereas o2B, 1 — oB represents the 
division being offered by Player B in period 2. By necessity, o\ > 0 and 
o% > 0. 
If the parties do not form a pre-electoral coalition and decide to run 
separately, they may still end u p as members of the governing coalition. 
T h e expected share of office benefits tha t a par ty receives in th is case, SA 
and SB, will depend on whether the election is presidential or legislative. 
In legislative elections, one can think tha t the share of office benefits 
received by a par ty entering government after running separate ly will be 
proport ional to its seat share in the governing coalition in par l iamentary 
regime elections (Laver 19986). In other words, Pa r ty A can expect 
to receive a share of the office benefits, SA = — s c a ^ A if jt enters 
'
 n
 seats A+seats j 
government with some par ty (or part ies) j, where seats A is t he number 
of seats won by Par ty A and seatSj is the number of seats won by 
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par ty j .1 2 Naturally, if Pa r ty A fails to enter government after running 
separately in legislative elections, then SA = 0. This simply means t h a t 
Pa r ty A will receive no office benefits. In presidential elections, the 
expected share of office benefits will either be sA = S or SA = 0 for 
Pa r ty A. In practical terms, this means t ha t if you win the presidency 
you gain all of the office benefits (large S); if you lose the elections, you 
win nothing. 
Aside from office benefits, pa r ty leaders also care abou t policy. I 
make the common assumption tha t they each have single-peaked pref-
erences over a unidimensional policy space. One can think of th is policy 
space as representing the t radi t ional left-right cleavage in most coun-
tries. Par ty leaders care about the policy tha t is implemented after the 
election. If they fail to win the election or enter government, t hen policy 
is determined by the opposit ion. I cap ture the ut i l i ty loss associated 
wi th having the opposition set policy at its ideal point wi th a s t andard 
quadra t ic loss function — (P* — Popp)2, where P< is the ideal point of 
pa r ty i and P o p p is the policy implemented by the opposit ion. In order 
to simplify the notat ion, I call this loss XAOPP or Xjjopp- By measuring 
th is ideological distance, I can distinguish between elections in which the 
1 2The terminology is slightly different for legislative elections in pres-
idential regimes since one might prefer to speak of legislative majori ty 
coalitions rather t han governing coalitions. 
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opposition has a very radical policy (Xi_opp is large) and those in which 
the opposit ion's policy is more modera te (Xi_opp is small) . 
Pa r ty leaders also care about the ideological cohesion of t he pre-
electoral coalition. If the part ies have different policy preferences, one 
could think of the 'coalit ion's preferred policy' as being some weighted 
average of the players ' ideal points (weighted by the expected par ty 
s t rengths, for instance). If two part ies are very close to each other in 
the policy space, the coalition policy will be close to each of their ideal 
points. On the o ther hand, if two part ies are d is tant , a weighted average 
of their policy posit ions would likely yield a coalition position t h a t is far 
from either 's preferred policy. T h u s each pa r ty leader needs to consider 
the utility loss associated with policy being implemented a t the potential 
'coalition ideal point ' . I s t a r t with the distance between the two players, 
using the same s t anda rd quadra t ic loss function as was presented above, 
— (PA — PB)2> where PA is the ideal point of Player A and PB is the 
policy implemented by Player B. To simplify t he nota t ion, I call this 
XAB- However, the players are interested not in the distance between 
their own ideal point and t h a t of their coalition pa r tne r ' s ideal point per 
se. Rather , they care abou t the distance between their ideal point and 
tha t of the coalition. To capture this I let SU_BXAB be the utility loss 
for Player A associated with policy being implemented a t the coalition's 
ideal point, where su_B = aeatsse^atSg • Similarly, let SU_AXAB be the 
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utility loss for Player B associated with policy being implemented at the 
coalition's ideal point , where su_A = seatTAta^tSB-13 
3 . 2 . 2 E q u i l i b r i u m B e h a v i o r 
As I already s ta ted , the game tree presented above in Figure 3.1 defines 
a simple sequential bargaining game. An advantage of using a formal 
model such as this is t h a t it allows one to derive equilibrium strategies 
and pinpoint the precise assumptions t ha t lead to them. In this section, I 
examine the equilibrium behavior of t he par ty leaders. I follow common 
practice and solve the game through backward induction using the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium concept.1 4 I t hen proceed to analyze t he 
crucial parameters t h a t affect the likelihood of one of these equilibrium 
13To see where these te rms come from, consider the following simple 
numerical example. Take a policy space from 0 to 100 where Player A is 
located at 50 and Player B is located a t 60. T h e coalition policy would 
be somewhere between the two parties, and the larger of the two should 
exercise a stronger influence over the coalition's policy. To determine 
the weighted average for the coalition, use t he expected seats (or votes) 
to be won by each player, su A and SU_B- Imagine t h a t SU_A = -8 and 
SU.B = -2. T h u s Player A has to cede 20% of t he policy distance to 
Player B, and Player B in tu rn will yield 80% of t he policy distance to 
Player A. T h e coalition policy would be set a t 52. 
" T h i s equilibrium concept is a refinement on the Nash equilibrium 
which requires t ha t 'each player's s t ra tegy is an opt imal response to the 
other player's s trategies ' (Fudenberg k Tirole 1991). A sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium requires t ha t the s t ra tegy combinat ion induces a Nash 
equilibrium not only in the whole game, b u t in each of its subgames. 
St ra tegy combinations t ha t fulfill this requirement form a sub-game per-
fect Nash equilibrium. 
70 
outcomes, namely electoral coalition formation. This allows me to derive 
testable implications about the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions a t 
election t ime. 
In order to ease the presentat ion of the equilibria and proofs, I first 
simplify the presentat ion of the payoffs somewhat . First , I use the case 
where Player A and B have the same policy preferences. This simplifies 
the nota t ion significantly, though for t he discussion of comparat ive s ta t -
ics t ha t follows I draw upon the more general model where the players 
may have different ideal points. In addit ion, I let: 
• DA = PAASA ~ ^Agov) - AAOPP(1 - PAA) which represents Player 
A ' s payoff if running independently. 
• DB = PBASB - XBg0v) ~ XBOPP(1 - PBA) which represents Player 
B 's payoff if running independently. 
•
 fil
 -
 pl(l - SUBXAB - SUAXAB) - (XAOPP + XBopp)(l - P J ) w h i c h 
represents the to ta l 'electoral coalition pie' in round 1. 
• ft2 = P 2 ( l - SUBXAB ~ SUAXAB) - (^Aopp + Auopp)(l - Pi) w h i c h 
represents the to ta l 'electoral coalition pie' in round 2. 
One can th ink of DA and DB as representing the 'disagreement ' 
points for each player respectively. In o ther words, these are t he payoffs 
t ha t each player will receive if no electoral coalition agreement is reached 
by the end of t he second period. Q1 a n d Q2 represent the to ta l 'pie' 
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available in the game to an electoral coalition if formed in round 1 a n d 
round 2, respectively.15 
I make one final assumption a t this point .1 6 
• If a player is indifferent between making an offer and not making 
an offer, he will choose the la t ter . 
W i t h these simplifications and addi t ional assumptions in hand , I can 
now tu rn to the presentat ion of t he equilibria and proofs. 
P r o p o s i t i o n 1: There are three possible sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibria in this game. 
Let (Xt, 1 — Xt) be the offer made by Player A in period t, in which 
Xt is Player A's share. Let Wt, 1 — Wt be the offer made by Player B 
in period t, in which Wt is Player A's share. 
1. If DB < Q2 — DA, which means t ha t the to ta l 'electoral coalition 
pie' in Round 2 is larger t h a n the sum of bo th players' disagreement 
1 5 P J 5 and P 2 5 represent the expected utility associated wi th winning 
all of t he office benefits and set t ing policy a t the coalition ideal point . 
Since 5 = 1, this can be simplified to P„ or P 2 . 
1 6This assumption has a substant ive justification if one believes t h a t 
there are costs associated with making an electoral coalition offer. This 
assumpt ion is not entirely innocuous, though, since it does affect the 
number of sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in the game. It t u rns out 
t h a t if I allow the players to remain indifferent between making and not 
making an offer, there would be an addit ional equilibrium. I i l lustrate 
th is very clearly when providing the proofs for the game 's equilibria. 
Al though the number of equilibria is affected, the model 's implications 
are not . 
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payoffs, then Player A offers (Xx = al-Q2+DA, 1 - X i = i12-DA) 
in the first round and Player B accepts; and if the game were to 
reach the second round Player B offers (W2 = DA, 1 — W2 = 
Q2 - DA) and Player A accepts. 
2. If Q2 — DA < DB < ii1 — DA, which means t ha t t he to ta l 'electoral 
coalition pie' is larger t h a n the sum of the players' disagreement 
payoffs in Round 1 but not in Round 2, then Player A offers (X\ = 
fl1 - DB, 1 - Xi = DB) in Round 1 and Player B accepts; and if 
the game were to reach the second round Player B does not make 
an offer. 
3. If DB > Q1 — DA, which means tha t the to ta l 'electoral coalition 
pie' is smaller than the sum of the players' disagreement payoffs in 
bo th rounds, then nei ther player makes an offer in either round. 
T h u s a coalition will form in the first round in equilibria 1 and 2. In 
the thi rd equilibrium, no coalition forms. T h e first equil ibrium involves 
Player A making an initial offer t ha t is accepted by Player B. If the 
game had reached the second period, Player B would have m a d e an offer 
t h a t Player A found acceptable. T h e second equilibrium involves Player 
A making an initial offer t h a t is accepted by Player B. If t he game had 
reached the second period, Player B would not have m a d e an offer, even 
though Player A would have accepted an offer. In the th i rd equilibrium 
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Player A does not make an initial offer. Player B also fails to make an 
offer in period 2, a l though Player A would have accepted an offer. 
P r o o f of P r o p o s i t i o n 1: Given tha t there are no complications 
associated with incomplete information, I use backward induction to 
prove each of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. 
Equilibrium 1: There are two diverging pa ths in this game tree. I 
focus first on the one in which Player A makes an initial offer. At the 
last decision node in this half of the game, Player A mus t decide whether 
to accept or reject a coalition offer made by Player B. He will only ac-
cept this offer if he receives a t least as much uti l i ty a s he would get 
from rejecting it. In other words, he accepts if he receives a t least DA-
If Player B makes an offer he will want to maximize his payoff. Thus, 
he will offer exactly DA t o Player A and keep the rest of the 'electoral 
coalition pie' for himself. Player B would propose the agreement pair 
(DA', Q2 — DA) in the second period. It is impor t an t to note t h a t Player 
B will only make this counter offer if ft2 - DA > DB. If this condition 
does not hold, Player B will prefer to make no offer in the second pe-
riod. A little subs t i tu t ion and algebra indicates t h a t th is is precisely t h e 
condition associated wi th the first sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
outcome listed above. 
Continuing with the proof, and assuming tha t this condit ion holds, 
Player A knows t h a t he must give at least Q? — DA to Player B in order 
for him to accept a first period offer. Since Player A wants to maximize 
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his payoffs as well, this is all he will offer Player B. He will keep the rest, 
namely Q,1 — fi2 + DA- Player A will want Player B to accept the initial 
offer since the associated payoff is larger t han if the game continued into 
the second period. This is immediately obvious since ii1 > Q2. Thus, 
if Player A does make a n initial offer, then the agreement pair will b e 
(Q1 — J]2 + DA', ft2 — DA) and an electoral coalition will form in the first 
period. 
T h e question is whether Player A will actually make this initial of-
fer. This will depend on the payoffs he expects to receive if he does not 
make an offer in period 1. Th i s requires examining the half of the game 
tha t has so far been overlooked. T h e impor tan t th ing to note is t ha t 
the second period in this par t of the game tree is identical to the one 
already examined. Thus , we know tha t if the second period is reached, 
then Player B will make an electoral coalition offer of (DA;Q2 — DA). 
This will be accepted by Player A. Since we already know tha t Player A 
can guarantee himself a payoff of Q1 — Q2 -1- DA if he makes an electoral 
coalition offer in period 1 (which is larger t han DA), we know t h a t he 
will always make an offer in the first period. Thus , the sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium outcome is one in which Player A makes an initial offer 
t ha t is accepted by Player B. T h e game never enters a second period. 
Th i s equilibrium outcome assumes tha t the condit ion DB < Q2 — DA 
holds. 
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Q.E.D. 
The process of backward induction used- to prove equilibrium 1 is 
i l lustrated graphically in Figure 3.2. T h e wide black lines indicate the 
action taken by the players in each sub-game. 
Figure 3.2: Equil ibrium 1 
no offer offers X..1-X, 
accepts offer 
ft'-ft2 +D4: Cl2 -D* 
no offer 
rjffersW,. 1-W, 
A 
DA;DR 
DA:Dn 
accepts offer DA: Dn 
DA: i r -DA 
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Equilibrium 2: Given tha t there are two diverging pa ths in this game 
tree, I again focus first on the one in which Player A makes an initial 
offer. I have already shown in the previous proof t h a t if Player B makes 
an offer in the sedond period then it will be the agreement pair (DA', Q2 — 
DA). However, it may be the case t h a t Player B prefers not t o make a 
counter offer in the second period. This will be t rue if DB > ^ 2 — DA. 
Figure 3.3: Equil ibrium 2 
no offer offers X..1-X, 
D A : D B A 
reiects offeix^ " \ . accepts offer DA: Dn DA: & -DA 
D A : D „ D A : £r -DA 
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If th is condition holds, Player A knows t h a t he only has to give DB 
t o Player B for him to accept an offer in t he first period. Since Player 
A wants to maximize his payoff, he will propose the agreement pair 
(Q1 — DB',DB) if he wants his offer t o be accepted. However, it may 
be the case tha t Player A prefers his initial offer to be rejected if his 
expected payoff in the second period is larger. This will be the case if 
DA > fi1 — DD- T h e second sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium relies 
on the fact t ha t this condition does not hold. In other words, it must be 
the case t ha t if Player A makes an offer in the first period he does not 
want it to be rejected. 
T h e only remaining question a t this point is whether Player A prefers 
to make an offer tha t is accepted in t he first period or make no offer a t 
all. This requires examining the second half of the game tree. Again, 
the second period in this half of the game tree is identical to the one 
already examined. Thus , Player A expects t ha t Player B will make no 
offer in the second period. Given the assumption tha t DA < Q1 —DB, we 
know t h a t Player A will always make an offer in the first period. Thus , 
the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is one in which Player 
A makes an initial offer tha t is accepted by Player B. T h e game never 
enters a second period. This equilibrium assumes t ha t DB > Cl2 — DA 
and DA < ft1 — DB bo th hold. W i t h a little algebra, it is clear t ha t 
these conditions can be rewri t ten as O 2 — D'A < DD < fi1 — DA, which 
78 
is the condition associated with equilibrium 2 listed above. 
Q.E.D. 
T h e process of backward induction used to prove equilibrium 1 is 
i l lustrated graphically in Figure 3.3. T h e wide black lines indicate the 
action taken by the players in each sub-game. 
Equilibrium 3: To a large extent , this proof is identical to the pre-
vious one. Again I focus first on the half of the game t ree in which 
Player A makes an offer. I have already shown t h a t if Player B makes 
an offer in period 2. then Player A will accept it. As in the previous 
proof, I now assume tha t Player B prefers not to make a counter offer in 
period 2. This will be t rue if DB > Q2 — DA- I have also shown tha t if 
Player A wants his initial offer to be accepted, then he will propose the 
agreement pair (Q} — DB\DB). In the previous proof, I then assumed 
t h a t Player A would only make an initial offer if this was going to be 
accepted. In other words, his payoff from having his offer accepted was 
larger t h a n tha t from having his offer rejected and Player B making no 
counter offer. T h e precise condit ion was t ha t DA < Q1 — DB- I now 
assume t h a t this condition does not hold. This assumpt ion is the only 
th ing tha t distinguishes equilibrium 3 from equilibrium 2. 
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium 3 
no offer 
D*: DR A 
rejects offep/ > v accepts offer DA; DB DA; Of -DA 
DA;D* D A : a2 -DA 
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T h e question t h a t needs to be resolved is whether Player A would 
prefer to make an offer t h a t he knows is going to be rejected or make no 
offer at ^all. This requires examining the second half of the game tree. 
Again, the second period in this half of the game tree is identical to 
the one already examined. Thus, Player A expects t ha t Player B will 
make no offer in t he second period. I t is clear t h a t Player A will receive 
DA whether he makes no initial offer in the first period or he makes 
an offer t ha t gets rejected. Player A is, therefore, indifferent between 
these actions. As I s ta ted earlier, I assume tha t if a player is indifferent 
between making an offer and not making an offer, then he will choose 
to do the lat ter .1 7 Thus , the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is one 
in which bo th players fail to make an offer. This equilibrium assumes 
t ha t DB > ii2 - DA and DA > ft1 - DB bo th hold. W i t h a minor bi t 
of algebraic manipula t ion it is easy to see t h a t if the second condition 
holds then the first automat ical ly does as well. T h e second condition 
can be expressed as DB > H1 — DA, which is t he condition associated 
with the thi rd equilibrium listed above. 
Q.E.D. 
17If this assumption is not made and the players are allowed to remain 
indifferent, then there is a fourth sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 
T h e outcome is t h a t Player A makes an initial offer which is rejected. 
T h e game enters a second period, bu t Player B does not make a counter 
offer. T h e end result is t h a t no electoral coalition forms. 
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T h e process of backward induction used to prove equilibrium 3 is 
i l lustrated graphically in Figure 3.4. T h e wide black lines indicate the 
action taken by the players in each sub-game. 
3 . 2 . 3 C o m p a r a t i v e S t a t i c s 
T h e equilibria of my model allow a certain number of insights. However, 
before moving on to an analysis of the comparat ive statics, it is worth 
taking a moment to first unders tand the intuit ion behind each of these 
equilibria. 
Al though the first two equilibria result in the formation of an electoral 
coalition, the na tu re of the bargain itself is very different. In the first 
equilibrium, the player who moves last (in this case1 Player B) is able to 
determine the na tu re of the bargain tha t is ul t imately reached. This is 
the result of having a two-period model in which Player B can make a 
credible th rea t to reject an initial offer from Player A t h a t is insufficiently 
at t ract ive. Player B knows t h a t if the game enters a second period, he 
can always make a take-it-or-leave-it offer t h a t will be accepted. This in 
t u rn is the result of having a large enough 'electoral coalition pie' (Q2) to 
bargain over relative to the disagreement payoffs (DA and DB) available 
from running separately. Bo th parties benefit from forming an electoral 
coalition in this equilibrium. However, in t he second round Player A 
will only ever receive DA while Player B is always able to obta in all of 
the benefits from forming the electoral coalition, albeit wi th a smaller 
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'pie' t han would have been the case if an agreement had been struck in 
period one. 
T h e bargain reached in the second equilibrium is very different. In 
this case, Pa r ty A is able to obta in all of t he gains from reaching a pre-
electoral agreement. P a r t y B only ever receives his disagreement payoff. 
This is because Par ty B is no longer able to credibly th rea ten to reject 
such an offer. 
No electoral coalition forms in the thi rd equilibrium. This is because 
there are no gains to be made from reaching a pre-electoral agreement. 
Bo th par t ies would have to give u p so much in t he bargaining process 
to get the other to accept, t h a t each would be be t te r off running alone. 
Having characterized the equilibria in a more intuitive manner , I 
examine a number of useful insights regarding the formation process of 
electoral coalitions provided by Proposi t ion 1. I focus primarily on those 
comparat ive stat ics t h a t inform us abou t whether an electoral coalition 
forms. There are two possible s ta tes of the world: one in which an 
electoral coalition forms (equilibria 1 or 2) and one in which it does not 
(equilibrium 3). 
T h e first four variables are included for the sake of any readers who 
would be curious about relevant signs. However, as they are jus t re-
s t a t emen t s of the original variables, they are of limited interest as far 
as empirical tests are concerned. T h e more impor tan t variables are the 
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Table 3.2: Compara t ive Stat ics 
Increase in Variable Probabil i ty of Coalit ion 
'Electoral coalition pie' in Period 1 (Cl1) Increasing* 
'Electoral coalition pie' in Period 1 (fl2) Increasing 
A's disagreement outcome (DA) Decreasing 
B's disagreement outcome (DB) Decreasing 
Probabil i ty first period P E C wins (Pi) Increasing 
Probabil i ty second period P E C wins ( P 2 ) Increasing 
Probabil i ty i wins, given no P E C (P»_d) Decreasing 
Dis tance between i and P E C position (sUjXij) Decreasing 
Distance between i and opposit ion (Aj_opp) Increasing if P„ > P,.d 
Decreasing if Pi < PijA 
,A's share of office benefits given no P E C (s*) Decreasing 
* i Increasing' here means non-decreasing. 
remaining eight; the comparat ive stat ics on these.variables will provide 
t he hypotheses to be tested. 
As Table 3.2 illustrates, a larger 'electoral coalition pie' and a higher 
probabil i ty of entering government as a coalition increases t he likelihood 
of pre-electoral coalition formation. Pre-electoral coalitions become less 
likely as the expected seat shares of each par ty from running alone in-
crease and as the probabili ty of entering office after running separa te 
electoral campaigns rises. T h e impact of the opposit ion pa r ty ' s (coali-
t ion's) ideological position on, the likelihood of electoral coalition forma-
tion is conditional on whether t he probabil i ty of entering government 
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as a coalition is larger t han the probabili ty of entering government af-
te r running separately. If t h e probabil i ty is larger as a coalition, then 
pre-electoral coalition formation becomes more likely as the opposition 
becomes more extreme. T h e opposite holds if the probabil i ty is larger 
as a separate party. Finally, as the ideological dis tance between the 
two potent ia l coalition par tne rs grows, they are less likely to form a 
pre-electoral coalition. 
3 . 2 . 4 T e s t a b l e I m p l i c a t i o n s 
There are two observable outcomes predicted by the model: ei ther a pre-
electoral coalition forms or it does not . Coalition formation is influenced 
by the variables presented in t he model. I t is made more or less likely 
depending on whether the variables increase or decrease, as is shown 
in Table 3.2. T h e clearest way to test the implications of the model 
is t o operationalize t he variables in question and es t imate their effects 
using statist ical techniques. T h e measurement of the variables will be 
discussed in Chapte r 5. 
T h e likelihood of a coalition forming between a pa r ty and each of 
t he other relevant part ies in a par ty system is the variable of interest 
here. To capture tfje likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions between pairs 
of part ies, I use dyads of par t ies for each election. T h e probabil i ty t ha t 
a given coalition forms will depend on the variables shown in Table 3.2. 
F rom this table, the following hypotheses can be s ta ted : 
85 
1. As the ideological distance between the potent ial coalition par tners 
increases, t he likelihood of joining a coalition decreases. 
2. As the probabil i ty of entering government as a coalition increases, 
a par ty is more likely to join a coalition. 
3. Pre-electoral coalitions become less likely as t he expected seat 
shares of each pa r ty from running alone increase and as the proba-
bility of entering office after running separa te electoral campaigns 
rises. 
4. As the ideological dis tance between the coalition's ideal point and 
tha t of the likely opposition par ty increases, the likelihood of join-
ing a coalition increases as long as the coalition is not expected 
to be det r imenta l to electoral success. If this condit ion does not 
hold, then a pa r ty is less likely to join a coalition as the ideological 
distance increases. 
5. As the electoral bonus a par ty receives from joining an electoral 
coalition increases ( tha t is, as P u increases compared to PiA), a 
par ty is more likely to join an electoral coalition. 
In Chapter 5 , 1 will discuss how the implications of the model can be 
t ransla ted into hypotheses t h a t can be tested with d a t a t h a t is readily 
available. 
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3 . 3 C o n c l u s i o n 
I conclude this chapter wi th a brief summary of my model. T h e theo-
retical model presented above sought to explain why, and under wha t 
circumstances, electoral coalitions form. T h e answer, I argue, lies in a 
careful analysis of t he costs and benefits associated wi th forming a coali-
tion prior to the election. In order to fully unders tand this cost-benefit 
analysis, I presented a game-theoret ic model in which two par ty leaders 
are involved in a sequential bargaining process over whether to coordi-
na te their pre-electoral strategies. Bo th par ty leaders get to propose an 
electoral coalition agreement if they wish. Any coalition offer tha t is 
proposed by either pa r ty leader can be rejected or accepted. At the end 
of the game, the payoffs are distr ibuted as a function of the decisions 
reached in t he game. I find t h a t there are two equilibrium outcomes. 
Ei ther an electoral coalition forms in the first period of the game, or no 
coalition forms a t all. 
T h e model generates several testable implicat ions which will be es-
t imated in Chap te r 5. T h e process by which t h e variables in t he model 
affect the likelihood of coalition formation will be more carefully detailed 
in the case studies presented in the following chapter . T h a t is, coalitions 
should be more likely to form if the chance of winning executive office, 
or the expected share of office, increases. O n the other hand, if a par ty ' s 
vote share when running alone increases, it will be less likely to join a 
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coalition. If an opposition victory would allow extremely unsatisfactory 
policies to be implemented, a par ty ' s likelihood of joining a coalition goes 
up if joining such a coalition makes it more likely t ha t the opposition 
would be barred from office. Of course, ideological cohesion within t h e 
coalition makes it more likely tha t a pre-electoral coalition will form. 
By formalizing these intuitions, I am able to conceptualize the puzzle 
in terms of the probabilities associated with electoral coalition forma-
tion and to pinpoint the factors involved. Th i s will enable me to move 
on to the econometric analysis with a much clearer idea of how to test 
the argument t h a n would otherwise be the case. Before doing so, how-
ever, I t u rn to a detailed quali tat ive analysis of pre-electoral coalitions 
in France and South Korea. These case s tudies allow me to show tha t 
the assumptions underlying the model as well as the predictions it gen-
erates are plausible and generate useful intui t ions for thinking about the 
electoral s trategies chosen by par ty elites. 
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C h a p t e r 4 
F r a n c e a n d S o u t h K o r e a 
4 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
In this chapter I use a detailed investigation of electoral coalitions in 
Fifth Republic France and post-1987 South Korea to i l lustrate the causal 
process of pre-electoral coalition formation. To a large extent , t he se-
lection of these specific cases is somewhat arbi t rary since I believe t h a t 
there is a general underlying logic of pre-electoral coalition formation 
t h a t is not country specific. However, I did t ry to choose cases t h a t differ 
on several interesting criteria. Pe rhaps t he most obvious differences be-
tween France and South Korea relate to their geographical location and 
their history with democrat ic forms of government. France is a country 
in Western Europe with a well-established democrat ic pedigree, whereas 
Korea is a recently established democracy in Eas t Asia v A less well 
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known difference relates to the role t h a t ideological dist inctions between 
par t ies and candidates play in these countries. While a well-entrenched 
left-right cleavage exists in the French Fifth Republic, ideological differ-
ences are minimal compared to the impor tance of regional dist inctions 
in South Korea. Thus, South Korea offers a good oppor tuni ty to exam-
ine the formation of pre-electoral coalitions in the absence of ideological 
conflict. 
Al though the history of electoral coalitions in South Korea is infor-
mative, t he French case is part icular ly well-suited for those interested in 
analyzing pre-electoral coalitiCns. Th i s is par t ly because French electoral 
history offers so many clear examples of coalition success and failure on 
b o t h the left and right of t he political spect rum. Moreover; t he ability 
(or inability) of political part ies to form electoral coalitions often has 
a large impact on election outcomes in France. T h e result of the re-
cent 2002 presidential elections is perhaps the clearest example of this. 
T h e unusual na ture of the semi-presidential regime also offers an almost 
unique oppor tuni ty to evaluate the impact of different electoral insti-
tut ions, namely legislative and presidential elections, on pre-electoral 
s trategies while holding other country characteristics constant . 
While differing according to several criteria, the two cases discussed 
below seem to suggest t ha t similar factors influence pre-electoral coali-
t ion formation in bo th countries. Evidence from South Korea a n d France 
indicate t h a t distr ibutional issues play a significant role in determining 
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t h e ease wi th which electoral coalitions form. If these issues can be re-
solved, then even the most s tr ident and long-held personal animosities 
th rea ten ing electoral coordination can be overcome. This is part icularly 
evident in the case of South Korea. T h e danger of wait ing too long be-
fore coordinat ing pre-electoral s trategies and the impor t an t role played 
by the ideological position of opposit ion part ies comes th rough clearly 
in the French case. 
I t is, perhaps, impor tan t to note a t this s tage t h a t I do no t intend 
t h a t these cases be seen as a test of some hypothesis or as proof in favor 
of a part icular argument . T h e role of the French and South Korean case 
studies in this project is simply to provide concrete, detailed examples of 
t h e process of electoral coalition formation. T h e case s tudies i l lustrate 
the theory which was derived theoretically in the previous chapter , and 
serve as a bridge to the cross-national statist ical tes ts t o follow. As I 
s t a t ed earlier, pre-electoral coalitions include cases in which pa r ty leaders 
do not compete separately; ra ther , they either announce to t he electorate 
t h a t they plan to govern together if successful at t he polls or agree to run 
under a single name, (with joint lists or nominat ion agreements) .1 W i t h 
th i s definition in hand, I t u r n first t o an investigation of t h e electoral 
coalition history in France and then to tha t in South Korea. 
*If members of an electoral coalition merge to form a single party, I 
no longer consider the new pa r ty to be an electoral coalition. 
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4 . 2 F r e n c h F i f t h R e p u b l i c 
T h e outcome of the first round of the French 2002 presidential elections 
came as an enormous surprise to almost everyone in France, as well 
as to observers around the world. I t had been widely expected t ha t 
Jacques Chirac, the president and leader of the mains t ream right, would 
make it th rough to t he second round along with Lionel Jospin, t he prime 
minister and leader of the ma ins t ream left. T h e real quest ion for months 
•had been which of the two men would win the second round. Then, 
unexpectedly, the left vote was split among so many candida tes tha t the 
Socialist leader came in th i rd , behind the extreme-right poli t ician Jean-
Marie Le Pen. T h e French press described the event as a n ear thquake, 
and the French elections were, for a couple of weeks, the subject of world-
wide speculation. Most analyses of this part icular election will no doubt 
focus on the disturbing success of the extreme right. However, it is worth 
emphasizing tha t this political ' ear thquake ' had as much to do with the 
inability of the French Left t o form a coherent pre-electoral coalition as 
it did wi th an increase in t h e s t rength of the ext reme right . After all, Le 
Pen only enjoyed a ra ther modera te increase in his voteshare compared 
to wha t he had received in t he previous presidential elections of 1995.2 
2 Le Pen received 16.86% of the vote in the 2002 presidential election 
compared to 15% in 1995. A rival far-right candidate , Bruno Megret, 
got another 2.34% of the vote in 2002. These figures come from the 
Election Politique website a t h t tp : / /www.elect ion-pol i t ique.com. 
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The outcome of t he first round in 2002, though admi t ted ly a surprise, 
is no t unprecedented. T h e left had approached the 1969 presidential 
elections in such ' to ta l disarray' tha t none of the left candidates made 
it to the second round. This enabled a lit t le-known centrist candidate , 
Alain Poher, to compete in the second round against Georges Pom-
pidou (Pierce 1980). In 1981, the unwillingness of Jacques Chirac to 
publicly encourage his electorate to suppor t the remaining mains t ream 
right candidate (Valery Giscard d 'Esta ing) after he had been eliminated 
in the first round of the presidential elections clearly contr ibuted to t he 
size of t he left-wing vote t h a t brought Francois Mi t te r rand to power 
(Wright 1995, Ysmal 1989). T h e inability of the modera te right to form 
a cohesive electoral alliance in these elections and a t the subsequent leg-
islative elections a few weeks later enabled the first left-wing government 
to come to power since the Popular Front in 1936. These examples illus-
t r a t e the impor tan t and often dramat ic role t h a t pre-electoral coalitions 
have played in determining electoral outcomes in France. 
4 . 2 . 1 E l e c t o r a l I n s t i t u t i o n s a n d D i s t r i b u t i o n a l I s -
s u e s 
T h e notoriously disproport ional electoral system of the French Fifth Re-
public favors large par t ies for presidential and legislative elections. Thus, 
one might expect t ha t pre-electoral coalitions are equally common in 
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bo th types of elections. However, this is not the case as Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 show.3 
Table 4.1: Fi rs t - round Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Elections 
Election year Pre-Electoral Coalitions 
1965 P C F + P S 
1969 None 
1974 P C F + P S 
1981 None 
1988 None 
1995 None 
2002 None 
Parties: ( P C F ) Communis t Par ty ; ( P S ) Socialist P a r t y 
3In Table 4.2, all coalitions listed as forming in the first round also oc-
cur in the second round. Only additional"coalitions are listed as forming 
in the second round. 
94 
Table 4.2: Electoral Coalitions in Legislative Elections 
Election year Pre-Electoral Coalitions 
Round 1 Round 2 
1958 
1962 
1967 
1968 
1973 
1978 
1981 
1986 (PR) 
1988 
1993 
1997 
2002 
None 
None 
U N R + U D T + R I 
SFIO-f-RAD-t-CIR (FGDS) 
U N R + R I 
U D R + R I + U C 
UGDS ( P S + M R G ) 
C D S + P R + R I (UDF) 
P S + M R G 
R P R + U D F 
P S + M R G 
R P R + U D F 
P S + M R G 
R P R + U D F 
P S + M R G 
R P R + U D F 
G r e e n s + G E 
R P R + U D F 
P S + G r e e n s + P R G 
U P M ( R P R + U D F + D L ) 
P S + G r e e n s + P R G 
None 
U N R + U D T + R I 
P C F + S F I O + R A D 
U N R + U D T + R 1 + C D 
F G D S + P C F + P S U 
U N R + R I + P D M 
F G D S + P C F 
U D R + R I + U C + R E F 
P C F + U G D S + P S U 
U D F + R P R 
P S + M R G + P C F 
R P R + U D F 
P S + M R G + P C F 
(no second round) 
R P R + U D F 
P S + M R G + P C F 
R P R + U D F 
P S + P C F 
G r e e n s + G E 
R P R + U D F 
P S + G r e e n s + P R G + P C F 
U P M 
P S + G r e e n s + P R G + P C F 
( R a d ) Radicals; ( P R G ) Left Radical Pa r ty ; ( U D T ) Left Gaullists; 
( P S U ) Unified Socialist Par ty ; ( U N R , U D R , R P R ) Gaullist Par ty ; 
( S F I O , P S ) Socialist Par ty ; ( P C F ) Communis t Par ty ; ( G r e e n s ) Green 
Par ty ; ( G E ) Generat ion Ecology; ( U D F ) Union for French Democracy; 
( R I ) Independent Republicans; ( P R ) Republicans; ( U C ) Center Union; 
( C D ) Democrat ic Center; ( P D M ) Progress and Modern Democracy; 
( D v . D . ) Other modera te right. 
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While electoral coalitions are relatively frequent in legislative elec-
tions, they are quite rare in presidential contests. This is a puzzle given 
t h a t the electoral systems used in b o t h types of elections are very similar. 
In this section, I i l lustrate t h a t dis tr ibut ional conflicts among par ty 
leaders are often so great in presidential contests t ha t pre-electoral coali-
t ions fail to form even though they can offer significant electoral advan-
tages. These distr ibutional issues are easier to resolve in legislative elec-
tions since ministerial portfolios are more divisible t han the presidential 
office. I begin by outlining the electoral systems used in the Fifth Re-
public before contrast ing t he history of electoral coalition formation in 
presidential and legislative elections. 
Presidential and legislative elections are bo th characterized by two 
rounds of voting in which a limited number of candidates progress to 
t he second round. If a presidential candida te wins an absolute majori ty 
of the nat ional vote in the first round, then he or she is automat ical ly 
elected president. If this is not t he case, then the t op two candidates go 
th rough to the second round t h a t is held two weeks later.4 Whoever wins 
the most votes in the second round becomes the president. Legislative 
elections are very similar. Each electoral district is a single-seat district 
4A11 presidential elections have gone to t he second round since the 
introduct ion of direct presidential elections in 1962. 
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and any candidate who passes a threshold of electoral suppor t in the 
first round of voting is eligible to enter a second round two weeks later .5 
T h e part icular threshold tha t must be overcome has been changed 
twice since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. It was orig-
inally set a t a relatively low 5% of the vote. This was subsequently 
increased to 10% for the 1967 election and 12.5% for the 1978 election 
(Cole k Campbell 1989). T h e plurality winner in the second round 
of voting becomes the elected deputy. T h e first-past-the-post na tu re 
of these electoral systems provides incentives for electoral coalitions to 
form. In fact, the right-wing president Giscard d 'Es ta ing specifically 
increased the threshold t ha t needed to be overcome to enter t he second 
round of legislative elections to 12.5% in 1978 in order to force centrist 
par t ies and center-right part ies to merge or form alliances wi th his own 
party. This move was motivated by the growing success of the socialists 
a n d communists at local elections in the mid-1970s (Duhamel 1999). 
5 T h e electoral system used for the 1986 elections was different. In an 
a t t e m p t to prevent an expected right-wing legislative majority, President 
Mi t te r rand introduced a proport ional representat ion system similar to 
t h a t used in the Four th Republic. He hoped t h a t this would encourage 
voters t o suppor t the extremist National Front and siphon off votes from 
t h e modera te right-wing part ies. Al though a large number of voters did 
suppor t the National Front, Jacques Chirac, the leader of the modera te 
r ight, became pr ime minister with a legislative major i ty of two seats. 
Chirac immediately restored the tradit ional single-seat plural i ty electoral 
system. 
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Given the na tu re of the electoral system in France, pa r ty leaders have 
a range of pre-election choices for legislative and presidential elections. 
At one extreme, par t ies could refuse to form any electoral coalitions in 
ei ther round of voting. Th i s is what happened with the Left prior to 
1965 and is wha t typically occurs now between the Nat ional Front and 
the modera te right-wing part ies.6 One option for pa r ty leaders is to 
form an electoral coalition for the second round only. In th is option, 
part ies would still get to compete against each other in t he first round. 
Th i s has been a common occurrence in legislative elections amongst t h e 
mains t ream part ies on the left and right. Another opt ion is for part ies to 
form electoral coalitions prior to the first round. Th i s requires choosing a 
single candidate to run in each district. Al though this is not as common 
as the previous option, Table 4.2 i l lustrates tha t it does occur with some 
frequency on b o t h t he left and right.7 T h e last opt ion is t h a t part ies 
could move beyond electoral coalitions and simply merge into a single 
party. The center-left par t ies chose this opt ion when they merged to 
6 A small number of modera te right-wing deputies regularly call for an 
electoral coalition wi th the National Front in certain districts. However, 
they tend to be isolated very quickly by the par ty elites. W h e n several 
mains t ream right politicians were elected with the help of the National 
Front in the cantonal and regional elections of 1998, President Chirac 
immediately went on nat ional television to denounce all alliances be-
tween the modera te and extreme right. T h e polit icians were then kicked 
out of their part ies (Mart in 1999, Hecht k Mandonne t 1987). 
7Typically, coalitions between the UDF and R P R t h a t form in the 
first round have only applied to part icular districts. T h e second round 
coalitions between these part ies are much more comprehensive. 
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form the Socialist P a r t y in 1971. T h e non-Gaull ist part ies on the right 
also chose this option, when they formed the Union of Democrat ic Forces 
(UDF) in 1978 (Massar t 1999, Portelli 1994, Bell k Criddle 1984) .8 
P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n s 
Having provided an overview of the pre-electoral coalition options avail-
able to par ty leaders, it is worth considering the history of these coali-
tion choices in presidential and legislative elections more specifically. As 
I s ta ted earlier, one would expect electoral coalitions to form quite fre-
quently in presidential elections since only two candidates can go through 
to the second round. Presumably, pa r ty leaders would like to avoid the 
outcomes of the 1969 and 2002 elections where the left vote was split 
among so many candidates t ha t none of t h e m m a d e it into the second 
round. T h e incentive for part ies to coordinate their pre-electoral s t ra te-
gies may be diminished if the presidency held little power. However, 
the impor tance of winning the presidency for t he different part ies in 
France is hard to overstate. One must remember t h a t it is slightly mis-
leading to describe the political system in France as semi-presidential. 
It could more accurately be considered a presidential system when the 
president enjoys a legislative majority (Duhamel 1999, Keeler k Schain 
1996, Chariot 1994, Hayward 1993). It is only when the president lacks 
S o m e t h i n g similar seems to have occurred on the modera te right 
following the success of t he pre-electoral coalition t ha t formed prior to 
the first round of the 2002 legislative elections. 
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a majority tha t the system behaves as if it were a par l iamentary regime 
dominated by the pr ime minister. T h e presidency has been the dominant 
political posit ion throughout the Fifth Republic with the exception of 
the three periods of 'cohabi ta t ion ' between 1986-88, 1993-95 and 1997-
2002.9 
Despite the impor tance of the posit ion and the incentives created by 
the electoral system, there are very few examples of coalitions forming 
in presidential elections. In fact, there are only two examples where t he 
left or the right have coordinated their strategies so as to present a sin-
gle presidential candida te for election. As the following examples will 
i l lustrate, many French specialists argue t h a t the chief obstacle to coali-
tion formation in presidential elections is t he dis tr ibut ional consequences 
associated with nominat ing a single candidate . 
Bo th t imes in which pre-electoral agreements have been reached in 
presidential elections, the Communis t Pa r ty ( P C F ) accepted a non-
communist candida te as the main s t andard bearer for the left. To some 
extent, the willingness of the Communis t P a r t y to accept a socialist 
candidate in 1965 and 1974 stems from the widely-held belief tha t a 
communist could never be elected president dur ing the Cold War pe-
riod. It is also impor tan t to remember t h a t the rise of the Socialist 
Par ty as the dominant par ty on the left was almost unthinkable in the 
9 Cohabi ta t ion refers to a t ime when the presidential and prime min-
isterial positions are held by people from opposing parties. 
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1960s and early 1970s. T h e P C F had been the largest par ty in 1945 
and was still the dominant pa r ty on t h e left by a considerable margin 
during the early years of the Fifth Republic. To a large extent , the 
P C F could only expect to benefit from suppor t ing Francois Mi t te r rand 
as the single candidate of t he Left in t he 1965 presidential elections. 
T h e P C F hoped to gain from a show of left-wing uni ty without ceding 
any author i ty to the socialists. In fact, they probably did not expect 
Mi t te r rand to even make it into the second round, let alone make the 
election competi t ive (Johnson 1981).10 I t was only because a centrist 
candidate , Jean Lecanuet, managed to win 15.6% of the vote in t he first 
round tha t a second ballot involving Mi t te r rand and de Gaulle was ac-
tual ly required. I t was this unforeseen occurrence t h a t indirectly began 
to establish Mi t te r rand ' s reputa t ion as t he leader of the left. 
It was the socialists who were the most reluctant to consider an elec-
toral coalition with the communists in the early years of the Fifth Re-
public. To some extent , this reluctance can be t raced to the t radi t ional 
and deep-seated hostility on t he non-communist Left towards the P C F 
(Jackson 1990, J u d t 1986). However, more impor tan t were the relative 
positions of the two part ies among the electorate. T h e P C F was by far 
the dominant pa r ty on the left and any alliance with the communis ts 
would automatical ly position the socialists as minority par tners . Many 
1 0 Mitter rand won 44.8% of the vote in t he second round, compared to 
de Gaulle 's 55.2% (Mackie k Rose 1991). 
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feared t h a t the emerging left-right bipolarization of the political system 
threa tened the very existence of the socialist par ty given its small size 
relative to the P C F . This helps to explain why one thi rd of socialist vot-
ers refused to suppor t the P C F in the second ballot of the 1962 legisla-
tive elections (Williams, Goldey k Harrison 1970). A nat ional electoral 
coalition with the communists also th rea tened the socialists' ability to 
conclude alliances with bo th the center and the left.11 Moreover, an 
alliance with the P C F was expected to cause problems in winning over 
those center-left and center-right voters who h a d not thrown their lot in 
with de Gaulle in 1962. These voters were influential since they repre-
sented the swing vote throughout the 1960s (Portelli 1994, Ysmal 1989). 
T h e socialists ul t imately accepted an electoral coalition in 1965 only 
after having unsuccessfully a t t emp ted to build a federation of the center-
left a round the presidential candida te of Gas ton Deferre.12 Deferre had 
wanted to build a 'grande federation' of progressive forces, reaching right-
wards to the Chris t ian democrat ic movement (MRP) (Jenson 1991). 
Center-r ight voters seemed more likely to vote for the Gaullists t h a n the 
n F o r example, it th rea tened the socialist policy of allying wi th the 
center right in Marseilles bu t with the P C F in certain regions of Paris . 
1 2 The origins of this federation can be found in a series of discussions 
t h a t took place around the presidential candida te of a mysterious 'Mon-
sieur X ' . I t was only once the idea of a candida te of the center-left had 
been ' t e s ted ' in the weekly magazine, L'Express, t ha t Gas ton Deferre 
came out and announced tha t he was actually Monsieur X (Chagnollaud 
k Quermonne 1996). 
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center-left, however (Hanley 2002). This center-left federation eventu-
ally fell apar t at the end of 1964 due to reluctance on the pa r t of the 
M R P to par t ic ipate in it. I t also collapsed under t he pressure exerted 
by the communists a t municipal elections, from pa r t s of the socialist 
pa r ty t h a t refused the centrist discourse and from the reappearance of 
t h e catholic school question (Jenson 1991).13 T h e failure of t he center-
left federation left the way open for Mit te r rand to run against de Gaulle 
in 1965. Mi t te r rand had organized the non-communist left under the 
banner of the Federat ion de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste (FGDS) 
a n d allied it wi th the communists . T h e relative success enjoyed by his 
candidacy helped to cement the idea of a left-left alliance. 
T h e events of May 1968 and the presidential elections of 1969 pro-
vided further evidence t h a t a left-left alliance was capable of providing 
realistic opposition to the Gaullist right. In February 1968, the socialists 
a n d communis ts reached an agreement on a common electoral 'platform', 
thereby consolidating the initiative t h a t had begun in the 1965 presiden-
t ial elections. However, the left-wing alliance soon began to disintegrate 
in May 1968 after several weeks of widespread strikes and rioting by 
s tudents and workers. Wi thou t consulting the leadership of t he P C F or 
1 3 The P C F were opposed to t he alliance because they did not want to 
be sidelined as they had been in the Four th Republic. Since the Gaullists 
opposed the alliance and wanted the centrist voters for themselves, they 
constant ly raised the religious issue to drive a wedge between the social-
ists and the MRP. 
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the FGDS, Mi t te r rand announced tha t he was willing to lead the Left in 
taking up its responsibilities for transit ion after the defeat of de Gaulle, 
which he argued was imminent . This appeared as a coup d ' e t a t to bo th 
the F G D S and the socialist party, and 'reeked . . . of Four th Republic 
centr ism' t o the communis ts (Jenson 1991). 
T h e alliance between the FGDS and the P C F collapsed, and the 
F G D S itself fell apar t . As a result, each par ty of the Left p u t up its 
own candidate and refused to form second ballot electoral pacts in the 
1969 presidential elections. This meant tha t two right-wing candidates, 
Poher and de Gaulle, contested the second ballot run-off. T h e disastrous 
outcome of these elections for the Left provided further evidence t ha t a 
change in electoral s t ra tegy was needed. 
' W i t h the Left balkanized as never before dur ing the Fifth 
Republic, a number of lessons cried out t o be learnt from 
the disasters of 1969. Firs t , [Socialist candidate Gaston] De-
ferre's exclusively Centre-Left version of Socialism had been 
routed a t the polls, securing indeed the lowest Socialist vote 
ever. Second, the Communis t go-it-alone s t ra tegy was shown 
to be no way for tha t par ty to get a candidate through to 
the second round, despi te a remarkably avuncular perfor-
mance by Jacques Duclos. I t had been amply demons t ra ted 
how not to play the presidential game, and the most certain 
long-term beneficiary of t he Left's fragmentation of 1969 was 
Francois Mi t te r rand , who had shown four years earlier how 
far a united Left could go' (Bell k Criddle 1984). 
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Thus , by the end of the 1960s, it had become apparent to the Left 
t ha t there were no electorally-viable al ternatives to a left wing alliance.14 
In 1972 the P C F , the P S and the small left-radical M R G successfully 
negotiated a 'Common Program' in which they agreed upon a platform 
for an eventual left government as well as cooperat ion in future elections 
(Bell 2000, Frears k Parodi 1979, Johnson 1981). T h e left as a whole 
advanced in the 1973 legislative elections, drawing higher than usual vote 
shares. T h e P C F was still t he leader by a small margin, with 21.3% to 
the Socialists' 20.4%. T h e P C F leadership, not yet worried about t he 
increasing s t rength of t he Socialist party, backed the left's most viable 
presidential candida te (Mit terrand) in the 1974 presidential elections. 
Mi t te r rand led the vote in t he first round of balloting, before narrowly 
losing to the ma ins t ream right candidate, Giscard d 'Esta ing. 1 5 Shortly 
thereafter, the Communist-Socialist alliance hit rocky ground because of 
shifts in the electoral suppor t for the two parties. 
Even though opinion polls in 1977 foreshadowed an almost certain 
victory for a uni ted left in the par l iamentary elections of 1978, most 
analyses agree t h a t the electoral coalition collapsed under the weight of 
14In fact, the 1969 elections did not see a d ramat i c fall in the to ta l 
number of votes cast for the Left as a whole. However, the failure to 
coordinate meant t h a t the Left lost a huge number of seats. This sug-
gested t h a t if t he Left could only reach agreement, they might achieve 
electoral success. 
1 5Mitterrand won 49.2% in the second round, compared to Giscard 
d 'Es ta ing ' s 50.8% (Mackie k Rose 1991). 
105 
s t rong dis tr ibut ional conflicts on the Left (Wright 1995). The Commu-
nists had agreed to t he Common Program a t a t ime when it was the 
largest pa r ty on t h e left and could expect to domina te a coalition gov-
ernment . However, the Socialist P a r t y had been the chief beneficiary 
of the Common Program and had displaced the P C F as the dominant 
pa r ty on the left. The 1977 polls indicated t ha t the Socialists could 
expect t o win 35% of the vote compared to 20% for the communis ts 
(Wright 1995). From this perspective, Mi t t e r rand ' s claim in the early 
1970s tha t his ' fundamental objective [was] to rebuild a great socialist 
par ty on the ground occupied by the communis ts in order to demons t ra te 
tha t out of five million communist voters, three million can vote social-
ist ' tu rned out t o b e remarkably prescient (Portelli 1994, Bergounioux k 
Grunberg 1992). T h e socialists could now expect to call the shots in any 
left-wing coalition government. As Wright (1995) states, 'To the Com-
munist leadership, such a prospect must have seemed a worse th rea t 
t h a n a continuat ion of conservative rule. ' Once the Communis t lead-
ership realized tha t the newly-unified Socialist P a r t y (PS) was get t ing 
nearly as much suppor t as the P C F , they withdrew from the electoral 
alliance agreements in an a t t emp t to s top the Socialist Pa r ty ' s growing 
momen tum (Melchior 1993, Johnson 1981, Frears k Parod i 1979). 
In t he next couple of years, it was difficult t o reach lasting agreements 
on electoral alliances and common programs. T h e P C F .has been fighting 
against Socialist hegemony of the left ever since the late 1970s, and 
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has refused to form electoral coalitions prior to the first round. For 
instance, prior to the presidential election of 1981, t he candidacy of the 
Communis t Pa r ty leader Georges Marchais 'was an act of pure defiance. 
I t was motivated by the desire to bui ld up, as in the elections of 1978 and 
1979, a Communis t resistance to Socialist advance, and by a par t icular 
concern to establish a s t rong base from which to defend Communis t 
positions in the municipal elections due in March 1983.' (Bell k Criddle 
1984). 
Unlike the Left, the part ies on the right haye never formed an elec-
toral coalition in presidential elections. Unti l the mid-1970s, t h e domi-
nance of the Gaullist pa r ty ( R P R ) mean t t ha t there was never a need 
to form a coalition.16 In the early years of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle 
had managed to sweep through the floating electorate on the right and 
in the center t h a t had not been tied down by par ty allegiances under 
the Four th Republic.1 7 He picked u p 50% of the C N I P vote, 30% of 
t he M R P vote, and 30% of the Radical vote in t he 1962 legislative elec-
tions, thereby almost wiping out the political center (Chariot 1971). T h e 
1 6The Gaullist Par ty was originally called the UNR in 1962. I t became 
t h e U D R in 1968 and the R P R in 1976. 
1 7Part ies of the Right during the Th i rd and Four th Republics had al-
ways suffered from elite fragmentat ion and poor organizat ion of their 
mass electoral following. However, t he Gaulist U N R was able to gain 
control over the local 'notables ' , a n d achieve a high degree of par l iamen-
ta ry discipline, centralization, and nat ional izat ion (Schain 1991). Na tu-
rally, this encouraged the socialists and communists t o reform their own 
pa r ty organizations. 
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dominant role played by the Gaullist pa r ty only came to an end in 1974 
when the par ty split following the dea th of the incumbent Gaullist pres-
ident, Georges Pompidou. T h e majori ty of the par ty suppor ted Jacques 
Chaban-Delmas in t he 1974 presidential elections, while a minori ty fol-
lowed the rising politician Jacques Chirac, who threw his suppor t behind 
Valery Giscard d 'Es ta ing and his new par ty (UDF). This split init iated 
a power struggle for supremacy on the mains t ream right t ha t has con-
t inued until this day. 
Al though Giscard won the 1974 presidential elections, the Gaullists 
were t he largest par ty in the legislature. As a result, Giscard relied on 
Gaullist suppor t to implement his policy and was forced to appoint a 
Gaullist pr ime minister, Jacques Chirac.1 8 Al though Chirac was a loyal 
p r ime minister a t first, he soon began to assert himself as t he real leader 
of the mains t ream right arid as the only candidate capable of arrest ing 
t he electoral rise of the left. By 1976, the tension between the two men 
became so great tha t Chirac resigned and positioned himself to chal-
lenge Giscard in future presidential elections (Portelli 1994). Following 
an acrimonious presidential campaign in 1981, first-round loser Chirac 
conspicuously failed to encourage his suppor ters to vote for Giscard in 
the second round (Bell 2000, Becker 1994, Ysmal 1989). T h e leaders 
t 8 Many elements in the Gaullist pa r ty were opposed to suppor t ing 
a Giscard presidency. However, Chirac threw his suppor t behind the 
president. 
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of the two parties were fighting for supremacy of the right more than 
they were fighting against their left opponents (Bell 2000, Mar t in 1993). 
W h e n Chirac was unable to advance to the second round, he may well 
have calculated t ha t a second presidential m a n d a t e for t h e U D F leader 
would give them too much of an advantage over his own party. Ul-
timately, Giscard lost the election, even though the aggregate score for 
t he right had been higher t h a n tha t of the left in t he first round (Du Roy 
k Schneider 1982, Brechon 1995). 
I t is often assumed tha t the ongoing lack of coordinat ion between 
t h e right-wing part ies has helped the left (Brechon 1995, Ysmal 1989, 
76-7). I t is striking, in this regard, tha t from mid-1981 to mid-2002, 
t h e right was only able to control the government for four years. T h e 
most egregious example of conflicts on the Right helping t h e Left was 
pe rhaps the 1981 presidential election in which they lost control of the 
'presidency for the first t ime in the history of the Fifth Republic. Since 
then voters have not coordinated on a single preferred mainst ream-r ight 
party, and the par ty elites have been largely unwilling to compromise. 
As a result, the Left have dominated French government for the last 
two decades. T h e disagreements between the ma ins t ream right cannot 
be blamed on ideological differences between the two par t ies since there 
were few, if any, policy dist inctions (Golder 2000). Ins tead, this raises 
t he possibility t ha t t he coordination problems could have been the result 
of distr ibutional issues. 
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L e g i s l a t i v e E l e c t i o n s 
As Table 4.2 illustrates, electoral coalitions have been much more com-
mon in legislative elections. This is t rue whether one considers left- or 
right-wing parties. T h e majori ty of these coalitions occur in the sec-
ond round, a l though there are occasional agreements to coordinate pre-
electoral strategies in part icular districts in the first round. T h e 1972 
Common Program commit ted the socialists and communis ts to a policy 
of withdrawal in favor of t he best-placed candida te on the left after the 
first round of voting. T h e R P R and UDF followed suit in June 1977 
when they signed a 'Majori ty Pac t ' with a similar withdrawal policy 
(Jaffre 1980, Frears k Parodi 1979). The effect on the number of right-
wing candidates compet ing in t he second round was qui te dramat ic . 
Table 4.3 i l lustrates t h a t there were 81 second-round contests involv-
ing 3 or more candidates in the 1973 legislative elections. Whereas the 
successful implementat ion of the left-wing electoral coalition meant t ha t 
only one of these contests included more t h a n one left-wing candidate , 
78 included at least two right-wing candidates.1 9 In 1978, following the 
signing of the 'Majori ty Pac t ' , there was only one second round contest 
with more t han two candidates . In fact, the U D F and R P R actually ran 
a single candidate from the first round in 130 of the 474 metropol i tan 
districts in this election. 
19In four of these contests, a left-wing candida te managed to win the 
seat even though the right-wing candidates won a major i ty of the votes. 
110 
These withdrawal policies have been implemented with varying de-
grees of success th roughout the 1980s and 1990s (Mart in 1993) .20 T h e 
mains t ream right par t ies have made an effort to nominate a single can-
didate for t he first round since the 1978 elections. In the 1981 legislative 
elections,, the two par t ies agreed on 385 unique candidates, mainly in-
cumbents (Bell 2000). Agreeing t h a t s i t t ing deput ies should, by and 
large, be allowed to run unopposed (from fellow moderate-r ight politi-
cians) seems to have been one way of resolving the distr ibutional prob-
lems, at least in those districts where a reasonably popular deputy is 
seeking reelection. T h e U D F and R P R have also organized primaries to 
determine which candida te was to run uncontested from the first round. 
However, politicians have not always been willing to s tep down. These 
are referred to as unapproved primaries (primaires sauvages). For exam-
ple, over 450 single candidates were designated in 1993. Many politicians 
who were not selected decided to run anyway, many as independents 
(Backman k B i renbaum 1993). T h e pre-electoral coalition implemented 
before the first round of t he 2002 legislative elections was much more 
comprehensive t h a n previous ones had been, and very few mains t ream 
20In the P R elections of 1986, the U D F and R P R ran joint lists in 61 
of the 96 electoral districts. They ran separa te lists in the remaining 35. 
I l l 
Table 4.3: Electoral Thresholds a n d Second-Round Candida tes 
Election Threshold Average number of Number of 2 n d Round 
Year (% of vote) Candidates eligible Contests with more 
for 2 n d Round than 2 Candidates 
1958 
1962 
1967 
1968 
1973 
1978 
1981 
1988 
1993 
1997 
2002 
5 
5 
10 
10 
10 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
5.02 
4.33 
3.08 
2.76 
3.32 
2.93 
2.33 
2.14 
1.96 
2.19 
2.04 
351 
140 
74 
48 
81 
1 
1 
9 
15 
79 
10 
Calculated using official election results (Ministry of the Interior). 
right politicians dissented.2 1 This was the first t ime t h a t such a compre-
hensive coalition had been implemented in the first round.2 2 
One might argue t h a t t he sharp reduct ion after 1977 in the number 
of second round contests with more t h a n two candidates was caused 
by the introduct ion of a larger electoral threshold (12.5%) in the 1978 
elections. It is fairly obvious tha t rising electoral thresholds have reduced 
21
 U D F leader Francois Bayrou, along with a small band of followers, 
did not join the new 'Union for a Presidential Majori ty ' electoral coali-
tion. He was worried t h a t t he R P R would domina te the new coalition 
and control the bulk of the campaign funding from the government. 
2 2 Pompidou was able to implement a similar coalition in. the 1968 elec-
tions. However, it was not so wide-reaching or cohesive. 
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the average number of candidates qualifying for the second round. 2 3 
However, Table 4.3 suggests t ha t this does not fully explain the initial 
drop off in the number of second round contests with more t h a n two 
candidates after 1977. In 1997, for instance, we see 79 second-round 
contests with more t han two candidates . Of these, all bu t three were 
the result of an extreme right (FN) candida te maintaining his or her 
candidacy (none were elected).24 Electoral thresholds and pre-electoral 
withdrawal agreements have bo th clearly helped the .reduction in this 
type of second round contest. 
T h e empirical evidence relating to electoral coalitions in legislative 
elections raises two questions. First ; why do pre-electoral coalitions form 
more often in these elections t h a n in presidential ones? Second, why 
do these coalitions form more often in the second round of legislative 
elections than in the first? I believe t h a t the answer to bo th of these 
2 3 The early 5% threshold was based on the actual number of votes 
cast. W h e n the threshold was raised to 10%, t he method of calculat ing 
the threshold also changed. Instead of needing 10% of the votes cast, 
the number of votes a candidate needed to advance to the second round 
was equal t o 10% of the registered voters. This method remained in 
place when the threshold was raised to 12.5%. Given tu rnou t levels, a 
candida te often needs around 17% of the vote to qualify for the second 
round. 
2 4In the other three cases there was one candida te on the left and two 
on the modera te right. In one case, the 4 th district in the Maine-et-Loire 
depa r tmen t , the left candidate won with only 36.57% of the vote because 
the two modera te right candidates split t he right-wing vote between 
them. 
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quest ions is related to the dis tr ibut ional issues t ha t need to be .overcome 
when forming an electoral coalition. In presidential elections there is 
only one position up for grabs. Thus , the benefits of office are not 
easily divisible. Moreover, the presidency is t he most powerful political 
posit ion in France under normal circumstances. I t is because of th is t h a t 
par t ies on bo th the right and left have found it difficult to compromise 
and form electoral coalitions in presidential elections. As t he evidence 
presented above suggests, no pa r ty (or pa r ty leader) wants to be reduced 
to a secondary role in these elections. In legislative elections, t he benefits 
of office are much more divisible. After all, ministerial portfolios can be 
allocated t o each of the part ies par t ic ipat ing in an electoral coalition. 
Th i s has benefited parties such as the Greens who have li t t le hope of 
winning executive office on their own. Although distr ibut ional issues are 
more easily overcome in legislative elections, they do still pose problems. 
Th i s is because pre-electoral agreements often involve some candidates 
being forced to s tep down in favor of candidates from other part ies. In 
fact, there are always a few candidates each election who refuse to s t ep 
down when requested to by the par ty leaders (Backman k Bi renbaum 
1993). 
T h e t radi t ional explanat ion as to why electoral coalitions tend to 
form only in the second round is t ha t the electoral inst i tut ions do not 
require par ty elites to act otherwise. It is often argued t h a t t he French 
two-round majori ty voting sys tem solves any problem of coordinat ion 
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because parties can compete in the first round and coordinate in t he 
second (Tsebelis 1990, Massar t 1999). Duverger even argues t h a t dual-
ballot systems produce no incentives to vote strategically in the first 
.round (Cox 1997, 123-4,137). This notion of how the electoral system 
works fits with the popular refrain t h a t 'in the first round, you choose; 
in t he second round, you el iminate ' (Cayrol 1971, Meny 1996). 
However, I disagree wi th this explanation. T h e electoral inst i tut ions 
create clear incentives to form electoral coalitions in t h e first round. T h e 
fact t h a t the number of par t ies compet ing in t he first dual-ballot election 
in 1958 was half t ha t typically found in the proport ional representat ion 
elections of the Four th Republic provides tenta t ive evidence to suggest 
t h a t pa r ty elites were already aware of these s t rategic incentives a t this 
early da te (Bourcek 1998, 119). T h e presence of electoral thresholds also 
creates obvious incentives for part ies to form electoral coalitions. The re 
are benefits to forming electoral coalitions even if a pa r ty knows for sure 
t h a t it is going to make it into the "second round. Unlike American elec-
t ions in which there are often several months between pa r ty primaries 
and legislative elections, in French elections there are only two weeks. 
As Tsebelis (1990, 191) s tates , this means t h a t if ' the two pa r tne r s of a 
coalition go too far in criticizing each other in t he first round, they will 
no t have t ime to change their strategies in t he second round and heal 
the wounds (even if they wish to) . ' Par t ies could avoid these difficulties 
if they formed an electoral coalition in the first round. Finally, it must 
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be remembered tha t the transfer of votes between rounds from one can-
didate to another is often far from perfect (Cole k Campbel l 1989).25 
Thus, waiting until the second round before forming an electoral coali-
tion can be a dangerous strategy. 
Thus , it is easy to see why par ty leaders would want to coordinate 
their pre-electoral strategies in the first round and have a single can-
didate representing their camp. It seems odd, then, t h a t analysts of 
French politics who agree on the need for withdrawals between rounds 
do not extend this logic the obvious next step. An exception is Hanley 
(1999), who states , 
'If proximate part ies can agree on a single candidacy on the 
first ballot, their chances are maximized even more. Voters ' 
a t tent ion is focused on the sole real choice (assuming tha t not 
too many are p u t off by the withdrawal of their t radi t ional 
champion), and the possibility of winning more seats a t the 
first round increases. If desistement [withdrawal agreement] 
is one way of restrict ing competi t ion, then first-ballot agree-
ments are, potentially, an even be t te r one. T h e main problem 
is to strike an agreement among the compet i tors t h a t sui ts 
everyone.' 
Striking an agreement t ha t suits everyone is the problem. To form 
a coalition in the first round requires reaching an agreement on which 
candidates are going to s t ep down in favor of o ther candidates . To some 
25Jaffre (1986) notes t ha t right-wing losers in the first round do not nec-
essarily offer their full suppor t to the politician who continues on to the 
second round, even when this politician is facing a left-wing opponent . 
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extent , these dis t r ibut ional problems can be overcome in those districts 
in which one par ty has a clear competi t ive advantage over its potential 
coalition par tner . Anecdotal evidence suggests t h a t this is precisely what 
happens in those distr icts where electoral coalitions are formed in the 
first round (Hecht k Mandonne t 1987). However, it is not immediately 
obvious how pa r ty leaders can reach agreement in those districts where 
bo th candidates are competit ive. After all, why would a candidate b e 
willing to s tep down if he or she has a dist inct possibility of progressing 
to the second round and winning? Second round coalitions allow these 
decisions to be m a d e by the electorate. All the par ty elites have to 
agree to is to abide by the decision made by the voters. Thus, I suspect 
t h a t electoral coalitions are relatively uncommon in the first round of 
legislative elections because par ty leaders prefer to let the electorate 
solve the difficult dis tr ibut ional conflicts for them. 
4 . 2 . 2 I d e o l o g i c a l D i f f e r e n c e s 
The ideological differences t ha t exist between coalition partners, as well 
as those between the coalitions themselves, also seem to affect the like-
lihood of electoral coalition formation in France. A coalition in which 
one member ' s ideological platform is too d is tant from tha t of the others 
may be rejected by the voters. In other words, ideological differences 
may cause a pre-electoral coalition to be subaddit ive. This means t h a t 
widely divergent ideologies can place constra ints on the effectiveness of 
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electoral coalitions and render their formation less likely. According to 
much of the secondary l i terature on left-wing politics in this period, 
it was the Communis t Pa r ty ' s dogmat ic allegiance to Stalinism through 
the 1960s t h a t contr ibuted to the Socialist Pa r ty ' s unwillingness to enter 
electoral coalition talks. Large ideological differences between opposing 
part ies (or coalitions) may, in turn , provide increased incentives for t he 
other side to coordinate their electoral strategies. This helps to explain 
why the mains t ream right part ies (and voters) were able to coordinate 
well when the Communis t Pa r ty domina ted the left in the 1960s and 
why bo th t he modera te right and left will now occasionally agree to co-
ordinate their electoral strategies to prevent a National Front victory.26 
This section begins by analyzing the impact of ideological differences 
within potent ia l coalitions and then between coalitions. 
Dif ferences w i t h i n E l e c t o r a l C o a l i t i o n s 
The policies suppor ted by the Communis t Pa r ty in the early years of 
the Fifth Republic were not popular wi th much of the electorate, which 
probably contr ibuted to common perceptions of it an an undesirable 
coalition par tner . During the height of t he Cold War, the close ties 
between the P C F and the Soviet Union were a dist inct electoral liability 
(Hanley 2002). T h e well-known socialist Guy Mollet famously remarked 
26Typically, vote transfers on the right were more effective when the 
left candida te is a Communis t t h a n a Socialist (Frears k Parodi 1979, 
Williams, Goldey k Harrison 1970). 
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tha t t he French Communis t Par ty was 'not on the left, bu t in the Eas t ' 
(Du Roy k Schneider 1982). The o ther part ies on the left were too small 
and fragmented to credibly offer the electorate a more modera te policy 
if they were to govern with the Communis t s (Bell k Criddle 1984). 
T h e Communis ts initially began to seek out some limited withdrawal 
a r rangements for the second round of legislative elections following the 
disastrous results of 1958. T h e P C F leaders had little choice bu t to 
reach some kind of electoral agreement wi th the other par t ies on the 
Left if they were to avoid being marginalized. Al though these with-
drawal agreements were far from perfect, they were sufficiently effective 
to increase the number of seats received by the Communis ts from 10 in 
1958 to 41 in 1962.27 T h e non-Communis t parties (Socialists and Rad-
icals) also benefitted, increasing their seats from 65 to 106 (Williams, 
Goldey k Harrison 1970). 
T h e reorganization of the socialist pa r ty and the revision of P C F 
ideology likely made it easier for left-wing part ies to reach pre-electoral 
agreements. Although the P C F abandoned its s t ra tegy of mil i tant au-
tonomy in favor of left-wing alliances for the 1962 elections, this did not 
immediately lead to a major ideological overhaul. Only in the late 1960s 
"Socia l i s t voters were much less likely to vote for a Communis t candi-
da te in t h e second round than Communis t voters were to suppor t a So-
cialist candidate . T h e vast majori ty of centrist voters simply refused to 
vote for an electoral union of the Left led by the P C F (Hanley 2002, Bell 
k Criddle 1984, Johnson 1981, Alexandre 1977). 
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did t h e P C F carry out a policy of 'destalinization' and democrat izat ion. 
This policy derived from its desire t o reenter mains t ream politics, to pre-
vent t he Socialists from drifting into an alliance with the centrist parties, 
and to regain some of the popular i ty it had lost due to its 'be t rayal ' of 
the s tudent and worker uprising in Par is in 1968 and its t imid reaction 
to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Besides making a commi tment 
to par ty pluralism, negotiated programs, and internal democrat izat ion, 
t he Centra l Commit tee ' s manifesto of Champigny-sur-Marne in Decem-
ber 1968 acknowledged t h a t while t h e revolution remained an end it was 
no longer a means (Gildea 1997). Th i s revision of P C F ideology showed 
t h a t t he Communis ts had adopted a more conventional in terpreta t ion of 
electoral democracy and were willing to play by a set of coalitional rules 
t h a t were more acceptable to its potent ial left-wing allies (Jenson 1991). 
T h e reorganization of the Socialist Pa r ty also made electoral coali-
t ion formation on the Left easier. At the 1971 pa r ty congress in Epinay, 
various non-Communis t par t ies on the left merged into t h e Socialist 
P a r t y (PS). This was seen as pa r t of a larger plan to eventually con-
ta in the P C F within a wider left-wing alliance (Melchior 1993, Bell k 
Criddle 1984, Johnson 1981, Frears k Parodi 1979). By this stage, the 
leaders of the modera te left-wing part ies had accepted the conclusion 
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t h a t a broad electoral coalition encompassing the ent ire left was a nec-
essary prerequisite to winning nat ional elections.28 To some extent , this 
reorganization of the Socialist Pa r ty created a greater ideological affinity 
between the PS and the P C F . After all, the new Socialist pa r ty united 
three currents of the non-communist Left tha t each had some sort of 
ideological affinity with the 'reformed' Communis t party. For example, 
t he P S accepted the dogma of the necessary 'break wi th capi tal ism' and 
the P C F accepted t ha t democracy would not b e replaced by a dictator-
ship of t he proletariat if the Left won. This made it much easier for t he 
pa r ty elites to form a programmat ic alliance in 1972. 
Despite these ideological changes, it would be wrong to overstate 
t he extent to which the P C F and PS shared similar policy objectives. 
Th i s was most apparent to modera te voters on the Left who were never 
entirely willing to vote for the Communis ts (Frears k Parod i 1979, 
Williams, Goldey k Harrison 1970). Since Communis t voters were typ-
ically willing to suppor t Socialist candidates, the shifting electoral for-
tunes of the two part ies is not entirely surprising. By the mid-1970s, 
t he P S a t t rac ted more votes t h a n the P C F did. Leaders on the Right 
2 8Rivalry among the various leaders of the modera te left was intense; 
anecdotes of the personal na tu r e of this rivalry are rife in t he descriptive 
l i tera ture (Du Roy k Schneider 1982, Alexandre 1977). It is impor tan t 
t o no te t h a t this did not prevent the merger. As a result , one should b e 
wary of the 'personal animosi ty ' s tory as an explanat ion for coordinat ion 
failure. 
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still played on the electorate 's fear of Communis t rule, as this had al-
ways proven to be an effective campaign tactic. T h e rup tu re of the left-
wing coalition prior to t he 1978 legislative elections played into their 
hands nicely (Hanley 2002, Du Roy k Schneider 1982, Fabre 1978). T h e 
P C F actually campaigned against the Socialists, and many modera te 
voters seemed hesi tant to suppor t a potentially uns table P S - P C F gov-
ernment (Jaffre 1980). The day after the first round of the legislative 
elections, the Socialists and Communis ts reestablished their electoral 
alliance (Lavau k Mossuz-Lavau 1980). However, by then it was too 
late. By not agreeing to the electoral coalition publicly, and ahead of 
time, the transfer of votes was not sufficiently effective to obtain the 
left-wing victory t h a t had been expected (Bell 2000). Jaffre argues t ha t 
' t he incessant quarrels between the Communis t pa r ty and the Socialists 
. . . destroyed the Left's credibility as an al ternat ive governing coalition 
[in 1978]. An impor tan t segment of public opinion felt t h a t ' C o m m u n i s t 
par t ic ipat ion in a Government would have a negative effect in many ar-
eas' (Jaffre 1980). T h e election results confirmed the Socialist Par ty ' s 
new dominance on the Left.29 From this point in t ime on, there was li t t le 
the P C F could do to prevent increasing levels of suppor t for t he Social-
ists. In t he end, being the smaller par tner of a victorious Left coalition 
may have seemed be t t e r t h a n continuing with the Right ' s conservative 
policies (Johnson 1981). Th i s helps to explain the P C F ' s willingness 
2 9 The P S received 24.4% of the vote, compared to 20.5% for t he P C F . 
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to form cohesive second round electoral coalitions with the Socialists 
through the 1980s and 1990s. 
While ideological differences often made electoral coalition forma-
tion difficult on t h e Left, this has never really been the case on t h e 
Right. There is s t rong evidence t h a t the U D F and R P R electorates 
share similar policy preferences and are willing to suppor t candidates 
from either party. At least one poll asked R P R and U D F voters in 1986 
who they would vote for in the upcoming legislative election accord-
ing to two different hypotheses: (i) if the U D F and R P R ran separate 
lists and (ii) if the U D F and R P R ran a single list. Using voter in-
tentions and simulations, pollsters concluded tha t the unified list would 
receive 15 more seats t h a n the two parties could expect to receive run-
ning separately. Given t h a t the Right only had a majori ty of 2 seats 
in the 1986 elections, an ex t ra 15 seats would have been a significant 
gain (Bourlanges 1986) .30 Other survey d a t a has consistently shown 
tha t most voters on the mains t ream right were in favor of a union of the 
two parties (Jaffr6 1986, Char iot 1993, Wilson 1998, Duhamel 2000).31 
30It is impor tan t to remember t ha t the 1986 election was held under 
a proport ional representat ion system. It is wor th s tat ing, though, t ha t 
there is some doub t as to how many of the French voters actually realized 
this prior t o the election. T h e simulation would certainly be more useful 
had the poll been taken during an election held under the usual two-
round system. 
31See also Le Figaro Magazine, 19 June 1999 and The Economist, 25 
October 1997. 
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This survey d a t a were echoed by a growing number of French political 
scientists and commentators 3 2 
T h e 1995 presidential election provided further evidence t h a t the 
mains t ream right cannot be separated into two part ies with substan-
tive policy differences. T h e U D F failed to present its own candidate 
and simply divided its suppor t between two R P R candidates, Jacques 
Chirac and Edouard Bahadur . Al though the U D F split its suppor t be-
tween these two candidates, there were no real policy differences between 
them. 3 3 T h e weight of the evidence suggests t ha t there was little division 
between the 'Orleanist ' U D F and the 'Bonapar t i s t ' R P R in these elec-
tions.34 Instead, it seemed tha t the divisions in the U D F were related 
to wha t they expected each R P R candida te to offer t hem if they won. 
If ideological divisions among potent ial coalition par tners were the only 
de terminant of how easy it is to reach pre-electoral agreements, then the 
Right should have found it easier to form electoral coalitions t han the 
Left. 
32See Duhamel (1995, 319-20), Donegani k Sadoun (1992), Duverger 
(1996, 473), Jaffre (1986, 66), Wilson (1998, 40), and Cole k Campbel l 
(1990, 133). 
33See Mazey (1996, 13), Fysh (1996, 74), Goldey (1997, 56), Gaffney 
(1997, 78). 
3 4Analysts of French politics often refer to t h e part ies on t he right using 
a typology developed by Rene Remond, according to which the right 
wing has been divided since Napoleon into an Orleanist , Bonapar t i s t , 
and Monarchist wing (Remond 1982). In recent years, references to this 
typology have diminished. For a further discussion, see Golder (2000). 
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Dif f erences b e t w e e n E l e c t o r a l C o a l i t i o n s 
It seems tha t electoral coalitions have always been easier to form in 
France when part ies have faced a more ext reme opposit ion par ty (or 
coalition). For example, the Gaullists certainly benefited from the ex-
t reme ideological position taken by the Communis ts in the early years of 
the Fifth Republic. To some extent , t he electoral collapse of the centrist 
part ies (CNIP, M R P and Radicals) in 1962 can be explained in te rms of 
the threa t posed by the Communis ts . T h e P C F was the largest par ty 
on the left and modera te voters were unwilling to suppor t center part ies 
if this risked increasing the likelihood of a Communis t government. 
It is interesting to note t ha t the non-Gaullist par t ies on the main-
s t ream Right only formed their own uni ted par ty (UDF) in 1978 after 
it had become obvious t h a t the Socialists were now the dominant par ty 
on the Left. In other words, one could argue t ha t it was the rise of a 
modera te left-wing par ty t h a t enabled divisions on the Right to become 
more pronounced. To a large extent , these divisions have remained un-
resolved to this day. T h e modera te na tu re of Socialist policies in the 
1980s and 1990s has not created overwhelming incentives for the Right 
to overcome their internal dis t r ibut ional conflicts. Mi t te r rand ' s experi-
men t wi th nationalization, s t a t e subsidies, and min imum wage increases 
between 1981 and 1983 was relatively short-lived. Since then the Social-
ists have consistently implemented modera te neoliberal economic and 
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social policies (Schmidt 1996). Right-wing part ies no longer have to 
worry about a Communist- led opposition coming to power if they fail to 
sufficiently coordinate their electoral strategies. There is now very little 
distinguishing the modera te left and the modera te right. 
To some extent, the fact t h a t the mains t ream par t ies on the left 
and right are now so similar has increased the impor tance of distribu-
tional conflicts. Individual par ty leaders seem to be less willing to make 
compromises under these circumstances. In the recent 2002 presiden-
tial elections, there were nine candidates representing the Left.35 These 
par t ies no longer felt obliged to suppor t a single left-wing candidate. 
In fact, many of the extremist part ies on the Left justified presenting 
their own candidates by saying t h a t this was t h e only way t o give the 
electorate a meaningful choice. Traditionally, part ies on t he ext reme left 
have been inconsequential. However, they gathered so much suppor t in 
t he 2002 presidential elections t h a t the Left lost its realistic chance to 
regain control of the presidency.3 6 
T h e rise of the National Front (FN) has also altered the incentives 
French politicians have for forming electoral coalitions. Par t ies on the 
3 5 There were seven candidates representing the Right . See 
ht tp: / /www.elect ion-pol i t ique.com for a complete listing of candidates 
and results. 
3 6Prior to the election, it was not clear whether the Left or Right would 
win the presidency. As a result , it is all the more devastat ing a blow 
to t he Left t h a t their cand ida te was unable to advance t o the second 
round because so many left voters turned to part ies on t he ext reme Left 
(Trotskyist and otherwise). 
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ext reme right have typically failed to enjoy electoral success or political 
longevity.37 Jean-Marie Le Pen ' s National Front represents an exception. 
Since its breakthrough in the early 1980s, it has managed to consistently 
win over 10% of the vote in legislative elections. T h e overwhelming 
source of the National Front ' s electorate is t he ma ins t ream right .3 8 Th i s 
has put pressure on the U D F and R P R since they have been losing 
voters t o the modera te Left and the extreme Right. T h e R P R and U D F 
have also been deeply aware t ha t the electorate is unlikely to judge them 
favorably if their ongoing electoral divisions allow the Nat ional Front to 
win seats in the National Assembly.39 This explains why the leaders of 
the modera te right have consistently made public s t a t emen t s denouncing 
local alliances with t he ex t reme right. 
These developments have increasingly forced the leaders of the main-
s t ream right to overcome their remaining coordination problems. As I 
mentioned in the previous section, the two mains t ream right par ty lead-
erships have a t t empted to coordinate on a single candida te in the first 
round of legislative elections since the late 1980s. In react ion to Le Pen 's 
3 7 The Poujadists did manage to win 11.7% of the vote in 1956, bu t by 
1958 their support had diminished to 1.2% (Mackie k Rose 1991). They 
did not compete in any other elections. 
3 8 The FN ' s electorate does come from both the t radi t ional Left and 
Right . However, the majori ty of FN voters place themselves on the right 
of the ideological spec t rum. 
39So far, the National Front has not managed to win seats in the 
legislature, with the exception of the 1986 proport ional representat ion 
elections. 
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strong showing in t he recent presidential elections, t he Right formed the 
most comprehensive and cohesive pre-electoral coalition to have emerged 
during the Fifth Republic. Par t ly as a result, t he FN were unable to win 
any seats in the 2002 legislative elections despite its s t rong showing in 
the presidential elections a few weeks earlier. T h e rise of the extreme 
right has even led to pre-electoral agreements between the Left and the 
Right. If the Nat ional Front appears to have a realistic chance of winning 
a seat , then the Left and Right occasionally form a 'Republican Front ' in 
which the best-placed candidate from either par ty is given a free-run to 
compete against t he FN candidate in the second round. 4 0 There clearly 
seems to be evidence t h a t the ideological posit ion of opposition part ies 
influences t he ease wi th which electoral coalitions form. 
4 . 2 . 3 C o n c l u s i o n 
T h e French case is replete with instances where pre-electoral strategies 
on the Left and Right have had a significant impact on who becomes 
the President, which pa r ty wins a legislative majori ty and who gets to 
implement policy. I t is impossible to deny tha t electoral coalitions mat -
ter in impor tan t substant ive ways to French voters. Al though electoral 
coalition failure is often blamed on the personal animosities or plain 's tu-
pidity ' of par ty leaders (Bell 2000, Goldey 1999, K n a p p 1999, Nay 1994), 
4 0As one might expect , these electoral agreements are often a source 
of conflict between the par ty elites and the local candidates. 
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the evidence presented here suggests t ha t there are some underlying sys-
temat ic factors t h a t influence the ease with which electoral coalitions 
form. 
Although the electoral systems in France create incentives for par ty 
leaders to coordinate pre-electoral strategies, I argue t ha t distr ibutional 
conflict has meant t h a t electoral coalitions are much rarer in presidential 
elections t han legislative ones. The electoral viability of part icular pre-
electoral coalitions is also impor tan t t o par ty leaders. To a large extent , 
Deferre's a t t e m p t to create a coalition between the Left and the Center in 
the early 1960s failed because it did not a t t r ac t sufficiently large numbers 
of voters. It is no t always the case tha t forming a coalition will bring 
electoral success. T h e early reluctance on the p a r t of the Socialists to join 
forces with the Communis t s i l lustrates this point since they recognized 
tha t the coalition might end up losing votes, wi th disgruntled voters 
moving towards the center and modera te right. 
T h e French case also indicates t h a t the t iming of electoral coalition 
formation mat te rs . After all, the failure of the Socialists and Commu-
nists to form a pre-electoral coalition until la te in the game in 1978 
clearly benefitted t he Right. In contrast , t he Right ' s early and very 
public announcement t h a t they would form a coalition in the legislative 
elections of 2002 bore fruit with a large legislative majority. Finally, t he 
ideological differences within coalitions and between them also seems to 
influence the ease wi th which coalitions form. While the history on the 
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Left suggests t ha t the growing ideological affinity between the Socialists 
and Communis t s in the 1970s helped t h e m agree on a Common Pro-
gram, t h e history on the Right clearly shows t h a t ideological affinity is 
not sufficient to guarantee t ha t an electorally beneficial coalition forms. 
Electoral coalitions, though, do seem to form more often if opposit ion 
part ies are ideologically extreme. 
Having examined the French case in some detail, I now t u r n to ex-
amine the history of electoral coalitions in South Korea. 
4 . 3 S o u t h K o r e a ( 6 t h R e p u b l i c ) 
Although Korea is a relatively new democracy, I believe t ha t it offers 
impor tan t insights into the electoral coalition formation process. In par-
ticular, it i l lustrates the overwhelming impor tance of dis tr ibut ional is-
sues to par ty elites bargaining over possible pre-electoral coalitions. In 
a short span of time, t he Korean case offers examples of (i) elections in 
which ideologically-similar pro-democracy presidential candidates pre-
ferred to compete against each ra ther t h a n form a winning electoral 
coalition against the official candidate of the former mili tary dic ta torship 
and (ii) elections in which striking personal animosities did not prevent 
the formation of pre-electoral coalitions and mergers between feuding 
par ty leaders. In addit ion, this case serves as a reminder tha t a l though 
the bulk of t he countries examined in this project are well-established 
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democracies located in western Europe , the general a rgument is appli-
cable to any democracy.4 1 
4 . 3 . 1 C o a l i t i o n F a i l u r e i n t h e T r a n s i t i o n a l E l e c t i o n s 
South Korea has not been a democracy in much of the postwar period. 
I t was arguably under author i ta r ian rule even in the 'democrat ic ' period 
of Syngman Rhee between 1948-1960 (Henderson 1988). After a brief 
flirtation wi th democracy following Rhee 's downfall, mil i tary rule was 
imposed. It was not until 16 years later in 1987 t h a t the first direct 
presidential elections were held 'in South Korea. As one might expect , 
the only impor tan t cleavage in this election was between the suppor te rs 
of the author i tar ian regime and those of the democrat ic opposit ion. T h e 
election was to be held under simple plural i ty rule and it was clear t ha t a 
majori ty of the electorate preferred t he democrat ic opposition to General 
Roh Tae Woo, the official candida te of the mili tary regime.42 
Despite the obvious significance of this election, the pro-democracy 
camp was unable to pu t forward a unique candidate . Instead, they split 
their suppor t between two leaders of the democracy movement , Kim 
Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. Opinion polls prior t o t he election 
clearly indicated tha t if bo th candidates remained in the presidential 
4 1 The choice of West European countries as a s ta r t ing point was based 
on my existing knowledge of these countries and issues of d a t a collection 
ra ther t han on any particular factors inherent to western Europe . 
4 2General Roh was the hand-picked successor of the mil i tary dic ta tor , 
President Chun Doo Hwan. 
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race, then the pro-democracy forces would lose (Kihl 19886). However, 
b o t h Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung considered themselves the le-
gi t imate leader of a democrat ic South Korea. Both candidates were also 
confident of at least receiving the votes from their own nat ive region43 
In spite of the t remendous pressure for the two candidates to form an 
electoral alliance, neither would yield (Nam 1989, 314). In the end, Gen-
eral Roh Tae Woo won the 1987 elections wi th 36.6% of the vote. Kim 
Young Sam came second wi th 28.0%, while Kim Dae J u n g came third 
wi th 27.0%.44 It is typically assumed tha t had the pro-democracy forces 
uni ted behind a single candidate , they would have won these t ransi t ional 
elections.45 
These elections were characterized by a wide gap between the pro-
democracy policies t h a t b o t h opposit ion candidates wanted to imple-
ment and the policies t ha t the mili tary incumbent preferred. Thus , the 
incentive to form an electoral coalition was extremely high if one simply 
considers the policy implications of not doing so. P a r t of the failure of 
Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam to coordinate their pre-electoral 
strategies may be a t t r ibu ted to the uncertainty about the possible elec-
t ion outcome. After all, electoral uncertainty t ends to be higher in new 
43See Im (2000), Nam (1989, 196), Dong (1988, 181-2). 
4 4 Kim Jong Pil, a leader in the 1961 mili tary coup and former pr ime 
minister during the mili tary dictatorship, came last wi th 8.1% of the 
vote. 
45See Oh (1999, 109-10), Han (1997, 52-5), Nam (1989, 317), Dong 
(1988, 170,185-6), Kihl (1988, 15). 
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democracies where polls are often unreliable and voters, as well as can-
didates, do not have previous election results on which to base then-
expectat ions. One interpreta t ion of the 1987 pre-election coordination 
failure is t ha t Kim Dae Jung thought his prospects were so 'favorable' 
in a four-party race t h a t he was willing to split from K i m Young Sam 
and form his own opposition par ty (Kim 20006). 
However, par t of the explanat ion for this coordinat ion failure may 
also be a t t r ibuted to the fact t ha t the costs of reaching an electoral 
coalition agreement were too high for either candida te to pay given the 
realistic expectat ion t h a t th is coalition would have significant implica-
tions for their role in future elections. Stepping aside in th is foundational 
election ran the risk of relinquishing all political power in the future. An 
electoral loss from running a separate campaign would not necessarily 
b e considered terrible, especially if it one could increase one's bargain-
ing power in future elections by polling a significant percentage of the 
vote. In many respects, this s i tuat ion mirrors the compet i t ion between 
Jacques Chirac and Giscard d 'Es ta ing for supremacy over the modera te 
r ight in France. In b o t h si tuations, pa r ty leaders were willing to suffer 
the loss associated wi th having the opposition implement policy in order 
to guarantee their survival as influential political actors. 
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4 . 3 . 2 O f f i c e a n d P e r s o n a l R i v a l r y 
T h e Korean political scene has witnessed a whirlwind of mergers and 
splits since the transi t ional elections in 1987. To some extent , this has 
been aided by the fact t h a t there is an unusual absence of policy differ-
ent iat ion among the various part ies (Kim 20006, J a u n g 2000, O h 1999, 
Pa rk 1990). The issue of democracy has been absent from electoral pol-
itics since the 1987 elections and no other divisive subject other t han 
geographical affiliation has really emerged to take i ts place. One might 
expect t ha t political compet i t ion is characterized by personal animosity 
and long-standing political enmity. After all, all three of General Roh 
Tae Woo's compet i tors in the 1987 presidential elections had been ar-
rested in 1980 by Roh ' s mentor and predecessor, General Chun. Kim 
Dae Jung had been under house arrest , in exile, in prison, or otherwise 
under serious official restriction for nearly 14 years. In 1971, he had 
barely escaped being executed by the military regime. Kim Young Sam 
had also been imprisoned, placed under house arrest , and expelled from 
the National Assembly (Oberdorfer 2001). However, these personal ani-
mosities have regularly been pu t to one side in the pursui t of votes and 
office. In 1990, Kim Young Sam, a leader of the pro-democracy forces 
in 1987, decided to merge his par ty with those of two former members 
of the mili tary regime, President Roh Tae Woo and Kim Jong Pil. Kim 
Jong Pil became the par ty leader, while Kim Young Sam was rewarded 
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by becoming the par ty ' s next presidential candidate . As what follows 
will clearly demonst ra te , this represents jus t one example among many in 
which personal enemies p u t their differences aside to form electoral coali-
tions. T h e history of these coalitions in Korea represents as compelling 
a case as can be m a d e against those who would explain pre-electoral co-
ordinat ion failures purely in te rms of t he personal animosities between 
par ty leaders. 
T h e inability of the president to run for re-election and the fact tha t 
he relies on a sympathe t ic majori ty in the legislature to implement his 
policy has facilitated t he formation of electoral coalitions in South Ko-
rea.4 6 Al though the president is by far the most impor tan t position in 
Korea (Morriss 1996), the legislature does have the ability to hold up leg-
islation if it is controlled by the opposit ion.4 7 It was because he did not 
enjoy a majori ty following the 1988 legislative elections t h a t President 
Roh eventually suggested merging his pa r ty wi th those of Kim Young 
Sam and Kim J o n g Pil. T h e resulting new par ty t h a t emerged in 1990 
controlled a majori ty of the seats in the Nat ional Assembly. Bo th Kim 
4 6According to t he const i tut ion, the president is only pe rmi t t ed to 
serve a single five-year t e rm (Kihl 1988a). 
4 7Although the Korean system is t reated as presidential (Przeworski 
et al. 2000), a few addit ional words should be given to clarify the system 
since it does have a pr ime minister and cabinet . T h e president is directly 
elected and gets to appoint the pr ime minister subject to the approval of 
parl iament . T h e president is not responsible to par l iament and does not 
have the.ability to dissolve it. T h e government of the pr ime minister can 
be brought down, though, by a vote of no confidence in the parl iament . 
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Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil knew tha t Roh Tae Woo could not run 
again for office and would retire from politics a t the end of his term. It 
is precisely because a president can only s tay in office for a single t e rm 
tha t the promise of s tepping down in favor of one's coalition pa r tne r 
becomes somewhat credible. In this case, President Roh had promised 
to s tep down and suppor t Kim Young Sam as the new par ty ' s official 
presidential candida te in the 1992 elections. I t seems fairly clear t h a t 
Kim Young Sam would have been less willing to merge his pa r ty wi th 
t ha t of President Roh wi thout the inst i tut ional feature of t e rm limits. 
Al though the existence of t e rm limits and the requirement of a sym-
pa the t ic legislative majori ty make electoral coalition proposals more 
credible, they do not make them sacrosanct . -For example, Kim Young 
Sam offered the role of pr ime minister and future presidential candida te 
to Kim Jong Pil in exchange for his suppor t (and tha t of his electorate) 
in the 1992 elections. Following his successful election with 42% of t he 
vote, President Kim changed his mind abou t his successor.4 8 He an-
nounced in the middle of his t e r m t h a t he now suppor ted a general 
policy of 'generational change' . Th i s enabled him to fill most of t he 
leadership posts with his own suppor te rs and consolidate his grip on his 
pa r ty and government (Kim 20006). 
4 8 Kim Young Sam's long-term rival, Kim Dae Jung, came second with 
33.8% of t he vote, while Chung J u Yung came third with 16.3%. 
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In response, Kim Jong Pil left t o form his own party. He was gen-
erally able to command only abou t 10% of the vote. Al though this was 
certainly not enough to win an election on his own, it was sufficiently 
large to be useful in an electoral coalition. Kim Jong Pi l eventually 
formed an electoral alliance wi th another former enemy, Kim Dae Jung, 
for t h e 1996 legislative elections. K im Dae J u n g had finished second to 
K im Young Sam in 1992. His problem was t h a t a l though he typically 
won a lmost all of t he votes in his nat ive Cholla region, he was unsuc-
cessful elsewhere.49 As a result , Kim Dae Jung was unlikely to ever 
win a nat ional election on his own. T h e pre-electoral coalition bargain 
reached between these two men involved Kim Dae J u n g becoming the 
presidential candidate for the 1997 elections and Kim Jong Pil becoming 
the pr ime minister. Given his previous experience, Kim Jong Pil was 
somewhat wary of his would-be coalition par tner ' s promises. It was only 
after ' two years of an intense cour tship ' t h a t Kim Dae J u n g was able to 
get K im Jong Pil to agree to his 'power sharing' plan. In exchange for 
4 9Prejudice against Cholla nat ives is qui te s t rong in the rest of the 
country. Regional antagonisms had been encouraged dur ing Pa rk Chung 
Hee's reign (Nam 1989, 279,316-7). Morriss (1996) argues t h a t regional 
vot ing did not develop before t he 1970s b u t has grown rapidly since 
then . He emphasizes t h a t this p a t t e r n is a political cons t ruc t since 
there are no intrinsic regional differences, and tha t in ' t h e absence of 
o ther socio-economic cleavages, regional a t t achment s provide a way for 
leaders to differentiate themselves, and a basis on which to appea l to 
their suppor te rs (Morriss 1996).' 
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withdrawing from the compet i t ion (which he was unlikely to win any-
way) and suppor t ing Kim Dae Jung, Kim Jong Pil would become pr ime 
minister and get to pick his own cabinet . Kim Dae J u n g also promised 
to change the inst i tut ional se tup and create more of a par l iamentary 
regime in which the president would have no more t h a n a ceremonial 
role (Diamond k Shin 2000, Kim 20006).50 
President Kim Young Sam was unable to run for reelection in 1997 
and his par ty was unable to field a unique candidate against t he Kim Dae 
Jung-Kim Jong Pil electoral alliance. Instead, two candidates , Lee Hoi 
Chang and Rhee In-je, competed for the votes of the pres ident ' s party. 
Lee Hoi Chang was able to co-opt a fifth candidate , Cho Soon, into an 
electoral alliance. Cho agreed to merge their two part ies and wi thdraw 
his candidacy in exchange for becoming leader of the new party, a posi-
t ion t h a t was 'guaranteed ' for two years (Kim 2000a). T h e results of t he 
1997 presidential election were close: Kim Dae J u n g received 39.7% of 
•the votes, Lee Hoi Chang 38.2%, and Rhee In-je 18.9% (Kim 20006, 61). 
K im Dae Jung clearly benefit ted from the alliance wi th Kim Jong Pil. 
His suppor t from Kim Jong Pi l ' s Ch 'ungch 'ong region was 20% higher 
t h a n in any previous election. Given the slim margin of victory, it seems 
5 0Natural ly it would be difficult t o get such a measure passed in a 
par l iament controlled by Kim Young Sam's party. As a result , this 
second promise.was never entirely credible. 
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likely t h a t the suppor t from Kim Jong Pil 's region was ins t rumenta l in 
finally get t ing Kim Dae J u n g elected (Kim 20006). 
Pre-electoral coalitions have played a significant role in determin-
ing the outcome of the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. Perhaps 
t he most obvious feature of these coalitions is" the willingness of par ty 
leaders to put their s t rong personal differences to one side in order to 
win office. T h e fact t h a t a coalition par tner could be promised a prime 
ministerial position and suppor t as the official presidential candida te in 
future elections wi th some degree of credibility facilitated the forma-
tion of these electoral coalitions.51 To some extent , one can make the 
case t h a t par ty leaders were able to use the inst i tut ional features of 
t he Korean political system to overcome the dis t r ibut ional issues t h a t 
arise when forming electoral coalitions by making the presidential office 
'divisible' across time. 
5 1Recently two presidential candidates used opinion polls t o decide 
which of them should wi thdraw from the race to avoid defeat by a thi rd 
candida te in the December 2002 election. Poll results indicated t h a t 
opposit ion leader Lee Hoi Chang would win in a three-way race b u t t h a t 
either Roh Moo Hyun or Chung Mong Joon might bea t Lee in a two-
way race. T h e second- and third-place candidates agreed to form an 
electoral coalition. T h e quest ion of who would wi thdraw from the race 
was decided by polling a sample of the electorate; after a televised debate 
between Roh and Chung, a pr ivate poll was commissioned. Roh won 
and Chung promptly withdrew. Chung began act ing as Roh ' s campaign 
manager , and it is widely assumed t h a t Roh had promised h im significant 
spoils if they won the election. Shortly before the election, however, 
Chung abrupt ly ended his alliance with Roh. Roh still won t h e election. 
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4 . 3 . 3 E l e c t o r a l C o a l i t i o n s a n d L e g i s l a t i v e E l e c t i o n s 
Unlike in presidential elections, electoral coalitions rarely form in leg-
islative ones. In t he elections for the Nat ional Assembly, s t rong local 
networks domina te t h e elections a t the district level, and each pa r ty typ-
ically does well in i ts regional stronghold and poorly elsewhere. Since 
the pr ime minister and the cabinet require par l iamentary suppor t , t he 
identi ty of the -par l i amenta ry majori ty has a significant effect on t he 
president 's power to implement policy. After the 1997 presidential elec-
tions, for instance, the opposition-controlled par l iament did not want 
to accept Kim Jong Pi l as pr ime minister, and there was no chance a t 
all t ha t t he president 's proposed inst i tut ional reforms would be passed. 
Presidential pre-electoral coalitions seem to be used as a way to create 
par l iamentary majorities; since the first legislative election in 1988, t he 
president 's pa r ty has never won a majority on its own (Koh 1996). 
In South Korea, part ies are distinguished mainly according to their 
regional base of suppor t a n d whether they are par t of t he government 
or the opposit ion (Lee k Glasure 1995). Voters are loyal t o t h e leaders 
from their region, a n d t end to suppor t any coalition or pa r ty in which 
their leader takes pa r t . Pre-electoral coalition bargains among par ty 
leaders seem driven total ly by the numbers of suppor te rs a t t r i bu ted to 
each candidate; policy and personal animosity play little, if any, dis-
cernable role. Dis t r ibut ional conflicts obviously ma t t e r , as was the case 
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in 1987 when the pro-democrat ic opposition split their electorate 's vote 
and in 1997 when the vote for t he incumbent pa r ty was split between 
two candidates. W i t h only one main office to fight over, politicians can-
not easily be bought off wi th impor tan t cabinet portfolios or legislative 
positions. Wi thou t such posts (and with no regional political positions 
of any importance) , presidential hopefuls have no way of making them-
selves known to a larger public so t h a t they can gain enough suppor ters 
to be brought into a bargain over an electoral coalition. T h u s politicians 
have an incentive t o run for the presidency even if it means spli t t ing 
their pa r ty ' s vote. They lose very little, in fact, because there are no 
significant policy differences among the candidates or part ies (all are 
conservative) so policy is not a concern.5 2 As for spl i t t ing the vote and 
losing the election, it doesn ' t m a t t e r if the candida te in question d idn ' t 
expect to win anyway. 
4 . 3 . 4 C o n c l u s i o n 
T h e South Korean case shows the impor tance of office-seeking in the 
formation of electoral coalitions. O the r t h a n the foundational election 
of 1987, none of t he elections have had a significant policy element to 
them. Thus , policy did not hinder coalitions from forming. Nor did 
52I am not considering policies with regional distr ibutive implications 
here. Implement ing such policies would presumably help an incumbent 
mainta in electoral suppor t . 
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ext reme ideological positions on the pa r t of one pa r ty encourage oppos-
ing coalitions to form, as occurred in the French case. Dis t r ibut ional 
conflict was the only significant issue in the coalition formation process. 
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae J u n g b o t h preferred to fight each other 
instead of guaranteeing a victory for the pro-democracy forces against 
the incumbent mili tary dic ta tor . Qui te possibly, this was because nei-
ther wanted to jeopardize their future role in a democrat ic South Korea. 
One factor tha t has facilitated electoral coalition formation is t he use of 
presidential t e rm limits tha t , in practice, enable the presidential office 
to be divided across t ime. 
4 . 4 C o n c l u s i o n 
The cases presented in this chapter i l lustrate the most impor tan t vari-
ables influencing pre-electoral coalition formation. Politicians care abou t 
b o t h policy and office, and it is these two goals t h a t affect electoral coali-
tion formation. If two pa r ty leaders are considering forming a coalition, 
they must have an expectat ion t h a t it would make bo th of t h e m be t t e r 
off t han they would have been on their own. Expecta t ions of the vote 
share the coalition would receive are crucial; the p a r t y leaders' respective 
electorates would have to be willing to vote for the coalition. If the policy 
divergence between the coalition pa r tne r s is such t h a t some of the voters 
will be unwilling to suppor t the coalition, it may not be worthwhile to 
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form it in the first place. Par t ies must be sufficiently ideologically com-
pat ible tha t they do not drive away significant numbers of voters. For 
instance, the Socialists and the Communis t s in France were able to form 
electoral coalitions only after their ideological positions drew sufficiently 
close to each other. 
Intra-coalit ional policy compatibi l i ty is only pa r t of the equat ion, 
however. Par t ies without significant policy differences (such as the mod-
era te right part ies in France or all of the par t ies in South Korea) may 
still have problems forming electoral coalitions in spite of expected elec-
toral advantages t ha t would be generated from a pre-electoral coalition. 
Coali t ion formation can be facilitated if the policy proposed by the likely 
opposit ion is far enough from t h a t of the potent ia l coalition members . 
T h e right-wing part ies and voters in France were able to coordinate more 
effectively when the Communis t P a r t y was considered to be extremis t 
and was the dominant par ty on the left. Likewise, all of t he modera t e 
part ies , on bo th the left and the right, will often coordinate if a cand ida te 
from t h e ext reme right might otherwise win a n election. 
In addi t ion to policy incentives and electoral advantages, the divis-
ibility of the office benefits ma t t e r s . I t is easier to agree to form an 
electoral coalition if the benefits of office to be divided can be shared in 
a manne r t ha t makes bo th part ies be t t e r off and tha t reflects their rela-
tive s t rengths . In France, legislative elections are easier to bargain over 
t h a n presidential ones. There are more t h a n 500 offices in the legislative 
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elections, including government portfolios, bu t in presidential elections 
the re is only one office t h a t canno t be divided. In South Korea, electoral 
coalitions for presidential elections are more easily formed because each 
coalition par tner can only occupy the office for a single t e rm. Bargains 
can thus b e made such t h a t one pa r tne r gets t o hold t he office first. In 
tu rn , he will-support the second par tner ' s candidacy. Interestingly, the 
personal interactions and problems between part icular candidates , which 
receive so much emphasis in t he descriptions of campaigns and politics 
in part icular countries, seem to play no systemat ic role in pre-electoral 
coalition formation. Indeed, t he old adage t h a t 'politics makes s t range 
bedfellows' is perhaps the more appropr ia te observation. 
T h e bargains t ha t are reached do seem to reflect t he relative elec-
tora l s t rength of candidates or part ies . 5 3 W h e n French p a r t y leaders 
choose unique candidates prior to the first round of nat ional elections, 
t he number of districts given to candidates from each par ty in the coali-
t ion seems largely based on the overall suppor t es t imated for each party. 
Thus , when the small Left Radical Pa r ty formed first-round coalitions 
wi th t h e larger Socialist Party, t h e Socialists would p u t candida tes u p 
in the lion's share of the distr icts .5 4 T h e mains t ream right part ies , R P R 
5 3 This phenomenon is also found in government coalitions, in which 
the dis tr ibut ion of portfolios mimics the propor t ion of votes won by the 
coalit ion par tners . 
54Similarly, in the 1997 first-round coalition between the Socialists and 
t h e Greens, t he smaller Green P a r t y pu t up candidates in only 30 dis-
t r ic t s (Boy k Villalba 1999). 
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and UDF, were similar in size, however. When they bargain over nom-
inat ion agreements each tr ies to get the upper hand . In some districts, 
nei ther wants to concede; instead they t reat the first round as a pr imary 
and they only have to agree t h a t the candidate wi th less suppor t after 
the first round will wi thdraw from the race. Of course, par t ies would de-
rive a larger electoral bonus from forming pre-electoral coalition before 
t he first round ra ther t h a n waiting for the voters t o decide for them. 
Still, the withdrawal agreements are preferable to no coalition at all. 
T h e two rounds in t he French system give par ty leaders a mechanism 
for coordinat ing on a single candida te because it takes t he ac tua l choice 
out of their hands and transfers it to the voters. The re is an inherent 
normat ive appeal to th i s me thod as well, since politicians in democracies 
presumably, a t a minimum, pay lip service to the representat ive na tu re 
of their role. Even wi thout normat ive implications, though, routinely 
thwar t ing one's voters would likely have an adverse effect in the long 
run on their continued suppor t for the part ies involved. 
Now t h a t I have presented a detailed account of electoral coalition 
formation on bo th t he Left and the Right in France, as well as in South 
Korea, I will t u r n to a different type of empirical analysis. In the follow-
ing chapter , I compare pre-electoral coalition formation in 21 countries. 
Specifically, I test the theory of coalition formation presented in Chap te r 
3. 
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C h a p t e r 5 
E m p i r i c a l I m p l i c a t i o n s 
5 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
As I mentioned in the introduct ion, in most par l iamentary democracies 
single part ies are unable to command a majori ty of suppor t in the leg-
islature. T h u s political par t ies who wish to exercise executive power 
typically enter some form of coalition, either an electoral coalition prior 
to election or a government coalition afterwards. T h e results from Chap-
ter 2 showed t h a t t he incentives to form electoral coalitions are shaped 
by electoral rules, condit ional on the effective number of part ies compet-
ing in an election. As long as there is a sufficient number of par t ies in 
a country, then disproport ional electoral rules might create a s i tuat ion 
in which par ty leaders could increase the legislative seats they win if 
they coordinate their electoral strategies wi th those of another pa r ty or 
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parties. T h e analysis in Chap te r 2 did not go much farther t h a n the 
incentives created by electoral rules; the ac tua l choice faced by par ty 
leaders, and the factors t h a t affect t ha t choice, were left for later chap-
ters. 
As wi th government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral 
coalitions is the result of a bargaining process among par ty leaders. For 
th is reason, I used a bargaining model in C h a p t e r 3 to analyze t h e for-
mat ion of electoral coalitions and specify the factors t ha t enter into t he 
decision of the potent ia l pre-electoral coalition members . Before moving 
on to discuss the hypotheses generated by the model, I will briefly review 
the basic s t ruc tu re of t he bargaining game a n d its implications. 
Consider the bargaining process t h a t occurs between two potent ia l 
electoral coalition par tners prior t o a legislative election in a par l iamen-
tary democracy.1 W h o will get which portfolio? In part icular , who gets 
to be pr ime minister? One might th ink t h a t t he willingness of par ty lead-
ers to compromise on these distr ibut ional issues is likely to be influenced 
by their own ideological positions and those taken by opposit ion part ies. 
For example, pa r ty leaders are likely to find it easier to reach agreement 
if they share similar ideological positions. In contras t , they are less likely 
to feel t h e need t o compromise on dis t r ibut ional issues if the opposit ion 
JI tell the story here in te rms of par l iamentary legislative elections 
because the d a t a I use to tes t t he model are from par l iamentary democ-
racies. However, t he model in Chap te r 3 applies to any kind of election. 
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part ies t h a t are likely to benefit from their failure to reach agreement 
are relatively close to them ideologically. Of course, these dis t r ibut ional 
and ideological issues are likely to be moot if the pre-electoral coalition 
is expected to be disadvantageous from an electoral s tandpoint . Given 
t h a t pa r ty leaders care abou t office and policy, wha t are the condit ions 
under which they will form a pre-electoral coalition? 
As the reader may recall, t he bargaining game involved two players 
and a complete-information environment. There are two possible coali-
tion par tne rs (Par ty Leader A, P a r t y Leader B), as well as an opposi t ion 
par ty t h a t is no t a s trategic actor in th is game. T h e two par ty leaders 
mus t decide whether to run separately or form an electoral coalition. 
To form an electoral coalition they mus t reach agreement on a coalition 
policy and a post-election dis t r ibut ion of offices. T h e two par ty leaders 
will only decide to form a pre-electoral coalition if the expected uti l i ty 
from this agreement is greater t h a n t h e expected utility from running 
separate ly ( the reservation price). 
The re are two periods, t = {1,2}. In period 1, Pa r ty A makes an 
offer or does nothing. If an offer is made , Pa r ty B accepts or rejects it. 
If Pa r ty B accepts it, the bargaining ends and a pre-electoral coalition 
forms (PEC) . If Pa r ty B rejects it, t he game enters a second period in 
which P a r t y B can make a counter-offer. If no counter-offer is made, t he 
game ends wi thout the formation of a pre-electoral coalition (No P E C ) . 
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If a counter-offer is made, P a r t y A must decide whether to accept or 
reject it and the game ends with P E C or No P E C . 
If no offer was made in period 1, P a r t y B decides whether to make 
an offer in t he second period. If no offer is made, the game ends with No 
P E C . If an offer is made, Pa r ty A accepts or rejects it and the game ends 
wi th P E C or No P E C . Each t ime a player has t h e oppor tun i ty to make 
an offer he picks from a cont inuum of choices t h a t corresponds to the 
potent ia l electoral coalition agreements t h a t each player can propose. 
T h e cont inuum arises since each electoral coalition offer is a par t icular 
division of an overall 'pie'. T h e sequence of play in the game is i l lustrated 
in Figure 5.1. 
T h e comparat ive s tat ics generated by the model are qui te intuit ive 
and are listed in Table 5.1. (A more complete list of the compara t ive 
s ta t ic results can be found in Table 3.2 in Chap te r 3.) 
It is clear tha t the probabil i ty of electoral coalition formation in-
creases when: 
1. t he ideological distance between the potent ia l coalition pa r tne r s 
(XAD) decreases. 
2. t h e probabil i ty t ha t the coalition wins (F„ , F 2 ) increases. 
3. the probabili ty tha t the pa r ty wins after running alone (Pi_d) de-
creases. 
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Figure 5.1: Timeline for Bargaining Game 
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4. t he ideological dis tance between the par ty ' s policy a n d t h a t of the 
opposit ion (Xijypp) increases as long as the coalition is electorally 
beneficial ( J* > Pijd). 
5. t he electoral bonus a pa r ty receives from joining an electoral coali-
t ion increases ( tha t is, as Pu increases compared to Fj_d), a par ty 
is more likely to join an electoral coalition. 
6. t he par ty ' s share of office benefits (SJ) from running alone de-
creases. 
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Table 5.1: Compara t ive Stat ics 
Increase in Variable Probabi l i ty 
of Coalit ion 
Probabil i ty first period P E C wins ( F j ) Increasing* 
Probabil i ty second period P E C wins ( F 2 ) Increasing 
Probabil i ty i enters government 
given no P E C (Pi J) Decreasing 
Distance between i and P E C position (Aj_pec) Decreasing 
Distance between i a n d opposit ion (A^pp) Increasing 
if Pi > PiA 
Decreasing 
if K < Pi.d 
A's share of office benefits given no P E C (si) Decreasing 
* ' Increasing' here means non-decreasing. 
5 . 2 H y p o t h e s e s 
T h e model provides clear, tes table implications. T h e problem is t h a t 
some of the variables in the model are difficult to accurately measure 
wi th real world da ta . For example, how would one measure F„ when no 
coalition actually forms, or Pi_d when one does? While it is theoretically 
possible to calculate these probabili t ies through the use of survey d a t a 
asking individuals how they would vote faced with a variety of different 
coalition environments, this d a t a does not exist for the elections in my 
da tase t . 2 Because of these difficulties, it is necessary t o reformulate t he 
2Kaminski (2001) has utilized a similar survey approach to the one 
suggested here to analyze coalition stabili ty in Poland. 
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model 's implications into hypotheses t ha t can actually be tested with 
real world da t a . 
T h e model 's first implication is straightforward and can be tested 
directly. As is the case wi th government coalitions, pre-electoral coali-
t ions should form more easily between par t ies wi th similar ideological 
positions (Budge k Laver 1992). This is because the uti l i ty loss asso-
ciated wi th having policy set a t the coalition's ideal point r a ther t han 
one's own ideal point is minimized to the extent t h a t the coalition mem-
bers are ideologically similar. Moreover, a pa r ty ' s electorate, along with 
i ts rank-and-file members , should be more willing to suppor t the pre-
electoral coalition if there is no need to make significant policy conces-
sions. Thus , t he first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Pre-electoral coalitions are less likely to form 
as the ideological dis tance between potent ia l coalition mem-
bers increases. 
T h e second implication from the model is t h a t electoral coalitions 
are more likely the greater t he probabil i ty t h a t t he electoral coalition is 
going to win. T h e probabil i ty t h a t the coalition is going to be successful 
is clearly a function of the seat share tha t t he coalition members even-
tually obtain: t he larger t he coalition, the greater its chance of electoral 
success. However, it is impor t an t to note t ha t the coalition members 
may believe t ha t they have a realistic chance of winning by running 
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separately if the coalition becomes sufficiently large. According to the 
model 's th i rd implication, par t ies will be less likely to form a coalition 
if this occurs. This means t ha t when bo th part ies are small, an increase 
in the potent ia l electoral coalition size should make coalition formation 
more likely. However, a t some point , further increases in potent ia l coali-
tion size will make coalition formation less likely since at least one of 
the par t ies will be large enough to prefer running separately. Thus, it 
is possible to combine the model 's second and thi rd implications in the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: T h e probabil i ty t h a t an electoral coalition 
forms is a quadra t ic function of the size of the potent ial pre-
electoral coalition. I t should be increasing in the first t e rm 
(size) and decreasing in the second te rm (size2). 
It is also possible to test the model 's third implication separately. Hy-
pothesis 2 suggests t h a t electoral coalitions will be less likely to form if 
t he coalition becomes too large because a t some point at least one of 
the coalition part ies will s ta r t to believe t h a t it can enter government 
by running independently. I t na tura l ly follows from this t h a t the point 
at which the electoral coalition becomes ' too large' will depend on the 
relative size of t he coalition parties. For example, imagine two potent ia l 
two-party coalitions t h a t each expect to win 40% of the seats. In the 
first coalition each pa r ty expects to win the same percentage of seats 
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(20%). In the second coalition, one par ty expects to win 30% of the 
seats while the other expects to win only 10%. It seems obvious t h a t the 
larger par ty in this second coalition is more likely to want to compete 
independent ly than are ei ther of the smaller part ies in the first potent ia l 
coalition. Th i s is the case even though the expected size of the two coali-
t ions is the same. In other words, potent ia l coalitions between par t ies 
t ha t are asymmetr ic in size should be less likely to form when the overall 
coalition size becomes sufficiently large. Thus , the third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3: If the expected coalition size is sufficiently 
large, then pre-electoral coalitions are less likely to form 
if there is an asymmetr ic dis t r ibut ion of electoral s t rength 
among the potent ia l coalition part ies. 
T h e fourth implication of t he model suggests t h a t when part ies are faced 
wi th an opposit ion par ty t h a t is ideologically-extreme relative to their 
own ideal point , they will be more likely to form an electoral coalition so 
long as the probabili ty of winning is larger as a coalition t h a n running 
separately. This is because not entering government and being in the 
opposi t ion means receiving no uti l i ty from office benefits and suffering 
a uti l i ty loss from having policy implemented by the government. Th i s 
loss in util i ty might be qui te significant if the government is ideologically 
ex t reme relative to one's own ideal point . Par t ies will presumably want 
to do all t ha t they can to keep such an 'extreme' government from coming 
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to power. Par t ies will be likely to form a pre-electoral coalition in these 
c i rcumstances if the probabil i ty of enter ing government is larger as a 
coalit ion t h a n from running independently. In other words, par t ies will 
be more likely to form a pre-electoral coalition if this is the best way of 
keeping an 'extreme' government from coming to power. 
The re is s t rong empirical evidence to suggest t h a t disproport ional 
electoral inst i tut ions provide an electoral bonus to large par t ies or coali-
t ions th rough their mechanical effect on the t ransla t ion of votes into 
seats (Golder k Clark 20036). T h u s t h e probabil i ty of enter ing govern-
ment as an electoral coalition compared to running independent ly should 
be larger the more disproport ional t h e electoral system. While it is not 
possible to know the precise identi ty of t he potent ia l government prior 
to the election, part ies should expect t o suffer a greater util i ty loss from 
government policy when the pa r ty system is ideologically polarized. It is 
possible to reformulate the model ' s second implication with the following 
two related hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: Pa r ty system polarizat ion increases t he likeli-
hood of pre-electoral coalitions when t h e electoral system is 
sufficiently disproportional . 
Hypothesis 5: An increase in t he disproport ional i ty of t he 
electoral system will increase t he probabili ty of forming a 
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pre-electoral coalition. Th i s positive effect should be s t ronger 
when the par ty system is polarized. 
T h e model 's last implication is perhaps t he most obvious of all of 
them: the more office benefits you expect to receive running alone, the 
less likely you are to form a pre-electoral coalition. However, it is also 
the most difficult implication to actual ly tes t . This is because t he coun-
terfactual is too difficult t o cap ture empirically. For example, one never 
observes t he share of office benefits t h a t a pa r ty would have obta ined 
from running separately in those s i tuat ions where it was actual ly a mem-
ber of a coalition. Nor do we observe the share of office benefits tha t a 
pa r ty would have received if it entered government after running sepa-
rately in s i tuat ions where it did not actually enter t h e government coali-
tion. Testing this implication would require a model t h a t combined elite 
bargaining and voter behavior, as well as an ins t rument for es t imat ing 
vote shares in t he counterfactual si tuations. This is beyond the scope 
of this chapter , though the interested reader should consult Glasgow k 
Alvarez (2003) and Quinn k Mar t in (2002) for recent work along these 
lines. 
T h e reader should note t h a t a l though coalition analysts have sug-
gested for years t h a t coalitions are more likely to form between par t ies 
wi th similar policy preferences, three of t he four hypotheses presented 
here have not appeared in t he government coalition l i terature . To some 
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extent , this should not come as a surprise. After all, the disproport ion-
ality of t he electoral rules should not affect t he government coalition 
formation process. However, one would think t h a t pa r ty leaders who 
are deciding whether to form a coalition and contempla t ing possibly be-
ing in opposit ion should take account of the ideological posi t ion of other 
potent ia l governments, irrespective of whether this coalition bargaining 
process is occurring prior t o the election or afterwards. Nevertheless, it 
is rare for the government coalition l i terature to address t he ideological 
positions of other potent ia l governments. 
5 . 3 E m p i r i c s 
In this section, I first describe the d a t a and the me thods employed to test 
t he hypotheses outl ined above. I then present and discuss the results. 
5 . 3 . 1 D a t a a n d M e t h o d s 
T h e datase t used in the following analysis is new and addresses electoral 
coalitions in 292 legislative elections in 20 advanced industrialized parlia-
men ta ry democracies between 1946 and 1998.3 T h e d a t a are organized 
in dyadic format to reflect t he fact t ha t the major i ty of pre-electoral 
3 T h e countries included are Australia, Austr ia , Belgium, Canada , 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, J apan , 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Por tugal , Spain, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom. I do not include Israel or Greece because 
d a t a were not available for all of the relevant variables. 
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coalitions in my sample (74%) are between two part ies.4 This means 
t h a t each observation is' a potent ia l two-party coalition. Using a dyadic 
format yields 4,445 potent ia l two-party electoral coalitions. An example 
might help i l lustrate the d a t a s t ructure . In the 1983 Austra l ian election 
there are three part ies, and thus three dyads: Labor Par ty-Nat ional 
Party, National Par ty-Libera l Party, and Liberal Par ty-Labor party. If 
the two par t ies in a dyad formed a pre-electoral coalition (PEC) , the 
dependent variable is coded as one; zero otherwise. If a coalition forms 
among more t h a n two part ies, each of the relevant dyads can be coded as 
pa r t of the coalition accordingly. For instance, if a pre-electoral coalition 
forms among three par t ies on the French left, t hen the dyads Communist -
Socialist, Communis t -Greens , and Socialist-Greens would each be coded 
as one. 
I include 'all t he significant part ies which are represented in the na -
t ional assembly' in the da tase t , where the significance of a par ty is de-
fined in t e rms of government coalition or blackmail potent ia l (Budge 
e t al. 2001). In effect, no par t ies wi th less t h a n 0.01% of the vote are 
included. Of the 4,445 potent ia l two-party electoral coalitions in t he 
dataset t h a t could have formed, only 234 actual ly formed; this is roughly 
5%. As is often t he case wi th dyadic da ta , t he phenomenon of interest 
occurs only rarely (King k Zeng 2001). As I noted earlier, though, t he 
4
 Dyadic d a t a is also the format of choice in t he internat ional relations 
l i terature addressing coalition or alliance behavior . 
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more substant ively interesting figure to remember is t ha t pre-electoral 
coalitions competed in 44% of all elections in t he da tase t . 
Given the dichotomous na tu re of my dependent variable, I use a 
probit model to test my hypotheses. In this model, the latent variable 
PEC* measures the underlying propensi ty of par ty leaders in a dyad 
to form a pre-electoral coalition. T h e propensi ty to form a pre-electoral 
coalition PEC* is modeled as a linear function of several independent 
variables: 
P E C * = Po + / 3 1 I d e o l o g i c a l I n c o m p a t i b i l i t y 
+ / 3 2 P o l a r i z a t i o n -f- / ^ E l e c t o r a l T h r e s h o l d 
+ / ^ P o l a r i z a t i o n * E l e c t o r a l T h r e s h o l d 
- H / ^ C o a l i t i o n S e a t L a g + / ? 6 Coal i t i onSeatLag 2 
+ /?7 A s y m m e t r y 
4 - / 5 § A s y m m e t r y * C o a l i t i o n S e a t L a g + e* (5.1) 
where PEC* is a la tent variable t ha t is assumed to be less t han zero 
when we do not observe a pre-electoral coalition and greater t han zero 
when we do. 
Ideologicallncompatibility measures the absolute ideological dis tance 
between t h e part ies in the dyad and is a proxy for the lack of ideological 
compatibi l i ty in the coalition. D a t a on the ideological position of each 
par ty are taken from the Manifesto Research Group, which evaluates 
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each pa r ty on a one-dimensional scale t h a t ranges from -100 (extreme 
left) t o + 1 0 0 (extreme right) (Budge et al. 2001).5 
Polarization is a measure of the ideological dispersion in the par ty 
sys tem and is calculated as the absolute ideological dis tance between 
the largest left and right wing pa r ty in t he par ty system. 6 T h e d a t a 
are again taken from the Manifesto Research Group. This par t icular 
measure of par ty system polarizat ion is most appropr ia te because of 
the fact t h a t government coalitions are almost always going to contain 
ei ther the main par ty on the left or t he main par ty on the right. Thus , 
part ies worried abou t an 'ext reme ' government (relative to their own 
ideological positions) coming to power will be concerned primari ly wi th 
t h e ideological posit ions taken by these part ies. 
ElectoralThreshold measures the effective electoral threshold (Lijphart 
1994).7 Th i s variable acts as a proxy for t he disproportionali ty of the 
5 T h e most ideologically incompat ible electoral coalition to form oc-
curred in the Austra l ian elections of 1954 between the Liberal Pa r ty and 
the Nat ional Party. Out of a possible 200-unit difference, they were 99.1 
uni t s apa r t . 
6 T h e most polarized par ty system in which a pre-electoral coalition 
formed was Sweden in 1985 (80.9 units) and the least polarized par ty 
system was Belgium in 1978 (0.79 uni ts) . An al ternat ive measure of 
polar izat ion might be t he sum of t h e absolute ideological distances from 
each pa r ty in t he dyad to the pr imary pa r ty located on the opposi te 
side of the ideological spect rum. However, using this measure does not 
substant ia l ly change any of t he results discussed below. 
7 T h e effective threshold is t he m e a n of t h e threshold of representat ion 
and exclusion. It is calculated as J ^ + | j ^ , where M is the distr ict 
magni tude . If there are legal thresholds a n d / o r upper tier seats, t he 
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electoral system: the higher the effective threshold, the larger t he dis-
proport ionali ty.8 As was t he case wi th the analyses in Chap te r 2,it tu rns 
out t h a t qualitatively similar results to those presented here are found if 
t he log of average district magni tude is used instead of effective thresh-
olds. T h e interaction te rm Polarization*ElectoralThreshold is included 
to test the conditional na tu re of Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
CoalitionSeatLag measures the percentage of the total seats won by 
the two par t ies in t he dyad in the previous election. Th i s variable is a 
proxy for the expected success of t he potent ia l coalition in the current 
calculation is slightly more complicated (Taagepera 1998a, Taagepera 
19986). T h e effective electoral threshold ranges from a low of 0.7 in the 
Nether lands since 1956 to a high of 35 in countries with single-member 
dis t r ic ts such as Canada and the United Kingdom. 
8 In the preliminary empirical analyses in Chap te r 2, t he effective num-
ber of electoral par t ies was an impor t an t factor. Here, I present a more 
sophist icated account of pre-electoral coalition formation t ha t incorpo-
ra tes the size of the potent ial electoral coalition (in te rms of expected 
sea ts in the legislature). This measure is related to the effective number 
of parties, however. When the effective number of par t ies is small, we 
would expect t h a t the size of t he potent ia l coalitions would be large. 
Obviously a polity with a large effective number of par t ies would gen-
era te many potential coalitions t h a t are all fairly small in size. Looking 
a t potent ia l coalition size for each dyad of part ies is a richer measure 
t h a n t h e effective number of par t ies because i t allows us to dist inguish 
between different possible coalitions prior t o any election, r a ther t h a n 
having a single measure characterizing the par ty system. 
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election.9 In order to tes t the quadra t ic na tu re of Hypothesis 2 it is 
necessary to also include C'oalitionS'eatLag2. 
Asymmetry measures the asymmetr ic s t reng th of t he two par t ies in 
t he potent ia l coalition dyad and ranges from 0 to 1, wi th larger numbers 
indicating a higher level of asymmetry. The interact ion t e r m Asymme-
try* CoalitionS eatLag is included to test the condit ional na tu r e of Hy-
pothesis 3. 
T h e predictions from the hypotheses are shown in Table 5.2. T h e 
coefficient on Ideologicallncompatibility (Pi) should be negative since 
t h e likelihood of electoral coalition formation is expected to decline as 
t he potent ia l coalition par tne rs become more ideologically incompatible. 
T h e marginal effect of pa r ty system polarizat ion is QPdJ^?*aiicm — 02 + 
P^ElectoralThreshold. This is expected to be positive when the elec-
tora l system is sufficiently disproport ional (ElectoralThreshold is high). 
Th i s requires t h a t /?4 be positive. T h e marginal effect of electoral sys-
t e m disproport ionali ty is
 dElJSLshoid = & + P^Polarization. Th i s 
should be positive irrespective of t he level of ElectoralThreshold. I t 
9 T h e largest pre-electoral coalition to form occurred in t he Aus t r ian 
elections of 1959 between the People's Pa r ty and the Socialist Party. 
Between them, the coalition members controlled 95% of the legislative 
seats. 
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follows then tha t /?3 should be positive. T h e coefficient on Coalition-
SeatLag (/?s) is expected to be positive, while the coeficient Coalition-
SeatLag2 (P6) is expected to be negative. Th i s is because the proba-
bility of pre-electoral coalition formation should initially increase wi th 
coalition size, and then decrease. This should be the case irrespec-
tive of the level of Asymmetry. T h e marginal effect of Asymmetry is 
dA^mmetr = 0? + PsCoalitionSeatLag. This should be negative since 
Asymmetry is expected to reduce the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition 
formation when the potent ia l coalition size is sufficiently large (Coali-
tionSeatLag is high). Th i s requires t ha t P$ be negative. 
Table 5.2: Predic ted Effect of Row Variables on P E C Format ion 
Predic t ion 
Ideologicallncompatibil i ty (Pi) 
ElectoralThreshold (pz) 
Polarization* ElectoralThreshold (Pi) 
Coali t ionSeatLag (/?s) 
Coali t ionSeatLag2 (P6) 
Asymmetry*Coal i t ionSeatLag (0&) 
Pz + /^Polar iza t ion 
fa + ^ E l e c t o r a l T h r e s h o l d 
P7 + /?8CoalitionSeatLag 
negative 
posit ive 
positive 
positive 
negat ive 
negative 
positive 
positive when 
ElectoralThreshold high 
negative when 
Coal i t ionSeatLag high 
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5 . 3 . 2 R e s u l t s a n d I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
T h e results from two models are provided in Table 5.3. T h e first column 
presents results from a random effects probit model where observations 
are clustered by election. T h e second column repor ts results from a 
probit model wi th robust s tandard errors. T h e r andom effects in P R O -
B I T 1 are used to determine whether any unobserved factors specific to 
each election influence pre-electoral coalition formation. Random effects 
are similar t o fixed effects in t ha t they are bo th used to model unob-
served heterogeneity. However, they measure unobserved heterogeneity 
in different ways. T h e fixed effects model in t roduces d u m m y variables, 
essentially modelling unobserved heterogeneity as an intercept shift. In 
contrast , a r a n d o m effects es t imat ion models unobserved heterogeneity 
with an addit ional dis turbance te rm tha t is d rawn from a normal distri-
but ion wi th mean 0. There are at least two reasons why random effects 
are preferable here. Theoretically, a random-effects specification is more 
appropr ia te when inferences are being made abou t a popula t ion on the 
basis of a sample as is the case here (Greene 2003, Hsiao 2003). More 
practically, running a fixed-effects model by election would mean t h a t all 
elections in which no pre-electoral coalition formed would be dropped. 
This would leave me with only 35% of t he observations and potential ly 
introduces selection bias. 
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Table 5.3: Determinants of the Propensi ty to Form Pre-Electoral Coali-
tions (PEC*) 
Dependent Variable: Did a pre-electoral coalition form? 1 Yes, 0 No 
Regressor 
Ideologicallncompatibili ty 
Polarization 
ElectoralThreshold 
Polarizat ion*ElectoralThreshold 
Coali t ionSeatLag 
Coali t ionSeatLag2 
Asymmet ry 
Asymmetry*Coal i t ionSeatLag 
Cons tan t 
N 
Log likelihood 
P R O B I T 1 
( random effects) 
-0.01** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.001** 
(0.0003) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.13 
(0.29) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-2.46*** 
(0.32) 
3451 
-594.92 
P R O B I T 2 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.22 
(0.24) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-2.23*** 
(0.19) 
3451 
-635.34 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). 
S tandard errors are given in parentheses (robust for P R O B I T 2 ) . 
R a n d o m effects clustered on each election. 
Data : 4711 dyads, 20 advanced, industrialized countries, 1946-1998. 
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T h e results across the two models are very similar. However, a like-
lihood rat io test indicates t h a t the random-effects probit model is su-
perior.1 0 As a result, my inferences are based on this model. Note, 
however, t h a t the s t anda rd probi t model (with robust s t anda rd errors) 
shows quali tatively similar results. 
T h e results presented in Table 5.3 indicate t ha t all of the coefficients 
have the predicted signs and are stat ist ical ly significant where expected. 
However, these results are difficult t o interpret directly because of the use 
of mult iple interaction te rms and t h e fact t h a t t he coefficients relate to 
the latent propensity to form pre-electoral coalitions ra ther t h a n the ac-
tual quan t i ty of interest - t he probabil i ty of forming a pre-electoral coali-
tion (Brambor , Clark k Golder 2004, King, Tomz k Wi t t enberg 2000). 
All we can infer is t ha t (i) electoral coalitions are less likely to form the 
more ideologically incompatible t he potent ia l coalition members , (ii) t he 
probabil i ty of pre-electoral coalition formation is a quadra t ic function of 
the size of the potent ial coalition when Asymmetry is zero, (iii) higher 
electoral thresholds have no effect on the probabil i ty t h a t an electoral 
coalition forms when par ty system polarizat ion is zero (something tha t is 
1 0 The log-likelihood from the model with random effects is -594.92, 
while the log-likelihood from t h e model wi thout r andom effects is -
635.34. Th i s gives a x 2 s ta t is t ic of 80.83 i.e. 2(-594.92+635.34)=80.83. 
T h e p-value of obtaining a \ 2 s ta t is t ic of this magni tude or larger if the 
r andom effects are not required is less t h a n 0.0001 with one degree of 
freedom. This strongly suggests t h a t r andom effects should be retained. 
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never observed), (iv) par ty system polarizat ion has no effect on t he like-
lihood t h a t an electoral coalition forms when the electoral threshold is 
zero (something tha t is never observed), and (v) potent ia l coalitions t h a t 
are more asymmetr ic have no effect on the probabili ty of pre-electoral 
coalit ion formation when the potent ia l coalition expects to win no seats. 
Much more revealing and substant ively meaningful information can be 
obta ined if we explicitly examine the marginal effect of each variable on 
the probabili ty of pre-electoral coalition formation. 
A good way to examine the marginal effects of variables in interact ion 
models is graphically (Brambor , Clark k Golder 2004). Hypothesis 5 
s ta tes t h a t an increase in the disproport ional i ty of t he electoral system 
will increase the probabili ty of pre-electoral coalition formation and t h a t 
th i s positive effect should be s t ronger when the pa r ty system is more 
polarized. In Figure 5.2, I plot t he marginal effect" of a one uni t increase 
in the electoral threshold on the probabil i ty t h a t an electoral coalition 
forms across the observed range of par ty system polarizat ion when all 
o ther variables are held a t their means. T h e solid black line indicates 
how this marginal effect changes wi th par ty sys tem polarizat ion. 
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Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect of a One Unit Increase in Electoral Thresh-
olds 
Marginal Effect of Electoral 95% Confidence Interval 
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T h e 95% confidence intervals a round this line, allow us to determine 
t h e conditions under which electoral thresholds have a stat ist ical ly signif-
icant effect on t he likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation.1 1 T h e 
marginal effect is s tat is t ical ly significant whenever the upper and lower 
bounds of t h e confidence interval are b o t h above (or below) t he zero line. 
Figure 5.2 clearly indicates t h a t more disproport ional electoral systems 
"Confidence intervals a re based on simulations using 10,000 draws 
from the est imated, coefficient vector and variance-covariance matr ix . 
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Figure 5.3: Marginal Effect of a One Unit Increase in Pa r ty System 
Polarization 
Marginal Effect of Polarization 95% Confidence Intervat 
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coalition formation in a substantively meaningful por t ion of observed 
cases. In sum, Figure 5.3 provides s t rong suppor t for Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 3 s ta tes t h a t an increase in the asymmetr ic dis t r ibut ion 
of electoral s t reng th among coalition par tne rs should reduce the likeli-
hood of electoral coalition formation when the potent ia l coalition size 
is sufficiently large. I plot the marginal effect of a 0.01 unit increase in 
electoral coalition asymmet ry across t he possible range of coalition size 
in Figure 5.4. Again, all other variables are held a t their means. I t is 
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easy to see t h a t Asymmetry only makes electoral coalition formation less 
likely when the potent ia l coalition size is greater t han 26. This is exactly 
as predicted and is substantively significant since potent ia l coalition size 
is greater t han 26 in 61% of the sample observations. Thus , Figure 5.4 
provides s t rong suppor t for Hypothesis 3. 
Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of a 0.01 Unit Increase in Asymmetry 
Marginal Effect of Asymmetry 95% Confidence Interval 
Expected Coalition Seat Share 
Hypothesis 2 s ta tes t h a t pre-electoral coalition formation should be 
a quadra t ic function of expected coalition size the likelihood tha t a 
pre-electoral coalition forms should initially rise with expected coalition 
size and then fall. 
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Figure 5.5: Marginal Effect of a one Unit Increase in Expected Coali t ion 
Seatshare 
Marginal Effect of Seatshare - 95% Confidence Interval 
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In Figure 5.5, I plot the marginal effect of a one uni t increase in 
expected coalition size a t all possible values of coalition size, a t varying 
levels of Asymmetry: when Asymmetry is one s t andard deviat ion below 
its mean (Figure 5.5a), when Asymmetry is at i ts mean (Figure 5.5b), 
and when Asymmetry is one s t anda rd deviation above its mean (Figure 
5.5c). Consider Figure 5.5a first. If the expected size of the coalition 
is less t h a n 23%, then an increase in coalition size is expected to make 
pre-electoral coalition formation more likely. Again, t o provide some 
substant ive meaning to this result it should be noted t h a t one third of 
t he observations in the sample have a potent ia l coalition size smaller 
t h a n this. In pontrast, if the potent ia l coalition is expected to win more 
t h a n 51% of the seats, then increasing the coalition size any more is 
expected, to make electoral coalitions less likely. Roughly one third of 
t he potent ial coalition dyads expect to win more seats t h a n this. Thus, 
Figure 5.5a provides s t rong evidence tha t an increase in coalition size 
will make electoral coalitions more likely when the expected size of t he 
coalition is small bu t not when when it is large. While Figures 5.5b and 
5.5c provide corroborat ing evidence for this, they also allow the reader to 
see how increasing the asymmet ry between coalition par t ies conditions 
the effect of an increase in coalition size. T h e point to no te is t h a t as we 
increase Asymmetry (move from 5.5a to 5.5b to 5.5c), the coalition size 
a t which making the coalition any larger would reduce the probabil i ty of 
electoral coalition formation falls. For example, increasing coalition size 
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makes pre-electoral coalitions less likely when the coalition is expected to 
win more t h a n 51% of the seats if Asymmetry is one s t a n d a r d deviation 
below its mean. However, an increase in coalition size is expected to 
make electoral coalit ions less likely when the coalition is expected to 
win jus t 37% of t he sea ts if Asymmetry is one s t a n d a r d deviat ion above 
i ts mean. Overall, the evidence presented in Figure 5.5 provides strong 
suppor t for bo th Hypothesis 2 and 3. 
Thus far, I have* shown t h a t the explanatory variables affect the prob-
ability of electoral coalition formation in the predicted manner . However, 
it is na tura l to ask whether these effects are substant ively significant. 
How much more likely is a pre-electoral coalition to form if I increase 
one of the variables by a s t anda rd deviation? How many more (or fewer) 
pre-electoral coalitions would be observed in a sample of this size if I in-
creased one of t he variables by a s t anda rd deviat ion? Th i s information 
is presented in Table 5.4. 
T a b l e 5 . 4 c a p t i o n : T h e first and second columns present 
the predicted probabil i ty of a pre-electoral coalition .form-
ing when the row variable is either a t i ts m e a n or one s tan-
dard deviation higher, with all other variables held a t their 
means (unless otherwise specified). T h e th i rd and fourth 
columns present the difference and percentage change in the 
two predicted probabili t ies respectively. Given a sample size 
of 4,445, the final column indicates how many more (or fewer) 
electoral coalitions are expected to form if t he row variable 
was one s t andard deviat ion above its mean. 95% confidence 
intervals (calculated via simulation) in parentheses. 
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Table 5.4: Substantive Effect of Explanatory Variables on Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation 
Variable Predicted Probabil i ty Difference in Percent Change Numerical 
Mean Plus 1 Std. Dev. Probabil i ty in Probabil i ty Significance 
Ideological Incompatibili ty 
Polarization 
(Electoral Threshold at min) 
Polarization 
(Electoral Threshold at max) 
Electoral Threshold 
(Polarization at min) 
Electoral Threshold 
(Polarization at max) 
Asymmetry 
(Coalition Seat Lag at min) 
Asymmetry 
(Coalition Seat Lag at max) 
.028 
[.017, .042] 
.016 
[.008, .027] 
.932 
[.682, .999] 
.020 
[.008, .038] 
.069 
[.021, .152] 
.014 
[.005, .028] 
.394 
[.046, .849] 
.021 
[.011, .034] 
.017 
[.008, .032] 
.993 
[.940, 1.0] 
.028 
[.012, .054] 
.192 
[.082, .343] 
.015 
[.006, .031] 
.251 
[.023, .656] 
-.007 
[-.013, -.002] 
.001 
[-.006, .01] 
.061 
[.0004, .291] 
.008 
[-.002, .023] 
.123 
[.047, .228] 
.001 
[-.005, .009] 
-.143 
[-.300, -.011] 
-25.1 
[-42.2, -5.5] 
110.4 
[67.9, 169.9] 
107.7 
[100, 142.5] 
147.3 
[89.6, 227.9] 
311.0 
[164.2, 563.8] 
113.8 
[70.7, 172.6] 
-38.9 
[-65.9, -10.7] 
-30.7 
[-56.6, -6.8] 
+6 .4 
[-25.2, 45.9] 
+272.2 
[1.8, 1293.4] 
+37.8 
-9.9, 104.4] 
+547.8 
[208.1, 1014.2] 
+ 6 . 1 
[-24.1, 38.2] 
-637.4 
[-1333, -48.7] 
T h e first column in Table 5.4 indicates t he predicted probabili ty t h a t 
a pre-electoral coalition forms when the row variable is a t its mean and 
all of the variables are held a t their means. Thus , the predicted proba-
bility t h a t a coalition forms when all the variables are a t their means is 
0.028 with a 95% confidence interval [0.017, 0.042]. Similarly, the pre-
dicted probabil i ty when ElectoralThreshold is at i ts min imum observed 
value and all o ther variables are at their means is 0.016 [0.008, 0.027]. 
T h e second column indicates the predicted probabil i ty of pre-electoral 
coalition formation when the row variable increases by one s t anda rd de-
viation above its mean , while all other variables are held a t their means. 
For instance, the predicted probabili ty of electoral coalition formation 
is 0.021 [0.011, 0.034] when Ideologicallncompatibility is one s t andard 
deviation above its mean and all other variables are at their means. T h e 
third column indicates the change in predicted probabili ty between the 
first and second column. In other words, t he thi rd column captures t h e 
effect of a one s t anda rd deviation increase in t he named variable on the 
predicted probabil i ty of electoral coalition formation. Thus , an increase 
of one s t anda rd deviat ion in the electoral threshold above its mean in-
creases the probabil i ty tha t an electoral coalition forms by 0.123 [0.047, 
0.228] when Polarization is a t i ts max imum observed value and the other 
variables are a t their means. 
T h e fourth and fifth columns provide t he most substantively inter-
esting information. T h e fourth column indicates the percentage change 
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in predicted probabi l i ty t h a t arises from a one s t andard deviat ion in-
crease in the named variable. This is often referred to as the ' relative 
risk'. Thus , a one s t anda rd deviation increase in Ideologicallncompatibil-
ity above its mean reduces the probabil i ty t h a t a pre-electoral coalition 
will form by 25.1% [5.5, 42.2] when all t h e o ther variables are set a t their 
means. It should be noted t ha t a l though the predicted probabilities as-
sociated wi th the different scenarios presented in Table 5.4 appear qui te 
small, i t is clearly t he case t h a t changes in each explanatory variable can 
be of significant substant ive importance . As King and Zeng (2001, 711) 
note, ' relative risks are typically considered impor tan t in rare event s tud-
ies if they are at least 10-20%' when we increase an explanatory variable-
from one s t anda rd deviat ion below i ts mean to one s t andard deviat ion 
above its mean. Note t h a t here I am only increasing each variable by 
one s t andard deviat ion above its mean and yet the best es t imate as to 
the relative risks are all higher t h a n 20%. 
Finally, the fifth column indicates how many more (or fewer) electoral 
coalitions there would be in a sample of this size (4,445) if the named 
variable increased by one s t andard deviat ion above its mean. Th i s is 
calculated as t h e difference in predicted probabil i ty multiplied by t h e 
sample size. Thus , a one s t andard deviat ion increase in Ideologicalln-
compatibility above its mean would lead to 30.7 [6.8, 56.6] fewer electoral 
coalitions when all other variables' are held a t their means. If the elec-
toral threshold was increased by a s t anda rd deviat ion when par ty system 
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polarizat ion is at it maximum observed value, then we would expect to 
see an ex t ra 547.8 [208.1, 1014.2] electoral coalitions. Given t h a t there 
were only 234 pre-electoral coalitions in the da tase t , the numbers in this 
column represent substant ia l changes. 
Taken together t he results presented in Table 5.4 indicate t h a t the ex-
p lana tory variables not only have a statist ically significant effect on pre-
electoral coalition formation but t h a t they have a substantively mean-
ingful effect as well. 
5 . 4 C o n c l u s i o n 
Given t h a t it is often infeasible for a single par ty to govern alone in par-
l iamentary democracies, par ty leaders are faced with a s t rategic choice. 
They can either form an electoral coalition prior to the election or par-
t ic ipate in government coalition bargaining afterwards. Despi te the fact 
t ha t electoral coalitions are common in many countries, t h a t they often 
affect electoral and policy outcomes, and tha t they influence the ability 
of voters to pick governments of their own choosing, the vast majori ty 
of the coalition l i terature has largely ignored them. T h e fact t h a t one 
regularly observes electoral coalitions across a broad range of countries 
suggests t ha t they must offer some form of political advantage - a t least 
some of the time. Since electoral coalitions do not always emerge, it 
mus t equally be t rue tha t there are costs associated with pa r ty leaders 
coordinat ing their pre-electoral strategies. 
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As a result, I proposed a simple bargaining model in which the de-
cision of par ty leaders to form a pre-electoral coalition depended on the 
associated costs and benefits. These costs and benefits were modeled in 
t e rms of preferences over policy and the division of office benefits. T h e 
hypotheses generated by this model were subjected to several tes ts using 
a new datase t I constructed containing information on potent ia l coali-
t ion dyads in 20 industrialized par l iamentary democracies from 1946 to 
1998. T h e results indicate t h a t ideological compatibi l i ty increases the 
likelihood of forming an electoral coalition, as do disproport ional elec-
tora l insti tutions. Par t ies are more likely to form an electoral coalition 
if t he potent ia l coalition size is b e large (but not too large) and if t he 
coalition members are of similar electoral size. Finally; electoral coali-
t ions are more likely if the pa r ty system is polarized and the electoral 
inst i tut ions are disproportional . 
Chap te r 2 opened with an empirical question: W h y did pre-electoral 
coalitions form in the 2002 French legislative elections bu t not in the 
2002 Dutch elections? T h e results from the stat is t ical model clearly 
throw light on this question. While France typically had the highest 
predicted probabilit ies of coalition formation in the sample, t he Nether-
lands consistently had the lowest. T h e specific coalitions t h a t formed in 
each country have been influenced b o t h by the ideological compatibi l i ty 
of the coalition par tners and their expected seat shares. For example, 
t h e French Socialist Par ty only really overcame its reluctance to form 
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electoral alliances wi th the Communis t P a r t y ( P C F ) once the Commu-
nist Pa r ty ' s dogmatic allegiance to Stalinism had begun to wane in the 
1970s. Prior to this, electoral coalitions between these par t ies had been 
uncommon due to the t radi t ional and deep-seated hostil i ty on t he non-
Communis t left towards the P C F (Jackson 1990, J u d t 1986). 
T h e results from the s tat is t ical analysis also indicate t h a t the pro-
port ionali ty of the electoral system plays a major role in t he likelihood 
of electoral coalition formation. While the average distr ict magni tude 
in France is one, the average district magni tude in t he Nether lands is 
t he largest in the sample (150). This suggests t h a t it should not be 
surprising to see t ha t pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in 
France compared to the Netherlands. T h e fact t ha t pa r ty system polar-
ization is relatively low in the Nether lands compared to France provides 
a further explanat ion for the observed variation in coalition formation 
in these countries. The re is reason to believe t h a t pa r ty sys tem polar-
ization explains the t empora l variation in electoral coalition formation 
within countries such as France as well. For example, t he French main-
s t ream right part ies were much more willing to form electoral coalitions 
in the 1950s and 1960s when the dominant par ty on the left was the 
Communis t Par ty compared to later decades when t h e Socialist pa r ty 
became the main opposit ion party. 
T h e theory of pre-electoral coalition formation based on the bargain-
ing model in Chapte r 3 is much richer t h a n the implicit claims made 
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in the government coalition l i terature tha t served as a launching point 
in Chap te r 2. An advantage of this richness is t h a t it helps make sense 
of the tempora l variat ion in electoral coalition formation t h a t occurs in 
some countries. 
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C h a p t e r 6 
C o n c l u s i o n 
Coalitions are a fundamental pa r t of democrat ic politics because democ-
racies generally rely on legislative majori t ies to determine policy. In 
most countries, single part ies do not form such a majority. Those par-
ties who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced to form 
coalitions. In practice, political parties can form coalitions prior to elec-
tions or they can compete independently and try to form a government 
coalition afterwards. Most scholars tend to employ a simple dichotomy 
between single-party government (as in the ideal 'Westminster ' , or 'ma-
jor i tar ian ' system) and coalition government (as in the ideal proport ional 
system) (Lijphart 1999). T h e uns ta ted assumpt ion often m a d e in the 
l i terature is t h a t coordination among political actors occurs prior to 
elections and within part ies in Westminster systems, bu t after elections 
and between par t ies in proport ional representat ion systems (Bawn k 
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Rosenbluth 2003). This simple dichotomy is limited in its usefulness be-
cause it overlooks t h e fact t h a t political part ies can, and often do, form 
mult i -par ty coalitions prior to elections.1 For example, mul t i -par ty elec-
toral coalitions are commonplace in countries such as France, Germany 
and Austral ia. In fact, electoral coalitions formed prior to 44% of t he 
elections in the 25 countries studied here. 
Despite their number , very little has been wri t ten on pre-electoral 
coalitions compared to government coalitions. Al though scholars with 
par t icular knowledge of cases such as Germany or Ireland often ment ion 
pre-electoral agreements when explaining why certain government coali-
tions form, there are no systematic cross-national studies of pre-electoral 
coalitions. Nor are there any specific theoretical models of electoral coali-
tion formation. Al though there is some speculat ion in the government 
coalition l i terature as to when par t ies will be more likely to form elec-
toral coalitions, these speculative hypotheses have not been subjected 
1
 There are exceptions, of course. Powell (2000) makes a point of con-
sidering b o t h single part ies and pre-electoral coalitions in 'major i tar ian ' 
systems. He does so because he is interested in the identifiability of 
government alternatives. However, a more typical example is Laver and 
Schofield (1998). Al though they include a nice discussion of pre-electoral 
coalitions in their book on mul t ipar ty government, they frame their dis-
cussion of coalition politics in t h e following manner : "The special forms 
of bargaining and negotiat ion t ha t characterize the politics of coalition 
can be found after nearly every election t h a t does not produce an unas-
sailable 'winner ' in the shape of a single pa r ty t ha t controls a majori ty 
of the seats in the legislature" (Laver k Schofield 1998, 1). Emphas is 
mine. 
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to sys temat ic analysis. T h e dea r th of s tudies on pre-electoral coali-
t ions is qui te unusual given the fact t h a t electoral coalitions frequently 
have a significant impact on the types of government t ha t form; around 
a quar te r of coalition governments in the par l iamentary governments 
s tudied here were based on pre-electoral agreements. I t is also surpris-
ing because electoral coalitions have the a t t rac t ive quality of providing 
a s t rong link between the electorate and the government (Powell 2000). 
By providing such a link,, electoral coalitions undermine the criticism of 
propor t ional representat ion systems t h a t governments lack a convincing 
m a n d a t e from the voters and t h a t t he quali ty of representat ive democ-
racy is diminished (Pinto-Duschinsky 1999). 
This dissertation represents the first a t t e m p t to provide a theoretical 
model and cross-national empirical analysis of electoral coalition forma-
tion. Arguably, scholars of coalition politics would like an integrated 
model of coalition formation t h a t incorporates bo th pre-electoral coali-
t ions and government coalitions wi thin a unified framework. Almost by 
necessity, such a model would also have to take account of the number 
of par t ies by addressing par ty mergers and splits. Given the s ta te of the 
coalition l i terature and the fact t h a t we do not even have a very satisfy-
ing model of government coalition formation, a fully integrated model is 
some way off in the future. In this dissertat ion, I under take a narrower 
project analyzing the de te rminants of pre-electoral coalition formation. 
Such a par t ia l equilibrium approach not only offers t he possibility of 
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impor t an t insights into this s tage of t he coalition formation process, bu t 
also holds out the possibility t h a t it could be combined with models of 
government formation at a later date . The approach taken in this disser-
t a t ion explicitly recognizes t h a t the accumulat ion of knowledge typically 
occurs in small s teps (Kuhn 1962). 
T h e analyses presented in this dissertat ion are based on a new datase t 
t h a t I have collected comprising information on all instances of public-
electoral coalitions in 25 industrialized democracies. Th i s sample in-
cludes all of the west European democracies in addi t ion t o some other 
established democracies commonly included in studies of advanced in-
dustrialized democracies. I find t h a t there have been a t least 232 elec-
tora l coalitions at the nat ional level in this sample. T h e da tase t used 
in this dissertat ion is much more comprehensive t h a n any th ing t h a t ex-
ists in the l i terature. More detailed information abou t t he specific pre-
electoral coalitions tha t have formed is available in t he appendix . 
Before presenting my theoretical model of pre-electoral coalition for-
mat ion , I tested two speculat ive hypotheses from the government coali-
tion l i terature in chapter 2. T h e first hypothesis was t h a t electoral 
coalitions are more likely to form in disproport ional electoral systems 
(Shepsle k Bonchek 1997, S t rom, Budge k Laver 1994). This is because 
larger par t ies typically benefit from disproport ional sys tems (Golder k 
Clark 20036). In other words, electoral coalitions are beneficial because 
they reallocate "votes to produce a more efficient t rans la t ion of votes 
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into seats" (Cox 1997, 67). W i t h the exception of Duverger (1959), 
scholars have ignored the fact t ha t the incentives to form electoral coali-
t ions in disproport ional sys tems only exist in mul t i -par ty contexts; one 
would not expect pre-electoral agreements if there were only two parties. 
Thus , I tested the hypothesis tha t electoral coalitions are more likely to 
form and be successful in disproport ional systems when there are many 
part ies (Disproportionali ty Hypothesis) . 
T h e government coalition l i tera ture also speculates t h a t electoral 
coalitions form because pa r ty leaders wish to signal the identi ty of future 
governments to the electorate. There are several reasons why par ty elites 
might want to do this. Firs t , they might want to signal t h a t member 
par t ies can form an effective government coalition a n d thereby convince 
voters t ha t they would not be wasting their votes by suppor t ing the 
coalition parties. Second, they might want to signal t he identi ty of a 
potent ia l future government as clearly as possible, pe rhaps out of a de-
sire to give voters a more direct role in choosing government coalitions. 
Thi rd , they might simply want to signal the identi ty clearly because 
they think tha t there would be increased efficiency in the government 
coalition bargaining following the election. T h e second hypothesis (Sig-
nalling Hypothesis) t h a t I tes ted was t ha t pre-electoral coalitions are 
more likely when government identifiability is low (or the number of 
effective part ies is high). 
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T h e results from several time-series cross-sectional analyses provide 
s t rong suppor t for the disproport ionali ty hypothesis. Electoral coalitions 
do seem to form more often and be successful in mul t ipa r ty systems with 
disproportional electoral rules. There was no suppor t for the hypothesis 
tha t pre-electoral coalitions form because they signal the identifiability 
of government al ternatives. Simply increasing the number of part ies in 
the system does not lead to an increase in electoral coalitions. As I noted 
when discussing the results in Chap te r 2, the effective number of parties 
is not a part icularly good proxy for the identifiability of government 
alternatives. As a result , it is perhaps too early to reject the hypothesis 
tha t electoral coalitions sometimes form as signalling devices. 
T h e hypotheses implicit in t h e government coalition l i terature and 
examined in chapter 2 focus primarily on the incentives to form pre-
electoral coalitions. They ignore the fact t h a t electoral agreements can 
involve significant dis t r ibut ional and ideological costs. Before party, lead-
ers can benefit from any increased probabil i ty of winning office tha t 
might result from forming a coalition, they have to reach an agreement 
on a coalition policy and a dis tr ibut ion of office benefits. P a r t y leaders 
may well fail to reach an agreement on these divisive issues. In chapter 
3, I present a formal model where par ty leaders weigh up bo th the costs 
and benefits of forming a pre-electoral coalition. I using a two-round 
complete information bargaining game in which pa r ty leaders care about 
office and policy. Each leader must decide whether to form an electoral 
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coalition or not . Clearly, the electoral incentives outl ined in chapter 2 
play a significant role in this model since par ty leaders must take account 
of the probabil i ty associated with winning office from running separately 
and the probabil i ty from running as a coalition. Ultimately, par ty lead-
ers will only agree to form a coalition if the expected util i ty from doing 
so is greater t han the expected utility from running alone. 
T h e implications of t h e model are qui te s traightforward. Increasing 
the expected office benefits from running as a coalition makes it more 
likely tha t the par ty leaders will reach a pre-electoral agreement. If 
the likely opposit ion par ty is ideologically extreme, then the two party 
leaders in the model will be more likely to form a pre-electoral coalition 
so long as the coalition is electorally beneficial. In other words, the 
par ty leaders wish to keep the opposition from coming to power. If this 
is best achieved by forming a coalition, th is is w h a t they do. If not , 
they prefer to run separately.2 Par t ies t h a t are ideologically close are 
more likely to form an electoral coalition t h a n par t ies wi th incompatible 
policy platforms. Finally, pa r ty leaders are less likely to form a coalition 
as the probabil i ty of winning office running separate ly increases. 
2 The condit ional na tu re of this hypothesis may well have been over-
looked in a less formal approach to modelling electoral coalition forma-
tion. Additionally, the idea t ha t part ies might take t he ideological posi-
t ions of other potent ia l governments into account when bargaining over 
government coalition formation is not one t h a t appears in the l i terature 
on government coalitions. 
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I explore the plausibility of the model ' s assumpt ions and implications 
in chapter 4 using case studies of electoral coalit ions in Fifth Republic 
France and South Korea. These cases are par t icular ly interesting be-
cause they highlight t ha t the underlying logic of pre-electoral coalition 
formation is qui te general and not country-specific. Despite significant 
differences in te rms of geography, culture, democra t ic history, and ideo-
logical divisions, t he history of electoral coalit ions in b o t h countries pro-
vides significant suppor t for my model. In two very different sett ings, 
we see t h a t having a disproport ional electoral sys tem in which forming 
an electoral coalition could reasonably be expected to provide electoral 
advantages is not sufficient for pre-electoral agreements to be reached.3 
This is perhaps most clearly seen in t he first presidential elections after 
t he t ransi t ion to democracy in South Korea. Bo th leaders of the demo-
cratic opposi t ion preferred t o compete separate ly (and lose) even though 
opinion polls convincingly indicated t h a t a single democrat ic candida te 
would defeat the mili tary incumbent . 
T h e history of pre-electoral coalitions in France indicated t ha t po-
tential coalition par tners must be sufficiently ideologically-compatible 
for a coalition to form. For example, the Socialists and Communis t s 
3 This implies t ha t a cooperative game-theoret ic approach where coali-
tions automat ica l ly form whenever they are expected to be superaddi t ive 
in seats (Kaminski 2001) is less appropr ia te for modelling electoral coali-
tion formation t h a n the non-cooperative approach t h a t I employ in this 
dissertat ion. 
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were willing to consider electoral coalitions only after their ideological 
posit ions drew sufficiently close to each other in the 1970s. There is also 
compelling evidence from the French case t h a t coalition formation is 
facilitated if the policies proposed by the likely opposition are extreme. 
For instance, right-wing part ies and voters were able to coordinate much 
more effectively when the Communis t Pa r ty was considered the domi-
nan t pa r ty on the left. In addi t ion to policy and electoral incentives, 
b o t h cases also indicate t ha t the divisibility of office benefits ma t t e r s for 
the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation. T h e bargaining model 
suggests t h a t it is easier to form electoral coalitions when the benefits of 
office can be divided in a manner t h a t makes bo th part ies be t te r off. Ev-
idence in suppor t for this comes from the fact t h a t electoral agreements 
have been much more common in legislative elections in France t h a n 
in presidential ones. While the Korean case i l lustrates t h a t presidential 
electoral coalitions can form in certain circumstances, I argue t h a t they 
are m a d e possible by the use of t e rm limits in South Korea. Term limits 
are impor tan t because they provide for the t empora l divisibility of the 
presidential office. Finally, the evidence from bo th case studies suggest 
t h a t personal animosity and myopia on the p a r t of par ty leaders, which 
receive so much emphasis in the description of campaigns and politics 
in par t icular countries, play no sys temat ic role in pre-electoral coalition 
formation. Th i s is part icularly str iking in t he South Korean case. 
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While the case studies provide an evaluation of the model ' s assump-
tions and implications, it is hard to argue t ha t they represent any kind 
of a meaningful tes t of these implications. As a result, I subjected t h e 
model ' s hypotheses to a series of s tat is t ical tests in chapter 5. T h e 
da tase t t h a t I used in chapter 2 was reconfigured into dyadic format so 
as to resemble the theoretical model as closely as possible. T h e hypothe-
ses were tested on 4,445 potent ia l coalition dyads from 292 elections in 20 
par l iamentary democracies between 1946 and 1998. T h e results suppor t 
all of t he model ' s predictions. T w o part ies are more likely to form an 
electoral coalition when they share similar ideological preferences. T h e y 
are also more likely to form a coalition if the par ty system is ideologically 
polarized and the coalition offers an electoral bonus. Coali t ions are also 
more likely to form when the potent ia l coalition size is large, bu t not 
too large. In other words, pa r ty leaders prefer t o join a coalition if it in-
creases their chances of winning office. However, if the coalition becomes 
too large, then at least one of the par t ies s t a r t s to think t h a t it can win 
office on its own, thereby reducing the likelihood of coalition formation. 
T h e more asymmetr ic the s t reng th of the two parties, the more quickly 
this cut-point will be reached. T h e cross-national s ta t is t ical analysis 
conducted in chapter 5 clearly suppor t s the model of pre-electoral coali-
t ion formation t h a t is the centerpiece of th is dissertation. 
This project represents the first systematic , cross-national s tudy of 
pre-electoral coalitions. I hope t h a t it will generate a wider scholarly 
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deba te about the role t h a t these coalitions play in elections. There is 
substant ia l room for further research on electoral coalitions. For exam-
ple, one might want to locate them within broader political processes. 
As I mentioned earlier, t he question of why part ies form pre-electoral 
coalitions is related to the number of part ies in a country and to t he 
evolution of par ty systems. T h e evidence from chapter 2 suggests t h a t 
pre-electoral coalitions form when the electoral rules give a seat bonus 
to larger part ies and where par t ies want to retain their independence 
ra ther t han merge. Duverger (1959, 224) notes t h a t electoral alliances 
are frequently " the prelude to t he extreme form, total fusion, which is 
the normal t e rm of t he development and is often a t t ended by schism..." 
It is beyond the scope of this project to predict which electoral coalition 
s i tuat ions are ' s table ' and which are jus t a s tep on the way to a merger. 
Ins tead, I consider snapshots of a pa r ty system prior to an election and 
ask whether or not a pre-electoral coalition is likely to form, and if so, 
which part ies will join. Th i s is a necessary first s tep, though future 
work will hopefully analyze pre-electoral coalitions in a more dynamic 
framework. 
This raises an interest ing question, though. Under what circum-
stances will part ies remain separa te and form electoral coalitions ra ther 
t h a n merge to form a larger pa r ty? T h e answer is not clear and little 
work has been done to explain th is puzzle. Nevertheless, I can offer 
one or two speculations. If two par t ies have separa te electoral bases of 
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suppor t , they might be less likely to merge. For instance, if the elec-
tora tes are geographically separate , as is the case wi th the Chris t ian 
Democrat ic Union and the Chris t ian Social Union in Germany, or the 
National Par ty and t h e Liberal Pa r ty in Austral ia, the par t ies in ques-
tion can easily form an electoral coalition instead of merging into a single 
party. In some countries, nat ional and lower-level elections are held ac-
cording to different electoral rules, and the more propor t ional elections 
may give part ies and voters incentives to main ta in a higher number of 
part ies t han would otherwise be the case. Al though legislative elections 
in France use single-member districts, regional (and some local) elec-
t ions use proport ional representat ion. Small par t ies t h a t might other-
wise have disappeared can win regional and local offices, thereby making 
them more viable coalition par tners on the nat ional political scene. 
W h e n the costs of forming an electoral coalition a re qui te low, par ty 
leaders may be unwilling to give up their independence by merging to 
form a larger party. For instance, some electoral sys tems allow voters 
t o indicate coalition preferences. T h e al ternat ive vote in Austral ia, the 
single transferable vote in Ireland and the two vote system of Germany 
all allow voters t o show their suppor t for more t h a n one par ty in a given 
election. Thus par ty elites do not need to broker nominat ion agreements 
and force some of their own candidates to wi thdraw from competi t ion. 
T h e two-round system iised in France, as discussed in Chap te r 4, means 
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t ha t par t ies can let the voters determine who will be the coalition candi-
da te in the second round if the par ty leaders are unable to find an easy 
compromise prior t o the first round. Wait ing unt i l the second round is 
not as efficient as finding a joint candida te for t he first round, bu t the 
lack of coordinat ion is certainly not as costly as failing to coordinate in 
a single-member district plurali ty system would be. 
Even in proport ional systems, pre-electoral coalitions can generate 
more seats t h a n t h e par t ies would win independent ly so long as t he 
coalition is superaddi t ive in votes. Anecdotal evidence suggests tha t the 
1976 bourgeois coalition in Sweden may have been superaddi t ive in votes 
because voters were more ap t to vote for the conservative par t ies once the 
part ies had presented the electoral coalition as a signal t ha t they were a 
credible government al ternat ive. Simulat ions based on polls taken prior 
to t he 1986 election in France (held under propor t ional representat ion) 
indicated t h a t a coalition of the mains t ream right par t ies would have 
won 15 more seats t han they would have done running independently. 
Al though the u l t imate seat bonus is likely to be lower in proport ional 
systems t h a n in disproport ional ones, we still see pre-electoral coalitions 
forming in propor t ional electoral systems. 
A logical next s tep is to s tudy the effects of pre-electoral coalitions. 
I have speculated above tha t coalition governments based on electoral 
coalitions are likely to be more ideologically cohesive, all else equal, t han 
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coalition governments t h a t formed after an election. This is because elec-
toral coalitions must explicitly present themselves to the electorate. I t 
is also possible t h a t the added legitimacy associated wi th electoral coali-
t ions could increase government dura t ion for those governments based 
on pre-electoral coalitions. There is also reason to believe t h a t pre-
electoral coalitions are likely to affect o ther political phenomena. For 
example, recent work in international political economy links political 
uncertainty to stock market instability. I t should be the case t ha t elec-
tions wi th identifiable government al ternat ives (pre-electoral coalitions) 
lead to less volatility t han those in which there is a high level of uncer-
ta inty surrounding the identity of future government coalitions. None 
of these hypotheses have been empirically tested thus far. T h e s tudy 
of-electoral coalitions obviously provides a fertile terra in for the oppor-
tunist ic researcher. 
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A p p e n d i x 
In th is section, I provide detailed information on pre-electoral coalitions. 
Given t h a t different sources of information concerning the coalitions 
sometimes conflict, I cite t hem in detai l so t h a t the interested reader 
can evaluate my coding decisions. T h e sources are provided in Table 
A.27. Vote percentages are mainly taken from Mackie k Rose (1991), 
the European Journal of Political Research, Caramani (2000), or t he 
website electionworld. org. 
Certa in part ies or coalitions are not included in the empirical analy-
ses; this is either because a coalition is confined to a par t icular region or 
the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) da tase t does not include the all 
of t h e part ies (Budge et al. 2001). In t he la t ter case, t he pre-electoral 
coalition would be included in the empirical analysis in Chap te r 2, bu t 
not in Chap te r 5. The final column in t he tables indicates whether or 
not t h e par t ies in each pre-electoral coalition are included in the M R G 
datase t . I also note those coalitions t h a t were included in the Mar t in k 
Stevenson (2001) analysis. 
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Table A . l : Electoral Coalit ions in Austral ia 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G ? 
Year coalition 
1946 
1949 
1951 
1954 
1955 
1958 
1961 
1963 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1974 
1975 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1987 
1990 
1993 
1996 
1998 
2001 
43.9 
50.3 
50.3 
47 
47.6 
46.5 
9.4 
42.1 
8.7 
46.0 
49.9 
43.4 
41.4 
44.9 
53.1 
48.1 
46.3 
43.6 
45.0 
45.9 
43.2 
44.27 
47.2 
39.18 
42.7 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
D L P + Q L P 
L i b + N a t 
D L P + Q L P 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
L i b + N a t 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
P a r t i e s : 
Lib: Liberal Pa r ty of Austral ia , N a t : Nat ional P a r t y (formerly Coun t ry 
Par ty ) , D L P : Democrat ic Labor Par ty , Q L P : Queensland Labor P a r t y 
(DLP and Q L P merged in 1962). 
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Table A.2: Electoral Coali t ions in Austr ia 1946-2002 
Elect ion % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1949 
1953 
1956 
1959 
1962 
1966 
1970 
1971 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1986 
1990 
1994 
1995 
1999 
2002 
82.74 
83.37 
89.01 
88.98 
89.43 
90.91 
(84.41) 
4.82 
74.84 
62.59 
(66.35) 
10.32 
O V P + S P O § 
O V P + S P O § 
O V P + S P O 5 
O V P + S P O 5 
O V P + S P O 5 
O V P + S P O 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
S P O + O V P * 
Green Alt. 
S P O + O V P 
S P O + O V P 
S P O + O V P * 
Greens + L F 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
O V P only 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(*) S P O announced intent ion to govern with OVP. 
(5) Counted as pre-electoral pac t s in Mar t in k Stevenson (2001). 
Coal i t ion: 
G r e e n A l t e r n a t i v e : Al ternat ive List of Austr ia and Uni ted Greens of 
Austr ia . 
Part i e s : 
S P O : Socialist Par ty ; O V P : People 's Par ty ; L F : Liberal Forum. 
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Table A.3: Electoral Coalitions in Belgium 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1946 
1949 
1950 
1954 
1958 
1961 
1965 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1978 
1981 
1985 
1987 
1991 
1995 
1999 
1.60 
1.77 
2.10 
2.10 
5.90 
11.23 
10.94 
4.7 
7.04 
1.40 
4.21 
4.92 
50.20 
17.40 
1.5 
10.30 
10.14 
5.6 
Lib-Soc* 
No 
Lib-Soc* 
Lib-Soc* 
Lib-Soc* 
No 
No 
F D F + R W 
FDF+.RW 
F D F + P L D P + R W 
F D F + R W 
F D F + R W 
V V P + V N P 
F D F + R W 
E c o + Agalev 
C V P + P S C + 
+ V L D + P R L 
P S C + P R L 
F D F + P P W 
P R L + F D F 
P R L + F D F 
V U + I D 2 1 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
(*) L i b - S o c C a r t e l : Provincial level alliance, in 4 out of the 30 districts, 
between the Liberal P a r t y and the Belgian Workers ' Parity, 1950-1958. 
Not included in the empirical analyses. 
199 
Part ies : 
F D F : Democrat ic Front of French Speakers; P L D P : French-speaking 
Liberal Par ty ; C V P : Chris t ian People's P a r t y (Flemish); P S C : Chris-
t ian People's Pa r ty (Walloon); V L D : Liberals (Flemish); P R L : Liberals 
(Walloon); R W : Walloon Rally; V V P : Flemish People 's Par ty ; V N P : 
Flemish National Pa r ty (merged 1979); Eco: Ecologist Confederation for 
the Organizat ion of New Struggles; A g a l e v : Live Differently, Greens; 
P P W : Par i pour la Wallonie; V U : People's Union; I D 2 1 : Social-Liberal 
Party. 
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Table A.4: Electoral Coalitions in C a n a d a 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1949 
1953 
1957 
1958 
1962 
1963 
1965 
1968 
1972 
1974 
1979 
1980 
1984 
1988 
1993 
1997 
2000 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Table A.5: Electoral Coalitions in Denmark 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1947 
1950 
1953 
(Apr.) 
1953 
(Sep.) 
1957 
1960 
1964 
1966 
1968 
1971 
1973 
1975 
1977* 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1987 
1988 
1990 
1994 
1998 
2001 
53.89 
7.80 
2.20 
6.40 
25.0 
25.8 
35.52 
1.67 
3.15 
2.70 
2.40 
No 
No 
"No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
R L + C o n + L i b 5 
No 
C D + S L E 
C D + S L E 
C D + S L E 
L i b + C o n 
L i b + C o n 
L i b + C o n 
No 
No 
C P + L S P 
C P + L S P 
C P + L S P 
C P + L S P 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
(*) Pre-electoral agreement between SD and KF, C D and C P P ('Forlig') 
to suppor t the minority SD government . 
(5) Counted as pre-electoral pac ts in Mar t in &: Stevenson (2001). 
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P a r t i e s : 
Lib: Liberals; Con: Conservatives; S D : Social Democrats ; R L : Radi-
cal Liberals; C P : Communis t Par ty ; L S P : Left Socialist Par ty ; M L : 
Marxist-Leninists (Together, known as Red-Green Unity List); C D : 
Center Democra ts (1973 splinter of Social Democrats) ; SLE: Schleswig 
P a r t y (German-speaking minori ty) . 
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Table A.6: Electoral Coalitions in Finland 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1948 
1951 
1954 
1958 
1962 
1966 
1970 
1972 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1991 
1995 
1999 
18.22 
17.63 
67.2 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
C E + C H R 
No 
No 
No 
L i b + C E 
No 
No 
No 
Purp le coalition 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
P u r p l e Coal i t ion: Conservative Par ty ; Left-Wing League; Swedish 
People's Party; Social Democrat ic Par ty ; and Greens. 
Part i e s : 
Lib: Liberals; C E : Center Pa r ty (formerly Agrarians); C H R : Chris t ian 
League of Finland. 
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Table A.7: Electoral Coalitions in France IV 1946-1957 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1946 
1951 
1956 
1.53 
7.99 
0.62 
12.10 
[< 15.27] 
No 
R R + R S 
R R + R S + R G R + U D S R 
U D S R + R G R + M R P 
S F I O + U D S R + R S * 
M R P + C o n s * * 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
(*) Republican Front, upheld in 48 districts. 
(**) Upheld in 29 distr icts (in alliance with Radicals in 22 addit ional 
districts). The total M R P + C o n s votes is 15.27%, b u t this overestimates 
t he vote to ta l for the electoral coalition because it includes all districts. 
N o t e : These coalitions were agreed upon at the distr ict level, and are 
thus not included in any of the empirical analyses. 
Part i e s : 
( M R P ) People's Republican Movement; ( S F I O ) Socialists; ( U D S R ) 
Democrat ic and Socialist Union of Resistance; ( R S ) Social Republi-
cans; ( R R ) Republican Radicals; ( R G R ) Rally of Republ ican Leftists; 
(Cons ) Conservatives. 
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Table A.8 Electoral Coalitions in France V 1958-2002 
Election 
Year 
1958 
1962 
1967 
1968 
1973 
1978 
% vote for 
P E C t 
31.94 
43.46 
37.73 
50.37 
18.96 
41.47 
43.65 
53.98 
36.55 
34.74 
47.29 
19.20 
40.61 
21.45 
44.07 
24.69 
45.24 
P E C 
(Round) 
No 
U N R + U D T + R I 
(2) 
P C F + S F I O + 
+ R a d (2) 
U N R + U D T + 
+ R I ( 1 ) 
U N R + U D T + 
R I + C D (2) 
F G D S (1) 
F G D S + P C F + 
+ P S U (2) 
U N R + R I (1) 
U N R + R I + 
+ P D M (2) 
F G D S + P C F (2) 
U D R + R I + U C (1) 
U D R + R I + 
+ U C + R e f . (2) 
UGDS (1) 
P C F + U G D S + 
PSU (2) 
U D F (1) 
U D F + R P R (2) 
P S + M R G (1) 
P C F + P S + M R G (2) 
Govt? 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
MRG 
U N R / U D R 
1 par ty 
Yes ' 
U N R / U D R 
1 par ty 
U N R / U D R 
1 par ty 
S F I O + R a d only 
S F I O + R a d + 
+ P D F only 
Yes 
In 1968 
n o P D M 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
PS only 
P C F + P S only 
1 par ty 
Yes 
P S only 
P C F + P S only 
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Table A.8 Electoral Coalitions in France V 1958-2002 
Govt? MRG Election % vote for 
Year P E C t 
P E C 
(Round) 
1981 
1986 
(PR) 
1988 
1993 
1997 
2002 
40.00 
37.*51 
53.68 
21.40 
32.10 
37.49 
35.87 
47.19 
25.10 
17.33 
7.84 
29.92 
30.34 
33.47** 
33.30 
30.16 
34.98 
R P R + U D F (1) 
P S + M R G (1) 
P S + P C + M R G (2) 
R P R + U D F * 
P S + M R G 
R P R + U D F (1) 
P S + M R G (1) 
P S + P C F (2) 
R P R + U D F (1) 
P S + P C F (2) 
G r e e n s + G E (1) 
R P R + U D F (1) 
P S + G r e e n s + 
+ P R G (1) 
P S + P C F (2) 
U P M (1) 
P S + G r e e n s + 
+ P R G (1) 
P S + G r e e n s + 
+ P R G + P C F (2) 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
P S only 
P S + P C F only 
Yes 
PS only 
Yes 
PS only 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1 par ty 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
(f) T h e vote percentages are taken from the first round. For scores from 
the second round, consult www.election-politique.com. 
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(*) T h e U D F and R P R ran joint lists in 61 districts, and separa te ones 
in 35 distr icts . T h e separate lists won an addi t ional 8.30% and 11.20% 
of t h e vote, respectively. 
(**) 40.28% if score from Greens is also included. 
C o a l i t i o n s : 
F G D S : S F I O + R a d + C I R (1967); U G D S : P S + M R G (1973) 
U D F : C D S + P R + R I (1978); U P M : R P R + U D F + D L (2002). 
P a r t i e s : 
( R a d ) Radicals (Split in 1972 into t h e Reformateurs ( R E F ) and t h e 
Radical Left Movement ( M R G ) ) ; ( P R G ) Left Radical Par ty ; ( U D T ) 
Left Gaull is ts (Merged with the U N R after 1962 elections.); ( U N R ) 
Gaullist P a r t y (Became the U D R in 1968, then the R P R in 1976.); 
( S F I O , t hen P S ) Socialist Par ty ; ( P S U ) Unified Socialist Pa r ty ; ( P C F ) 
Communi s t Par ty ; ( G r e e n s ) Green Par ty ; ( G E ) Generat ion Ecology; 
( U D F ) Union for French Democracy; ( R I ) Independent Republicans; 
( P R ) Republicans; ( U C ) Center Union; ( C D ) Democrat ic Center ; ( P D M ) 
Progress and Modern Democracy. 
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Table A.9: Electoral Coalit ions in Germany 1949-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1949 
1953 
1957 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1972 
1976 
1980 
1983 
1987 
1990 
1994 
1998 
2002 
48.38 
53.55 
0.85 
45.31 
47.59 
46.09 
0.60 
44.86 
54.21 
48.64 
50.48 
53.48 
44.54 
55.73 
53.35 
54.85 
1.20 
41.44 
39.58 
38.5 
47.1 
No 
C D U + C S U + D P 
C D U + C S U + D P 
B P + C C P + H P P t 
C D U + C S U 
C D U + C S U 
C D U + C S U 
D F U + D K P J 
C D U + C S U 
S P D + F D P 5 
C D U + C S U 
S P D + F D P 5 
S P D + F D P 5 
C D U + C S U 
C D U + C S U + F D P 5 
C D U + C S U + F D P 5 
C D U + C S U + F D P 
B ' 9 0 + G r 
C D U + C S U 
C D U + C S U 
C D U + C S U 
S P D + G r 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
CD* 
C D 
No 
C D 
C D 
C D 
No 
C D 
Yes 
C D 
Yes 
Yes 
C D 
C D 
C D 
C D 
No 
C D 
C D 
No 
No 
(*) C D U / C S U t rea ted as single party, CD. 
(X) Regional coalition only. Not included in any empirical analyses. 
(5) Counted as pre-electoral pac ts in Mar t in k Stevenson. (2001). They 
say there was an electoral pac t between the F D P and the C D U / C S U 
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in bo th 1953 and 1961, as well as a pact between the S P D and F D P in 
1969. 
Part i e s : 
( C S U ) Chris t ian Socialist Union; ( C D U ) Christ ian Democrat ic Union; 
( F D P ) Free Democrats; ( P S D ) Social Democrats; ( D P ) Ge rman Par ty ; 
( B P ) Bavarian Par ty ; ( C C P ) Catholic Center Par ty ; ( H P P ) Hanove-
rian Peasants ' Par ty ; ( D F U ) Ge rman Peace Union; ( D K P ) Ge rman 
Communis t Par ty ; (B '90 ) Alliance '90; ( G r ) The Greens. 
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Table A. 10: Electoral Coalit ions in Greece 1946-66, 74-02 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1946 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1956 
1958 
1961 
1963 
1964 
1974 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1989 
(June) 
1989 
(Nov) 
1990 
1993 
1996 
2000 
55.1 
19.3 
2.9 
2.6 
16.4 
9.7 
8.2 
5.3 
34.2 
48.2 
2.9 
10.6 
33.7 
14.6 
35.3 
9.5 
20.4 
2.7 
48.1 
1.4 
45.8 
40.8 
13.1 
11.0 
10.3 
U C N M 
N P U 
UNM 
F W R + N A P P 
E P E K 
D C 
P I C 
N R F 
No 
U P 
DU 
U P P 
PADU 
C U + P P 
U D L + N A P P 
No 
N R U + P P 
UL 
C U + N F 
P L W F 
U D L + P A S O K 
R C P G + C P G - M L 
U D L + P A S O K 
P D S + N D 
P L W F 
P L W F 
P L W F 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Coal i t ions : 
( U C N M ) United C a m p of the Nationally Minded: People 's Party, Re-
formist Party, Nat ional Liberal Party, Royalist Party, Panhellenic Na-
tional Party, Pat r io t ic Union Party, Political Group Forward, Pa r ty of 
Reconstruction, Social Radical Union. 
( N P U ) Nat ional Political Union: Nat ional Unity Party, Democrat ic 
Socialists, Venizelist Liberals. 
( U N M ) Union of the Nationally Minded: P a r t y of t he Nationally Minded, 
People's Agrarian Party. 
( D C ) Democrat ic Camp: Union of Democrat ic Leftists, Socialist Par ty 
- Union of Popular Democracy, Pa r ty of Leftist Liberals. 
( P I C ) Politically Independent Camp: Greek Renaissance Party, Pa r ty 
of the Nationally Minded. 
( N R F ) National Reconstruct ion Front: Nat ional Unity Party, People's 
Progressive Party, Panhellenic Party. 
( E P E K ) Nat ional Progressive Center Union: Progressive Liberal Center 
Party, Democract ic Progressive Party. 
( D U ) Democrat ic Union: United Democrat ic Left, Liberal Pa r ty I, Na-
tional Progressives Center Union, Farmers ' and Workers ' Rally, Demo-
cratic Party, Liberal Democrats , People 's Par ty . 
( U P P ) Union of the People's Part ies: People 's Party, People 's Social 
Party. 
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( P A D U ) Progressive Agrarian Democrat ic Union: Nat ional Progres-
sives Center Union, Farmers ' and Workers ' Rally, Democrat ic Party, 
Progressives Party. 
( E K - N D ) Center Union: Movement of New Political Forces, Social 
Democrat ic Pa r ty of Greece, Chris t ian Democrats , Center Youth of 
1961-66. 
( U L ) United Left: Communis t Party, Communis t Party-Inter ior , United 
Democrat ic Left Party. 
( P L W F ) Alliance of Progress and Left-Wing Forces: Chr is t ian Democrats , 
Communis t Party-Inter ior , Socialist Init iative, Socialist March, U.D. 
Left. 
Part i e s : 
( F W R ) Farmers ' and Workers ' Rally; ( N A P P ) Nat ional Agrar ian Pro-
gressive Par ty ; ( U D L ) United Democrat ic Left; ( P A S O K ) Socialists; 
( P S P ) Popular Social Par ty ; ( N R U ) National Radical Union; ( P P ) 
Progressive Par ty ; ( N F ) New Forces; ( C U ) Center Union; ( R C P G ) 
Revolutionary Communis t Pa r ty of Greece; ( C P G - M L ) Communis t 
Pa r ty of Greece - Marxist Leninist; ( P D S ) Pa r ty for Democrat ic So-
cialists; ( N D ) New Democracy. 
N o t e : In Greece from 1961 to 1966, a single par ty faced an already high 
electoral threshold of 15%, bu t the threshold for an electoral coalition 
of two part ies was 25%, and this threshold j u m p e d to 40% for electoral 
coalitions of more t han two parties. T h u s only large electoral coalitions 
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would be likely to contest elections, and any par ty with less t h a n 15% 
of t he electorate 's suppor t would have to withdraw, merge wi th another 
party, or join an electoral coalition wi th a much larger par ty or part ies 
(Clogg 1987). 
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Table A . l l : Electoral Coalitions in Iceland 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1946 
1949 
1953 
1956 
1959 
(Jun. ) 
1959 
(Oct.) 
1963 
1967 
1971 
1974 
1978 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1991 
1995 
1999 
19.2 
15.2 
16.0 
16.0 
13.9 
4.60 
1.8 
26.8 
No 
No 
No 
S P + S D P * (PA) 
S P + S D P * (PA) 
S P + S D P * (PA) 
S P + S D P * + 
+ N P P (PA) 
S P + S D P * ( P A ) 
No 
U L L + P P * * 
No 
No 
No 
No 
N P + H P 
No 
P A + W P + S D P + 
+ P M 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
(*) Following 1956, this electoral coalitions included the left wing of t he 
S P D only. This electoral alliance eventually merged into a single par ty 
in 1968. 
(**) Splinter only. Not included in empirical analyses. 
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P a r t i e s : 
( I P ) Independence Par ty ; ( P P ) Progressive Par ty ; ( U L L ) Union of Lib-
erals and Leftists; ( N P P ) Nat ional Preservation Par ty ; ( S P ) United So-
cialist Par ty; ( P A ) People 's Alliance; ( W P ) Woman ' s Par ty ; ( S D P ) So-
cial Democrat ic Par ty ; ( P M ) People 's Movement; ( N P ) Nat ional Par ty; 
( H P ) Humanis t Party. 
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Table A. 12: Electoral Coalitions in Ireland 1946-2002 
Election 
Year 
1948 
1951 
1954 
1957 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1973 
1977 
1981 
1982 
(Feb.) 
1982 
(Nov.) 
1987 
1989 
1992 
1997 
2002 
% vote for 
coalition 
53.11 
44.28 
48.75 
42.12 
46.42 
"48.6 
40.8 
44.0 
P E C 
No 
F G + L + 
+ C n P + C n T 
F G + L + C n T * 
No 
No 
No 
No 
F G + L 
F G + L 
No 
F G + L 
F G + L 
No 
No 
No 
F G + L + D L 
F F + P D 
No 
In Govt? 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
M R G 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(*) W i t h pledge of external suppor t from Claan n a Poblachta . 
P a r t i e s : 
( F G ) Fine Gael; ( F F ) F ianna Fail; (L) Labour; ( P D ) Progressive Democrats; 
( D L ) Democrat ic Left. 
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Table A. 13: Electoral Coalitions in Israel 1948-2002 
Election % vote for P E C Tn Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1949 
1951 
1955 
1959 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1973 
1977 
1981 
1984 
1988 
1992 
1996 
1999 
12.2 
4.7 
4.7 
21.3 
21.7 
46.2 
30.2 
39.6 
1.4 
3.8 
33.4 
24.6 
11.6 
37.1 
36.6 
31.9 
34.9 
4.0 
31.1 
24.9 
9.6 
25.8 
14.1 
20.2 
3.0 
3.7 
U R F 
No 
Torah Front 
Torah Front 
No 
Gahal 
Gaha l 
Maarakh 
Likud Bloc 
Maarakh 
Moked 
Torah Front 
Likud Bloc 
Maarakh 
D M C 
Likud Bloc 
Maarakh 
• Likud Bloc 
Maarakh 
HaTeh iya+ 
+ T s o m e t 
Likud Bloc 
Likud Bloc 
Meretz 
L G T 
Likud Bloc 
One Israel 
National Union 
Yahadut HaTorah 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
"No 
Yes 
Yes 
. N o 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No** 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No. 
Yes 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
No* 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
(*) T h e M R G Datase t includes these coalitions as single part ies. 
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(**) Joined the government after four months . 
(***) T h e Pr ime Minister was directly elected by the voters in 1996 and 
1999. 
Coal i t ions : 
U R F ( U n i t e d R e l i g i o u s Front) : Mizrahi, HaPoel HaMizrahi , Aguda t 
Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel 
T o r a h R e l i g i o u s Front: Aguda t Israel and Poalei Aguda t Israel 
Gahal : Liberal Pa r ty and Herut 
L i k u d B loc : Liberal Party, Herut , Free Center , Laam, Movement for a 
Greater Israel, S t a t e List 
M a a r a k h (Alignment): Labor Pa r ty and M a p a m 
M o k e d : Maki and Rakah (The Communis t P a r t y of Israel was founded 
in 1949, and in 1965 broke into two factions, Maki and Rakah. T h e y 
formed an electoral list together in 1973.) 
D M C (Democrat ic Movement for Change): Shinui and Free Center 
M e r e t z : Shinui, M a p a m and Ra tz 
O n e Israel: Labor and Gesher and Meimad 
L G T : Likud Bloc, Gesher and Tsomet 
Y a h a d u t H a T o r a h : Aguda t Israel and Degel HaTorah 
N a t i o n a l U n i o n : Moledet, Herut and Tekuma 
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Table A. 14: Electoral Coalit ions in Italy 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? ' M R G 
Year coalition 
1948 
1953 
1958 
1963 
1968 
1972 
1976 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1992 
1994* 
1996 
2001 
0.6 
34.3 
15.7 
46.4 
43.4 
42.1 
35.0 
45.4 
No 
Communi tyf 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Progressive 
Alliance 
Pac t for I taly 
Pole of 
Good Government 
Olive Tree I + R C * * 
Freedom Pole 
Olive Tree II 
House of Freedom 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes** 
No 
No 
Yes 
(1) 
Yes 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
No 
No 
(f) This was a local electoral coalition. Not included in any empirical 
analyses. 
(*) In 1993 Electoral system changed from proport ional representat ion 
to a mixed sys tem with single-member distr icts and some P R . T h e % 
vote for coalition is taken from the P R results. 
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(**) Although the RC (Communis t Refoundation) was a member of t h e 
electoral alliance, it did not enter government. However, it did suppor t 
it. 
(1) M R G datase t does not include Socialist Party, Social Christ ians, or 
Socialist Renewal. 
(2) M R G datase t does not include Chris t ian Democrat ic Center , Demo-
crat ic Union of the Left, Liberal Democrat ic Pole. 
(3) M R G datase t does not include the Prodi Group or t he Sardinian 
Action Party. 
(4) M R G datase t t rea ts Chris t ian Democra ts as single party. 
Coal i t i ons : 
C o m m u n i t y : Peasants ' Party, Sardinian Action Party. 
P r o g r e s s i v e Al l iance : Pa r ty of the Democrat ic Left, Communis t Re-
foundation, Greens, Network, Democrat ic Alliance, Socialist Party, So-
cial Christians, Socialist Renewal. 
P a c t for I ta ly: Popular Party, Segui Pac t . 
P o l e of G o o d G o v e r n m e n t : Forza Italia, National Alliance, Nor thern 
League, Panella List-Reformers, Chris t ian Democrat ic Center , Demo-
crat ic Union of t he Left, Liberal Democrat ic Pole. 
F r e e d o m Pole: Forza Italia, Nat ional Alliance, Chris t ian Democrat ic 
Center, United Chris t ian Democrats . 
O l i v e T r e e I: Pa r ty of the Democra t ic Left, Prodi Group, Dini List-
Renewed Italy, Green Federat ion. 
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H o u s e of F r e e d o m : Forza Italia, National Alliance, Nor thern League, 
Union of Chris t ian and Center Democra ts (formerly the Chris t ian Demo-
cratic Center and the United Chris t ian Democrats) , New I tal ian Socialist 
Party. 
Ol ive T r e e II: P a r t y of Democrat ic Left, I tal ian People 's Party, Democrats , 
Dini-List-Renewed Italy, Democrat ic Union for Europe, Green Federa-
tion, Italian Democrat ic Socialist Party, Pa r ty of I tal ian Communis ts . 
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Table A.15: Electoral Coalit ions in J a p a n 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1946 
1949 
1952 
1953 
1955 
1958 
1960 
1963 
1967 
1969 
1972 
1976 
1979 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1990 
1993 
1996 
2000 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
C G P + D S P f 
C G P + J S P f 
C G P + D S P f 
C G P + D S P + J S P ( f ) 
C G P + J S P f 
C G P + D S P f 
C G P + D S P + J S P f 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
(f) Coalition formed in some districts, b u t not nation-wide. 
Part i e s : Clean Government Pa r ty ( C G P ) ; Democra t ic Socialist Par ty 
( D S P ) ; J a p a n Socialist Pa r ty ( J S P ) . 
N o t e : Par t ies in J a p a n do form electoral coalitions for some mayoral and 
gubernator ia l elections. See Christensen (2000) and Johnson (2000) for 
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further discussion. In legislative elections, electoral cooperat ion agree-
ments are somet imes made in some districts, b u t these are not nat ional 
agreements and thus I have not included t h e m in t he empirical analyses. 
There were a number of formal agreements m a d e between various part ies 
in t he 1996 elections, for instance, bu t the electoral coordination seemed 
to occur on a distr ict-by-distr ict level and was not pa r t of a nat ional 
electoral coalition (Christensen 2000, 119). 
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Table A. 16: Electoral Coalit ions in Luxembourg 1946-
2002 
Election 
Year 
1954* 
1959 
1964 
1968 
1974 
1979 
1984 
1989 
1994 
1999 
% vote for 
coalition 
68.45 
6.64 
1.1 
9.91 
P E C 
No 
No 
No 
L S A P + C S V 
No 
. E F + S I 
No 
N. Ecol.f 
G A P + G L E I 
No 
In Govt? 
No 
No 
No 
No5 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
M R G 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1 par ty 
T h e elections of 1949 and 1951 were par t ia l legislative elections, and 
thus are not included. 
(5) T h e LSAP was prevented from entering the government coalition by 
its t r ade union ( the CSV did want to form the government coalition 
based on the electoral coalition). 
(f) T h e Ecologists for the Nor th were an alliance of GLEI and G A P in 
the Nor th Consti tuency. Not included in any empirical analyses. 
P a r t i e s : 
( C S V ) Chris t ian Democrats; ( L S A P ) Socialists; ( G A P ) Al ternat ive 
Green Par ty ; ( G L E I ) Green Left Ecological Initiative; ( E F ) Forcibly 
Enrolled; (SI) Independent Socialists. 
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Table A. 17: Electoral Coalit ions in Mal ta 1964-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1966 
1971 
1976 
1981 
1987 
1992 
1996 
1998 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Table A. 18: Electoral Coalit ions in the Nether lands 1946-
2002 
Election 
Year 
1946 
1948 
1952 
1956 
1959 
1963 
1967 
1971 
1972 
1977 
1981 
1982 
1986 
1989 
1994 
1998 
2002 
% vote for 
coalition 
33.70 
36.29 
31.89 
35.90 
52.00 
67.19 
4.10 
62.7 
P E C 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No • 
No 
P v d A + D 6 6 + P P R 
P v d A + D 6 6 + P P R 
A R P + C H U + K V P 
P v d A + P P R 
No 
No 
C D A + V V D 
P v d A + C D A 
C P N + P P R + E V P 
No 
D 6 6 + P v d A + V V D 
No 
In Govt? 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes* 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
M R G 
Yes 
Yes 
1 par ty 
Yes ' 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
(*) Following caretaker government 
Part i e s : 
( P v d A ) Social Democrats ; ( D 6 6 ) Liberal Democrats; ( P P R ) Radical 
Par ty ; ( C H U ) Chris t ian Historical Union; ( A R P ) Ant i -Revolut ionary 
Par ty ; ( K V P ) Catholic People 's P a r t y (Arp, CHU and K V P merged to 
form the Chris t ian Democrat Appea l ( C D A ) in 1979.); ( W D ) Liber-
als; ( C P N ) Communis t Par ty ; ( P P R ) Radical Par ty ; ( P S P ) Pacifist 
227 
Socialist Par ty; ( E V P ) Evangelical People 's Pa r ty (CPN, P P R , and 
E V P merged to form a single par ty in 1990.). 
228 
Table A. 19: Electoral Coalitions in New Zealand 1946-
2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Gov t? M R G 
Year coalition 
1946 
1949 
1951 
1954 
1957 
1960 
1963 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1975 
1978 
1981 
1984 
1987 
1990 5.2 M M + N L P N o No 
1993 
1996 
1999 46.4 A L + L A B Yes No 
2002 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
+ N L
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Part i e s : 
( M M ) Mana Motuhake; ( N L P ) New Labor P a r t y ( N L P s tood in the 
general seats and Mana Motuhake s tood in the Maori seats.); ( A L ) 
Alliance Par ty ; ( L A B ) New Zealand Labour Par ty . 
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Table A.20: Electoral Coalitions in Norway 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1949 
1953 
1957 
1961 
1965 
1969 
1973 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1989 
1993 
1997 
2001 
49.47 
48.88 
11.20 
45.78 
47.77 
45.28 
37.19 
26.04 
22.00 
No 
No 
No 
No 
S P + H + V + K R F 
S P + H + V + K R F 5 
C P + S P P + W I C 
H + K R F + S P 
H + K R F + S P 
H + K R F + S P 
H + K R F + S P 
No 
K R F + S P + V 
K R F + S P + V 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
1 par ty 
Yes 
Yes* 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
(5) Counted as pre-electoral pact in Mar t in k Stevenson (2001). 
(*) Initially, a Conservative Par ty minori ty government formed, with 
par l iamentary suppor t from the Chris t ian People 's P a r t y and the Center 
Party. (After the election, the three part ies could not agree on abort ion 
policy.) In 1983, all three joined the government . 
P a r t i e s : 
(A) Labor Par ty ; ( S P ) Center Par ty; (H) Conservative Par ty ; (V) Lib-
eral Par ty ; ( K R F ) Chris t ian People's Par ty ; ( C P ) Communis t Par ty ; 
( S P P ) Socialist People 's Par ty ; ( W I C ) Worker 's Information Commit-
tee. 
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Table A.21: Electoral Coalitions in Por tugal 1975-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1975 
1976 
1979 
1980 
1983 
1985 
1987 
1991 
1995 
1999 
• 
2002 
46.30 
19.51 
27.80 
17.32 
48.30 
18.69 
15.97 
12.46 
8.80 
8.60 
2.46 
7.00 
2.80 
No 
No 
S D + C D S + P M P 
P C P + M D P 
P S + U E D S + A S D I 
P C P + M D P 
S D + C D S + 
+ P M P + R e f 
P C P + M D P + 
+Greens 
P C P + M D P + 
+Greens 
CDU 
CDU 
No 
CDU 
UBL 
CDU 
UBL 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
not Ref. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1 par ty 
No 
No 
No 
No 
P a r t i e s : 
( P C P ) Communis t Par ty ; ( M D P ) Por tuguese Democrat ic Movement; 
( C D S ) Center Social Democrats ; ( S D ) Social Democrats ; ( D I ) Demo-
crat ic Intervention; (Ref . ) Reformists; ( P S ) Socialist Par ty ; ( U E D S ) 
Left Social Democrat ic Union; ( A S D I ) Independent Social Democrats ; 
( P R D ) Pa r ty of Democrat ic Renovation; ( P M P ) Popular Monarchist 
Party. 
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Coal i t i ons : 
( C D U ) Uni tar ian Democrat ic Coalition: Communis t Party, Greens. 
U B L United Block of the Left: Worker 's Revolutionary Par ty ; Demo-
crat ic People 's Union; Ext reme Left (Politica XXI). 
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Table A.22: Electoral Coalitions in Spain 1977-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1977* 
1979 
1982 
1986 
1989 
34.52 
9.35 
4.47 
2.82 
0.34 
0.20 
0.10 
5.97 
10.82 
2.70 
0.48 
0.40 
0.21 
0.96 
23.64 
48.4 
3.69 
0.48 
0.20 
26.12 
4.63 
5.04 
0.50 
0.20 
0.10 
9.13 
5.07 
0.52 
U CD 
P C E + C S 
P S P + F S P 
C D C + E D C f 
BLf 
UGf 
G N P B f 
A P + P D P + P L 
P C E + C S 
CiUf 
BLf 
G N P B f 
UGf 
HBf 
A P + P D P 
P S O E + P A D 
CiUf 
BLf 
UGf 
A P + P D P + P L 
P C E + left 
CiUf 
BLf 
UGf 
G N P B f 
IU 
CiUf 
BLf 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
1 pa r ty 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
1 par ty 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Table A.22: Electoral Coalitions in Spain 1977-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
0.20 G N P B f No No 
1993 
1996 
2000 
9.63 
4.98 
4.64 
10.64 
39.6 
4.20 
1.30 
IU 
CiUf 
CiUf 
IU 
P S O E + I U 
CiUf 
G N P B f 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
(*) Const i tuent Assembly a n d Legislative Assembly (Lopez P i n a 1985, 
30). 
(f) These are local or regional electoral coalitions. Not included in any 
empirical analyses. 
Coal i t i ons : 
( I U ) United Left Coalition: Spanish Communis t Par ty , Communis t 
P a r t y of the Peoples of Spain, Ca ta lan Unified Socialist Party, Pro-
gressive Federation, Pa r ty of Socialist Action, Uni ta r ian Cand ida tu re of 
Workers, Berdak-Les Verds a n d Republ ican Left. 
( U C D ) Union of the Democrat ic Centre: electoral coalition of 14 center 
and right-wing part ies t h a t eventually merged into single par ty in 1978. 
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( A P ) Popular Alliance: electoral alliance wi th a round 7 conservative 
const i tuent parties. By 1978, the coalition had split , losing some con-
servative members and gaining some modera te ones. 
( C i U ) Convergence and Union: Democrat ic Convergence of Catalonia 
and the Democrat ic Union of Catalonia. 
( U G ) Unidade Galega: electoral coalition of small Galician parties, 
known as the Socialist Galega Block in 1982 and t h e Socialist Galega-
Left Galega in 1986.) 
( G N P B ) Galician National Popular Block: electoral coalition in which 
the Marxist Union do Pobo Galego was the dominant- party. 
(BL) Basque Left: electoral coalition of left-wing Basque parties. 
( H B ) Herri Ba tasuna (United People): an electoral alliance of extreme 
left-wing Basque part ies. 
P a r t i e s : 
( P D P ) Chris t ian Democrats ; ( P L ) Liberals; ( E D C ) Ca ta lan Demo-
cratic Left; ( C D C ) Democrat ic Convergence of Cata lonia ; ( P C E ) Com-
munists; ( C S ) Ca ta lan Unified Socialist Par ty ; ( P S O E ) Socialists; ( P A D ) 
Par ty of Democrat ic Action; (CS) Ca ta lan Unified Socialist Par ty ; ( P S P ) 
Popular Socialist Par ty ; ( F S P ) remnant of Federat ion of Socialist Par-
ties. 
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Table A.23: Electoral Coalitions in Sweden 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1948 
1952 
1956 
1958 
1960 
1964 
1968 
1970 
1973 
1976 
1979 
1982 
1985 
1988 
1991 
1994 
1998 
2002 
47.48 
56.79 
1.40 
0.30 
1.70 
0.90 
48.81 
9.4* 
50.73 
12.42 
31.05 
C O N + L I B + C E 
S D + C E 
No 
No 
No 
CCf 
MPf 
Coalition '68f 
MPf 
No 
C E + L I B + C O N 
SKP+lef t* 
C E + L I B + C O N 5 
No5 
No 
C E + C D 
No 
L I B + C O N 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(*) Keesing's repor ted an alliance, bu t only ment ioned a single par ty 
(SKP) . 
(f) Regional coalitions only. Not included in any empirical analyses. 
5
 Considered to be an electoral pact in Mar t in k Stevenson (2001). They 
say the same coalition formed prior to the 1979 election. 
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Part i e s : 
( S D ) Social Democrats ; ( S K P ) Left Pa r ty ; ( C E ) Center Par ty ; (LIB) 
Liberal Par ty ; ( C O N ) Conservative Par ty ; ( C D ) Chris t ian Democrat ic 
Pa r ty ; ( N D ) N e w Democracy Party. 
Coal i t i ons : 
C C Citizens' Coalition: electoral alliance of CON, CE, and LIB in four 
districts; C o a l i t i o n '68: electoral alliance of CON and LIB in four 
districts; M P Middle Parties: electoral alliance of C E and LIB in one 
district . 
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Table A.24 Electoral Coalit ions in Switzerland 1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1947 
1951 
1955 
1959 
1963 
1967 
1971 
1975 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1991 
1995 
1999 
N o t e : Par t ies in Switzerland often form electoral coalitions in par t icular 
cantons, b u t these are not nation-wide. It is t rue t ha t the 'magic for-
mula ' used to determine coalition government composition means t h a t 
everyone knows in advance which par t ies will end up in government . I 
do not consider this to const i tu te a pre-electoral coalition, as t he par t ies 
in question are not coordinat ing their electoral strategies or campaigns. 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Table A.25: Electoral Coali t ions in the United Kingdom 
1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1950 
1951 
1955 
1959 
1964 
1966 
1970 
1974 
(Feb.) 
1974 
(Oct.) 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1992 
1997 
2001 
25.37 
22.57 
0.97 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
L ib+SocDem 
Lib+SocDem 
G r e e n + P C f 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
(f) Not included in any empirical analyses. 
P a r t i e s : 
( C O N ) Conservative Par ty ; ( L A B ) Labour Par ty ; (Lib) Liberals; ( S o c D e m ) 
Social Democrat ic Par ty ; ( G r e e n ) Green Par ty; ( P C ) Plaid Cymru . 
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Table A.26: Electoral Coali t ions in t he Uni ted S ta tes 
1946-2002 
Election % vote for P E C In Govt? M R G 
Year coalition 
1946 
1948 
1950 
1952 
1954 
1956 
1958 
1960 
1962 
1964 
1966 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1974 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1988 
1990 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
2000 
2002 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coalit ion D a t a 
Country Source 
Austral ia 
Austr ia 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France IV 
Budge et ai. (2001), Butler (1999) 
Klingemann et al. (1994) 
Mackie k Rose (1991), McAllister (2003) 
Aust . Election Commission (www.aec.gov.au) 
http:/'/electionworld. org 
Caraman i (2000), Dreijmanis (1982) 
Muller (2000), Powell (2000) 
Keesing's Record of World Events 
Caramani (2000), Dewachter (1987) 
Dewachter k Clijsters (1982) 
DeWinter et al. (2000), Downs (1998) 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Powell (2000) 
European Journal of Political Research (var.) 
http://electionworld. org 
Mackie k Rose (1991) 
http: //www. elections, ca/ 
Arter (1999), Caramani (2000)' 
Damgaard (2000), Elklit (2002) 
Esaiasson k Heidar (2000) 
Fi tzmaur ice (1981), Mackie k Rose (1991) 
Nousiainen (2000), Powell (2000) 
Ar ter (1999), Ca raman i (2000) 
Esaiasson k Heidar (2000) 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Powell (2000) 
Sundberg (2002) 
Caramani (2000), Cole k Campbel l (1989) 
Williams, Goldey k Harrison (1970) 
241 
Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coali t ion D a t a 
Count ry Source 
France V 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Boy k Roche (1993), Bell k Criddle (1984) 
Brechon (1995), Char io t (1994) 
Char iot (1980), Char iot (1971) 
Cayrol (1971), Cole k Campbel l (1989) 
Jaffre (1980), Mackie k Rose (1991) 
Thiebaul t (2000) 
www. election-politique. com/ 
http://elections2002.sciences-po.fr/ 
Caramani (2000), Conrad t (1978) 
Helms (2004), Powell (2000), 
Pulzer (1983), Saalfeld (2000) 
Schoen (1999) 
New York Times (for 2002 election). 
Caramani (2000), Clogg (1987) 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Papayannakis (1981) 
Siaroff (2000), Veremis (1981) 
Caramani (2000), Esaiasson k Heidar (2000) 
Grimsson (1982), Hardarson (2002) 
Indridason (2004), Krist jansson (1998) 
Lijphart (1994), Mackie k Rose (1991) 
http .-//electionworld. org 
Caramani (2000), Collins (2003) 
Farrell k Farrell (1987), Gallagher (2003) 
Gallagher (1982), Gar ry et al. (2003) 
Girvin (1993), Laver (1998a) 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Mair (1999) 
Mair (1987), Marsh k Mitchell (1999) 
Mitchell (1999), Murphy (2003) 
Powell (2000), Sinnot (1987) 
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Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coalition D a t a 
Count ry Source 
Israel 
I taly 
J a p a n 
Luxembourg 
Mal t a 
Nether lands 
New Zealand 
Hazen (1999), http://electionworld.org 
http://www. knesset. gov. il 
http://lcweb2. loc.gov/frd/cs/ 
Keesing 's Record of World Events 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Mershon (2002) 
Newell (2000), Powell (2000) 
Rhodes (1995), Verzichelli k C o t t a (2000) 
http://electionworld. org 
Christensen (2000), Hrebenar (2000) 
Johnson (2000), Mackie k Rose (1991) 
Dumont k Win te r (2000) 
Mackie k Rose (1991) 
http://electionworld. org 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Siaroff (2000) 
http://www. maltadata. com 
Caramani (2000), Daalder (1987) 
De Jong k Pi jnenburg (1986) 
Irwin (1999), Kitschelt (1994) 
Napel (1999), Powell (2000) 
T immermans k Andeweg (2000) 
http://electionworld. org 
Keesing's Record of World Events 
Budge et al. (2001), Geddes (2004) 
Mackie k Rose (1991) 
Vowles (2002), http://www.nzes.org 
http://electionworld. org 
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Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coalition D a t a 
Count ry Source 
Norway 
Por tuga l 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Arter (1999), Ca raman i (2000) 
Esaiasson k Heidar (2000), Hancock (1998) 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Maor (1999) 
Rommetved t (1992), Shaffer (1998) 
Valen k Mar t inussen (1977) 
http://electionworld. org 
Caramani (2000), Lloyd-Jones (2002) 
Magone (2000), Magone (1999) 
Mackie k Rose (1991) 
http .-//memory, loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome. html 
Caramani (2000), Colomer (2001) 
de Es teban k Lopez Guerra (1985) 
Gillespie (1995), Hopkin(1999) 
Laver k Schofield (1998), Lopez P i n a (1985) 
Lopez-Pintor (1985a), Lopez-Pintor (19856) 
Mackie k Rose (1991) 
http://electionworld. org 
Caraman i (2000), Bergman (1995) 
Hadenius (1990), Mackie k Rose (1991), 
Powell (2000), Sanners tedt k Sjolin (1992) 
Sarlvik (2002), Sarlvik (1977) 
Keesing's Record of World Events 
Caramani (2000), Caramani (1996) 
Mackie k Rose (1991), Powell (2000) 
Uni ted Kingdom Caraman i (2000), Kitschelt (1994) 
Rasmussen (1991) 
Uni ted Sta tes Mackie k Rose (1991) 
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